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Abstract:Within the cognitive sciences, most researchers assume that it is the job of linguists to investigate how language is represented,
and that they do so largely by building theories based on explicit judgments about patterns of acceptability –whereas it is the task of
psychologists to determine how language is processed, and that in doing so, they do not typically question the linguists’
representational assumptions. We challenge this division of labor by arguing that structural priming provides an implicit method of
investigating linguistic representations that should end the current reliance on acceptability judgments. Moreover, structural priming
has now reached sufficient methodological maturity to provide substantial evidence about such representations. We argue that
evidence from speakers’ tendency to repeat their own and others’ structural choices supports a linguistic architecture involving a
single shallow level of syntax connected to a semantic level containing information about quantification, thematic relations, and
information structure, as well as to a phonological level. Many of the linguistic distinctions often used to support complex (or
multilevel) syntactic structure are instead captured by semantics; however, the syntactic level includes some specification of “missing”
elements that are not realized at the phonological level. We also show that structural priming provides evidence about the consistency
of representations across languages and about language development. In sum, we propose that structural priming provides a new basis for
understanding the nature of language.
Keywords: language production; linguistics; mental representation; psycholinguistics; semantics; structural priming; syntax
The cognitive science of language is concerned with both
linguistic representations and how those representations
are used in processing. All researchers, whether nominally
psychologists or linguists, should seek to address both ques-
tions. In practice, however, linguists have focused largely
on representation and used a single method (acceptability
judgments) to investigate it, whereas psychologists have
not investigated representation but instead imported lin-
guistic theories into their accounts. In this paper, we
argue instead that researchers need not, and should not,
be restricted to acceptability judgments when investigating
linguistic representation.
This proposal is not new but was previously just a theo-
retical possibility. It now appears, however, that structural
priming – the tendency to repeat linguistic structure
across utterances – allows researchers to investigate linguis-
tic representations in a way that has many advantages over
acceptability judgments. Most important, it has now
reached maturity, in that hundreds of studies have used
this method; and many of them are informative, not
merely about language processing, but also about linguistic
representations themselves. In fact, we argue that evidence
from structural priming supports quite specific proposals
about linguistic structure relating to syntax and semantics,
so that it can be used to develop linguistic theory and dis-
criminate among competing accounts. Thus, the domi-
nance of acceptability judgments can be ended, and the
understanding of linguistic representation can develop to
a greater extent than before.
This paper describes our theoretical claims, linguistic
account, and applications. In section 1, we motivate the
use of structural priming to investigate mental representa-
tion and present the advantages of structural priming over
acceptability judgments. In section 2, we consider what the
extensive evidence using this method tells us about linguis-
tic representation. Section 3 discusses the implications of
our account.
1. Why a psychological account of linguistic
structure is now possible
A complete theory of human language requires characteri-
zation of both people’s linguistic representations and the
processes that operate over those representations. There-
fore, issues of representation and processing are in
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principle of interest to both linguists and psychologists,
albeit from different perspectives. In practice, however,
linguistic representation (in particular, with respect to syn-
tactic and semantic structure) has for the last four decades
been largely the domain of linguists and has been studied
primarily using a single approach in which linguists or
their informants make explicit metalinguistic judgments
about the grammatical (or semantic) acceptability of indi-
vidual sentences – henceforth, acceptability judgments.
Such judgments constitute the dataset upon which theories
of linguistic representation are based.
In this paper, we propose that the representations under-
lying language use need not and, in fact, should not be
investigated only via such judgments. Rather, we suggest
that they can be examined directly through a behavioral
measure that has been used widely in psychological
research to investigate the representation of a range of
information types. This method is priming: If processing
one stimulus affects the subsequent processing of another
stimulus, then these stimuli share some aspect of their rep-
resentation. Hence, structural priming effects, where pro-
cessing one utterance affects the processing of another
utterance that shares an aspect of linguistic structure but
is otherwise unrelated, provide evidence about linguistic
representation. In the classic demonstration, Bock (1986)
had participants repeat active or passive sentences and
then describe pictures depicting transitive events. She
found that they were more likely to use a passive target sen-
tence (e.g., The church is being struck by lightning) after
repeating a passive prime sentence (The referee was
punched by one of the fans) than after repeating an active
(One of the fans punched the referee). As subsequent
studies have demonstrated, these effects appear to arise
from repetition of aspects of abstract linguistic structure
and occur largely outside of awareness (Pickering & Ferre-
ira 2008).
They cannot be explained in terms of repetition of partic-
ular words. Bock (1989) showed that participants tended to
use prepositional object (PO) dative sentences (The girl is
handing a paintbrush to the man) rather than double
object (DO) sentences (The girl is handing the man a paint-
brush) after a dative sentence that did not include to (The
secretary baked the cake for her boss). Therefore,
priming could not be due to word repetition, because the
PO and DO target sentences share all words except to.
We also can rule out explanations couched entirely in
terms of meaning. First, the alternative responses (e.g.,
PO and DO, or active and passive) denote the same
events, in that they both can be used to describe the
same picture. Second, Messenger et al. (2012b) found
priming between sentences describing different event
types (e.g., Experiencer-Theme: The king is being
ignored by the bear, and Agent-Patient: The doctor gets
licked by the cow). Additionally, Hartsuiker and Westen-
berg (2000) found that Dutch participants repeated the
order of auxiliary and main verb (was geblokkeerd [“was
blocked”] vs. geblokkeerd was [“blocked was”]), even
though they do not differ in meaning. Moreover, the
effects cannot be explained by repetition of metrical struc-
ture, because The girl is handing a paintbrush to the man
was not primed by Susan brought a book to study,
though it was primed by the metrically equivalent Susan
brought a book to Stella (Bock & Loebell 1990). Overall,
these results are consistent with priming of representations
that are specified for syntactic information but not seman-
tic, lexical, or phonological information. This conclusion is
supported by studies showing priming of many other syn-
tactic constructions, such as noun-phrase structure
(Cleland & Pickering 2003) and verb-particle placement
(Konopka & Bock 2009).
Priming, however, is also informative about other aspects
of linguistic structure, including many components of
semantics including thematic roles, quantification, and
information structure. It occurs in diverse languages (e.g.,
English, Mandarin, Basque) and between languages, and
in children, non-native speakers, amnesiacs, and aphasics.
It has been found using many experimental methods, as
well as in natural conversation (Pickering & Ferreira 2008).
It also occurs in comprehension, as indicated by choice
of structure (e.g., Branigan et al. 2005), reading time
(e.g., Traxler et al. 2014), predictive eye movements (Arai
et al. 2007; Thothathiri & Snedeker 2008a), event-related
potentials (ERPs) (Ledoux et al. 2007), and brain activity
revealed by functional magnetic resonance imaging or
fMRI (Segaert et al. 2012). Priming of comprehension
usually involves participants selecting between analyses
that have different meanings (e.g., high- or low-attached
prepositional phrases [PPs]; Branigan et al. 2005), though
experiments investigating predictions in “visual-world” par-
adigms and those using fMRI are exceptions. When both
meaning and syntax differ across conditions, it becomes
much harder to relate any priming effects to linguistic
representation.
Importantly, structural priming occurs from comprehen-
sion to production (Branigan et al. 2000; Potter &
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Lombardi 1998) to a similar extent as within production
(Bock et al. 2007; Tooley & Bock 2014), and from produc-
tion to comprehension to a similar extent as within compre-
hension (Branigan et al. 2005). Moreover, studies of
priming effects within comprehension, within production,
and between production and comprehension implicate
common neural architectures (Menenti et al. 2011;
Segaert et al. 2012; Segaert et al. 2013). These findings
are particularly important for justifying the relevance of
priming to representation. We therefore believe we can
use structural priming effects to develop a psychologically
motivated theory of syntactic representation and the way
in which it relates to semantic representation. But before
sketching this account in section 2, we need to justify
why such an account is possible in principle.
1.1. The reality of linguistic representation
The nature of linguistic representation is of fundamental
interest for experimental psychologists who are concerned
with language, because people must represent linguistic
structure to use language. Psychological theories of
language, therefore, must specify the representations
that speakers and hearers use, as well as the processes
that operate over those representations, in the same
way that theories of visual cognition specify the representa-
tions that perceivers construct as they interpret scenes
(Biederman 1987).
Understanding the nature of linguistic representation
has also been the central goal of most theoretical linguistics,
at least since the publication of Syntactic Structures
(Chomsky 1957). Linguists have attempted to provide
grammars for natural languages (i.e., precise descriptions
of the relationships that may hold between linguistic
expressions). Some linguists view such grammars as charac-
terizations of essentially “platonic” objects that have
nothing to do with the human mind (e.g., Katz 1981; see
also Langendoen & Postal 1984). Any such platonic linguis-
tics is not our concern. For most linguists, however, gram-
mars are envisaged as the knowledge that underlies
speakers’ and hearers’ use of language: “Linguistics is that
branch of psychology that focuses its attention on one spe-
cific cognitive domain and one faculty of mind, the lan-
guage faculty” (Chomsky 1980, p. 4). Its primary aim is to
construct a grammar that is psychologically real, in the
sense that “the grammar corresponds to the speaker’s inter-
nal representation of that domain” (Bresnan & Kaplan
1982, p. xxiii). Our concern is the nature of this internal
representation.
Among linguists, however, there are different views on
the relationship between this representation and language
processing (see Lewis & Phillips 2015). One possibility is
that the grammar is drawn upon directly during processing.
This is clearly the simplest approach, requiring the fewest
additional assumptions. Under this approach, evidence
about the representations involved in language processing
is clearly relevant to linguistic theory; “linguistic” and “psy-
cholinguistic” representations would be the same. (Any dis-
crepancies between evidence from processing and
acceptability judgments would be due to factors such as
processing limitations that are explicable in terms of gener-
ally accepted cognitive assumptions [Lewis & Phillips
2015].)
Other linguists assume that the grammar is not used
directly in processing – in other words, that the grammar
and the language processing system form two distinct
systems. For these researchers, processing is assumed to
involve linguistic representations, but the nature of those
representations need not constrain their theories. The
kinds of theory involving two such systems might include
those that specify a form of “universal grammar” that is
available early in development and inputs into the gram-
mars of specific languages but does not continue to be rep-
resented later in development (e.g., Clahsen & Muysken
1986), or theories in which underlying representations
are compiled into different representations that are used
during processing online (e.g., Berwick & Weinberg
1984; Fodor 1983). Moreover, linguistically motivated the-
ories tend to seek to describe the language using as parsi-
monious a representational system as possible (e.g.,
Chomsky 1995), an approach that will not necessarily be
compatible with the representations used in language pro-
cessing (e.g., Croft 2001; Jackendoff 2002).
In all such cases, however, the representations used by
the processor remain an object of enquiry that critically
pertains to the speaker’s internal representation of the lin-
guistic domain (and any theory that assumes two systems of
representation must explain how the two systems are
related). Our goal is to consider alternative (experimental)
methods to acceptability judgments that potentially address
the linguistic representations implicated in language pro-
cessing. Evidence from such methods cannot disprove
the existence of other representations. But a theory that
does not assume inaccessible representations, however, is
more parsimonious than one that does. If the two represen-
tational systems are assumed only because of apparent
incompatibility between acceptability judgment and pro-
cessing data, then it is preferable to assume a single repre-
sentation, and that different methods tap into the same
representation in slightly different ways (see Lewis & Phil-
lips 2015).
We therefore assume – in the absence of compelling evi-
dence to the contrary – that there is a single representa-
tional system for language structure, which is implicated
during language processing, and that people do not have
other (inaccessible) mental representations of language
structure. If any such representations were to exist, they
would clearly be of interest. But they do not form part of
our account, and it is for theories that propose such repre-
sentations to motivate them and to specify the mapping
between them and those used in processing.
To characterize the knowledge that speakers and hearers
draw on, researchers from both experimental psychological
and theoretical linguistic backgrounds might, in principle,
use evidence from many different sources, including
judgments of grammaticality and meaning, and evidence
from language acquisition and perceptual experiments
(Chomsky 1965, p. 37). However, Chomsky is unconvinced
by the use of processing evidence to investigate linguistic
representation. In an important footnote, he says:
One common fallacy is to assume that if some experimental
result provides counter-evidence to a theory of processing
that includes a grammatical theory T and parsing procedure
P…, then it is T that is challenged and must be changed. The
conclusion is particularly unreasonable in the light of the fact
that in general there is independent (so-called linguistic)
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evidence in support of T while there is no reason at all to believe
that P is true. (Chomsky 1981, p. 283, footnote 39)
This provides a justification for ignoring experimental
data. In practice, most linguists have adopted this approach.
Therefore, they have tended to base their theories (particu-
larly of syntax) primarily on evidence from acceptability
judgments; in particular, they have tended to ignore psycho-
logical data suggesting that people process sentences using
representations that differ from those proposed by linguists
(see Fodor et al. 1974; Wasow & Arnold 2005).
1.2. Why acceptability judgments are not enough
Acceptability judgments involve native speakers of a lan-
guage deciding whether sentences are acceptable or unac-
ceptable. Traditionally, linguists who investigate whether
sentences are grammatical usually refer to them as gram-
maticality judgments: Sentences judged grammatical
should be licensed by the grammar; sentences that are
judged ungrammatical should not be licensed by the
grammar. Acceptability judgments are a convenient
source of data, because all that is required is a native
speaker. They can provide evidence about the set of possi-
ble sentences that comprise a language, and are assumed to
give evidence concerning the structure of speakers’ inter-
nalized knowledge of language (e.g., Chomsky 1986).
Acceptability judgments historically have provided a
fertile source of evidence for hypotheses about the nature
of linguistic representation, but they pose many concerns.
Some are surmountable and relate to how they typically
have been used (e.g., Gibson & Fedorenko 2013). For
example, linguists standardly ask a single informant about
the acceptability of a few sentences. It is possible,
however, to conduct acceptability judgments as a well-
controlled psycholinguistic experiment using many
(varied) sentences, using naïve participants, controlling
for plausibility, and randomizing presentation order. It is
also possible to control for effects of previous exposure or
judgments (sentences appearing more or less acceptable
when the construction is repeated; e.g., Levelt 1972;
Luka & Barsalou 2005; Snyder 2000), a phenomenon
presumably related to structural priming.
Next, acceptability judgments face the problems associ-
ated with any explicit task. The informant’s judgments
may reflect decision-making biases. This concern is exacer-
bated when the informant is the researcher or has knowl-
edge of the theoretical questions under investigation.
Moreover, the informant may not interpret terms such as
grammatical or acceptable as the linguist intends. To all
of these concerns, linguists may respond that traditional
methods are adequate, because they have not led to
many errors (e.g., Sprouse et al. 2013) and because
native-speaker linguists can immediately detect erroneous
judgments used in theory building (e.g., Phillips 2009),
but controversy remains.
However, acceptability judgments face more fundamen-
tal problems. Most obviously, they can be used to study lin-
guistic representations only in certain populations, because
they can be elicited only from speakers who are capable of
making metalinguistic judgments. For example, they
cannot be used with children younger than 3 (nor indeed
with many 3-year-olds; Ambridge & Rowland 2013; McDa-
niel & Smith Cairns 1998). Hence, acceptability judgments
cannot be used to address some fundamental representa-
tional questions.
Another far-reaching problem is source ambiguity (Hof-
meister et al. 2013). There is no reason to believe that
acceptability judgments offer privileged access to linguistic
representation in a way that other methods do not. Accept-
ability judgments are the results of linguistic and cognitive
processes, by which people attempt to process sentences
and then make metalinguistic judgments on the results of
those acts of processing (e.g., someone cannot understand
a sentence or finds it jarring and, therefore, assumes it is
unacceptable). Thus, they implicate the same linguistic rep-
resentations involved in all acts of processing. Therefore, it
is not possible to tell whether any judgment of unaccept-
ability reflects ungrammaticality, low probability, or unpro-
cessability. For example, Bresnan (2007) found that
acceptability judgments for sentences were affected by
those sentences’ probability of occurrence. Equally,
people often judge center-embedded sentences (e.g., The
rat that the cat that the dog bit chased fled) as unacceptable,
yet most theorists follow Chomsky (1965) in assuming they
are grammatical and that people’s judgments reflect pro-
cessing difficulty. Similarly, garden-path sentences (e.g.,
The horse raced past the barn fell) often are judged unac-
ceptable, yet most theorists assume this is because people
initially misanalyze them and fail to recover (Bever 1970).
In these cases, linguists might argue that there are clear
explanations for why they are judged unacceptable (com-
plexity, confusability, ambiguity).
In other cases, however, the explanation for why a sen-
tence is unacceptable is more contentious – for example,
whether the unacceptability ofWhat did who visit? reflects
a syntactic violation (Chomsky 1995) or processing diffi-
culty (Hofmeister et al. 2013). Conversely, linguists some-
times argue that acceptable sentences are not grammatical
(e.g., It was I; Sobin 1997). In this respect, acceptability
judgments are susceptible to the same challenges as pro-
cessing data: The data are compatible with particular
grammar-processor pairings, not just with particular gram-
mars. An explanation of which sentences are acceptable
and which are not therefore seems to require a theory of
processing alongside a theory of grammaticality.
A more fundamental problem is that, even if it could
somehow be determined that a particular set of acceptabil-
ity judgments indexed grammaticality, such judgments
directly determine only set membership. That is, they
determine weak generative capacity: which sentences are
members of the set of sentences licensed by a grammar,
and which sentences are not.1 However, they cannot by
themselves determine linguistic structure. To draw infer-
ences about linguistic structure, they need to be combined
with tests about constituency.
As widely acknowledged, however, constituency struc-
ture tests are inconsistent and problematic in many ways.
Textbooks introducing such tests standardly warn that
they produce contradictory results. To give some examples:
Coordination tests support the existence of constituents
(e.g., an NP-NP constituent in The woman gave the child
a cake and the dog a bone) that other tests such as topical-
ization and it-cleft do not (and in this case, most linguistic
theories ignore the coordination test). Ellipsis and question-
short answer tests may support constituents (e.g., baked a
cake in I said he baked a cake and in fact he did so/What
did he do? Baked a cake) when topicalization and it-cleft
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tests do not (*I said he baked a cake and baked a cake he/*It
is baked a cake that he, where* indicates ungrammatical-
ity). Ellipsis tests yield obviously problematic results (e.g.,
China is a country Tom wants to visit, and he will if he
gets the money suggests that China… visit is a constituent;
Kempson et al. 1999). These are not unusual or isolated
examples, and even the most basic assumptions about con-
stituency (e.g., the structure of simple transitive sentences)
show different results for different tests. Moreover, the
basic rationale for why these specific tests should tap con-
stituent structure remains unclear (Berg 2009). In fact, it
has been proposed that they are more appropriately consid-
ered as structural heuristics rather than structural diagnos-
tics (Payne 2006).
Most important, the use of acceptability judgments, with
or without the application of constituency tests, has yielded
no consensus at all about linguistic representation. For
example, theories associated with the transformational tradi-
tion (i.e., following accounts such as Chomsky 1981;
Chomsky 1995) assume syntactic representations of consid-
erable complexity, including many more branching nodes
than words, a large number of empty categories, and exten-
sive movement of constituents. Such representations can be
interpreted as involving many syntactic levels (if movement
is interpreted as taking place in stages) and associations
between the syntactic representations and other representa-
tions such as Logical Form or LF) and Phonetic Form or PF,
which themselves input into meaning and sound. These the-
ories also make broad assumptions such as binary branching.
In contrast, theories such as Head-Driven Phrase Structure
Grammar (HPSG; Pollard & Sag 1994) make very different
assumptions, with simpler, flatter trees, and few if any empty
categories. Some theories assume grammatical functions
play a central role (e.g., Lexical-Functional Grammar
[LFG]; Kaplan & Bresnan 1982), whereas others do not.
Other theories assign a key role to “constructions” (e.g.,
Goldberg 1995) or allow overlapping constituents (e.g.,
Steedman 2000). Additionally, there is little agreement
about whether there is a clear distinction between syntactic
and lexical information, or whether most syntactic informa-
tion is stored alongside lexical items. Acceptability judg-
ments have not been able to adjudicate between these
alternatives, except insofar as one set of rules or constraints
that can generate the same set of sentences is “better” by
some metric such as parsimony or learnability (and even
on these grounds, there is disagreement).
In sum, acceptability judgments have been more suc-
cessful in inspiring accounts of linguistic representation
than in discriminating among those accounts. They have
inherent and fundamental limitations: Judgments can be
influenced easily by nonlinguistic factors; they cannot be
used at all with some populations; and, most importantly,
they do not provide direct evidence about structure.
Given these concerns, researchers concerned with linguis-
tic representations should not rely solely on such judg-
ments; they should call on additional methodologies that
are directly sensitive to structure and that avoid the limita-
tions discussed above.
1.3. Psycholinguistic approaches to linguistic
representation
Is there a different approach to linguistic representation
that is based more directly on psycholinguistic methods?
Researchers have intermittently proposed that some form
of experimental method may be informative about linguis-
tic representation (and not merely processing). In the
1960s, psychologists attempted to relate processing diffi-
culty to linguistic complexity (e.g., number of transforma-
tions; Chomsky 1965) using reaction time measures
(McMahon 1963; Miller 1962; Miller & McKean 1964).
However, it proved very difficult to control for other poten-
tially relevant factors. For example, a passive might take
longer to process than an active because a passive involves
an additional transformation (hence, greater representa-
tional complexity), or alternatively because of length,
word frequency, local or global ambiguity, and so on.
Other experimental studies tested for the existence of
empty categories, as assumed by some linguistic theories
(e.g., Chomsky 1981) but not others. McElree and Bever
(1989) found that people were faster to decide whether a
critical phrase had occurred in a sentence if an empty cat-
egory (or “gap”) corresponding to the phrase occurred at
the end of the sentence than if the sentence had no
empty category. They argued that comprehenders reacti-
vated the empty category at its location, and hence, that
empty elements are mentally represented (see also Nicol
& Swinney 1989). But these results do not require empty
categories, and may instead be due to semantic processes.
Pickering & Barry (1991) accordingly argued against the
representation of empty categories in sentences such as
In which pot did you put the cup? because people appear
to relate in which pot to the verb put as soon as they
reach the verb (Sag & Fodor 1994; Traxler & Pickering
1996). Gibson and Hickok (1993), however, proposed an
account of these data in which people project (i.e.,
predict) an empty category when they reach the verb. In
accord with Chomsky (1981), Pickering and Barry’s data
can be explained by either a bottom-up parser (parsing pro-
cedure P1) using a grammar without empty categories
(grammatical theory T1), or a top-down parser (P2) using
a grammar with empty categories (T2). More recent
attempts to use processing evidence to adjudicate among
competing linguistic theories of ellipsis, quantification,
and scalar implicature have faced analogous problems
(Lewis & Phillips 2015).
Other types of experimental work are relevant, in princi-
ple, to linguistic representation but do not provide the basis
for a general methodology for understanding linguistic rep-
resentation. Sprouse et al. (2012) found that the acceptabil-
ity of sentences violating island constraints (e.g., What do
you wonder whether John bought? ) is unrelated to mea-
sures of working-memory capacity and therefore argued
that such island constraints are likely to constitute part of
grammar. Such research may constrain linguistic theories
but relates to quite specific phenomena. Some researchers
have used patterns of agreement errors (the road to the
islands; e.g., Bock & Miller 1991) to draw conclusions sup-
porting linguistic frameworks incorporating movement and
empty categories (Franck et al. 2010), but others assume
that they are informative about processing mechanisms
(e.g., the scope of utterance planning; Gillespie & Pearl-
mutter 2013). Research that uses young children’s errors
to infer their underlying representations runs into the
same problem of distinguishing representational from pro-
cessing explanations (Ambridge & Rowland 2013). Studies
using ERPs show different signatures for implausible
versus ungrammatical sentences (e.g., Kutas & Hillyard
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
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1980; Osterhout & Holcomb 1992), but it is unclear
whether there is a specifically semantic or syntactic compo-
nent in the ERP waveform (e.g., Kim & Osterhout 2005;
Nieuwland et al. 2013). Likewise, fMRI studies do not
unambiguously identify brain regions that are associated
with particular levels of linguistic representation (Price
2010).
In fact, most psychologists of language largely have shied
away from making claims about linguistic representation
and instead adopt the representations proposed by lin-
guists. A classic example is Frazier’s (1987) garden-path
theory, which assumes that comprehenders initially select
the syntactically simpler analysis of an ambiguous utter-
ance. The theory makes specific syntactic assumptions
(e.g., ternary branching structure is possible), which
affect its predictions. However, experiments concerned
with the theory (e.g., Frazier & Rayner 1982) have not
attempted to test whether these assumptions are correct.
Many alternative accounts of parsing are, if anything,
even less tempted to encroach on the territory of linguistic
representation (e.g., MacDonald et al. 1994).
In sum, linguists and psychologists agree that linguistic
structure is mentally represented. But acceptability judg-
ments are an imperfect and limited way of investigating
such representations, and psychological approaches have
not provided a general method for investigating linguistic
representation. However, we now propose that structural
priming is a very promising method that can be used sys-
tematically to address many linguistic questions.
1.4. Can structural priming be used to investigate
linguistic representation?
Priming effects occur when processing a stimulus with par-
ticular characteristics affects subsequent processing of
another stimulus with the same or related characteristics
(Schacter 1987). Such effects are found pervasively
throughout cognition. In visual perception, for example,
object recognition can be facilitated by previous exposure
to a stimulus with shared visual features (Biederman &
Cooper 1991). Psychologists use such effects to investigate
the nature of underlying representations. The logic under-
lying priming methodologies is that exposure to a prime
stimulus facilitates (or inhibits) particular representations,
making them more (or less) amenable to subsequent
reuse if they can be applied to a subsequent target stimu-
lus.2 If processing of a stimulus A is affected by prior pro-
cessing of B to a greater extent than by prior processing of
C, then the representation underlying A is more similar to
the representation underlying B than it is to the represen-
tation underlying C. By careful investigation, we can deter-
mine how A and B are related, and use this relationship to
inform a general theory of representation. For example,
Biederman and Cooper manipulated the extent to which
prime and target stimuli shared visual attributes such as
vertices and convex/concave components, and used their
results to propose a theory of visual object representation.
Such effects provide an implicit measure of representa-
tion that is independent of any explicit response (e.g.,
regarding well-formedness, presence of particular charac-
teristics, similarity). They occur without awareness or
explicit recall of the prime stimulus and are generally
believed to be automatic and resource free (e.g.,
Dehaene et al. 1998; Forster & Davis 1984). In other
words, priming effects arguably implicate a direct relation-
ship between representation and behavior.
Priming paradigms have been applied to language exten-
sively. For example, participants are faster at judging that a
target stimulus is a word (e.g., nurse) if they have just
responded to a semantically (or associatively) related prime
word (doctor) than an unrelated word (table; Meyer &
Schvaneveldt 1971). By manipulating the relationship
between prime and target, researchers have constructed
detailed models of the psychological representation of
lexical entries (McNamara 2005). For example, Marslen-
Wilson et al. (1994) found priming between words that
shared a semantically transparent stem (e.g., observation-
observant) but not between words that had a common
historical derivation but did not share a semantically trans-
parent stem (e.g., apart-apartment) and used these findings
to argue that the former had a decomposable (bimorphemic)
representation whereas the latter did not. They noted that
this psychological evidence contrasted with theoretical and
historical linguistic analyses.
We argue that priming can be used similarly to investigate
the representation of any aspect of linguistic structure. Thus,
we could demonstrate changes in some aspect of behavior
(e.g., likelihood of a particular response, response time, pat-
terns of brain activity) following a sentence with particular
characteristics and draw inferences about the representa-
tions that underlie the prime and target, without requiring
participants to make any explicit judgment.
Experiments using structural priming paradigms avoid
many problems typically associated with acceptability judg-
ments. They standardly use many sentences and many
naïve participants, control for plausibility differences and
effects of previous exposure, and randomize presentation
order (though we have noted that these controls can be
applied to acceptability judgments). Because they use
implicit behavioral measures, they can avoid decision-
making biases and problems about informants’ interpreta-
tion of acceptable and unacceptable (or grammatical and
ungrammatical). For the same reason, they can be used
to investigate representations in participants who cannot
make appropriate metalinguistic judgments or who are
indeed unable to make any explicit response – for
example, young children or language-impaired patients.
Furthermore, because priming is based on the processor
recognizing that two utterances are related, such experi-
ments provide evidence that goes beyond set membership.
Finally, investigations of priming between comprehension
and production are directly informative about representa-
tion (rather than aspects of processing that are specific to
production or comprehension).3
A possible concern is that priming between two sentences
may tap into a level of representation that is distinct from
another linguistic representation that is inaccessible to
priming (e.g., a “deep structure” as in Chomsky 1965). As
stated above, however, our goal is to characterize the linguis-
tic representations implicated in language use (and we have
argued against inaccessible representations; Section 1.1). Of
course, any such objection equally applies to the use of
acceptability judgments, which also involve processing and
might fail to access such representations.
Another concern is identifying which aspect of structure
that priming taps into. For example, speakers might tend
to repeat POs or DOs (Bock 1986) because they are
primed to repeat syntactic structure, or because they are
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
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primed to repeat aspects of meaning, thematic role order
(e.g., Theme-Recipient vs. Recipient-Theme), or order of
animate/inanimate entities, among other possibilities. In
some cases, it is possible to exclude alternative explanations
within an experiment. In other cases, we should seek con-
verging evidence across experiments, whereby alternative
explanations are ruled out systematically (as has been
done for POs/DOs; see sect. 1, para. 3–4, and sect. 2).
A different concern is that structural priming itself may
be susceptible to processing influences. Obviously, it may
not be sensitive to linguistic relationships under all condi-
tions – for example, if the target occurs too long after the
prime. Participants also may sometimes fail to demonstrate
priming because of processing limitations (e.g., children
may sometimes be unable to produce complex structures,
despite having the relevant linguistic representations).
For these participants, it may be important to use
priming paradigms that minimize processing requirements
or do not require an overt response (e.g., using ERPs and
fMRI; Ledoux et al. 2007; Segaert et al. 2012).
A more serious problem would occur if an effect that
mimicked structural priming arose for reasons that are
not informative about linguistic representation. In the
case of acceptability judgments and when using compre-
hension data (e.g., reading times), we have noted that con-
clusions about linguistic representation (i.e., T) might
depend on assumptions about processing (i.e., P). But it
is hard to see how the explanation of priming could
depend on processing assumptions.
Priming also could occur for reasons other than similarity
of linguistic representation. For example, comprehending a
garden-path sentence might be easier following another,
unrelated garden-path sentence, because comprehenders
are primed to adopt more complex or less frequent analy-
ses. Equally, speakers might be more likely to produce a
rare (or less felicitous) structure after encountering
another rare (or less felicitous) structure. But such effects
should be more general than effects due to structural
priming and could be distinguished with careful
experimentation.
A final concern is that most demonstrations of priming in
production relate to choices between sentence forms, and so
rely on the existence of structural alternatives. It is hard to
use priming in production to investigate the representation
of sentences in which no relevant alternative exists, or in
which one alternative is highly infrequent or infelicitous.
This simply means that priming in production cannot be
used to investigate all structures. On some occasions,
priming in comprehension may present an alternative.
1.5. Summary
There has been a historical division between a theoretical
linguistic focus on representation and a psychological
focus on processing. Research on representation has
relied almost exclusively on acceptability judgments,
which have provided a fertile source of data for developing
hypotheses but have many limitations and do not provide
unambiguous diagnostics that can discriminate among
alternative hypotheses. Most methods grounded in psy-
chology (or neuroscience) have not themselves provided
such diagnostics. However, we have argued that structural
priming is different: It provides evidence that is directly
informative about mental representation.
We propose that acceptability judgments can be used
with appropriate controls alongside structural priming
(and perhaps other experimental methods; see sect. 1.3)
as a means of developing representational hypotheses.4
But they should not be the final arbiters for discriminating
among hypotheses. Instead, researchers should where pos-
sible use structural priming to test hypotheses. In many
cases, evidence from structural priming will converge
with evidence from acceptability judgments, and hence
provide strong support for specific representational
claims. In other cases, priming evidence will adjudicate
between competing linguistic accounts (whether different
analyses of the same construction within the same broad
linguistic framework, or analyses based on very different
linguistic assumptions). Where acceptability judgment
and priming evidence do not converge, evidence from
priming should be favored, especially when acceptability
judgments do not produce clear evidence.
We have made this argument in principle. But we
suggest that there is now sufficient evidence from structural
priming experiments to outline a psychologically motivated
account of syntactic aspects of linguistic representation and
their relationship to semantics and the lexicon. We base this
account on specific structural priming findings but argue
that it is also compatible with traditional linguistic evidence
and that it discriminates among theories based on such
evidence.
2. An outline theory of syntax and its interfaces
based on structural priming
To explain our account, we consider the representation of A
book was begun by every linguist, under an interpretation
in which each linguist began writing a (possibly) different
book. We focus on information that appears relevant to syn-
tactic representation, either as part of the syntactic repre-
sentation itself or by interfacing with the syntactic
representation.
First, people must represent semantic information
(roughly corresponding to the speaker’s intended
“message”; Levelt 1989). Importantly, this includes propo-
sitions represented in terms of predicates and their argu-
ments. In our example, one proposition encodes a
complex event structure involving the initiation of an
event of writing. This writing event is associated with two
thematic roles: an Agent that undertakes the act of
writing and a Theme that is written. The Agent of the
writing act is also the Agent who initiates this act. There
is also quantificational information that every linguist has
wider scope than a book, and information structure specify-
ing that a book is emphasized.
We also assume that people represent syntactic and
lexical information about the words that are used and
how they are arranged. Thus, people represent that the
sentence includes the words a and book, in that order, as
well as information about larger units of structure (e.g.,
that a and book form a constituent). Importantly, elements
expressed in the message may not always correspond
straightforwardly to elements expressed in the syntax and
to lexical content (e.g., there is no word expressing the
writing event; cf. Jackendoff 2002). Finally, people repre-
sent the relationship between these different types of infor-
mation and sound (phonology, intonation, etc.).
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
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Our account has the following basic properties (see
Fig. 1). It distinguishes representations specifying semantics
from those specifying syntax. There is a single semantic level
of representation that encodes information about quantifica-
tional scope relations, information structure, and thematic
structure, including missing elements (i.e., elements that
do not correspond to an element that is uttered). There is
a single syntactic level of representation that draws on
well-formedness constraints (or rules) specifying local rela-
tions with respect to linear order as well as hierarchical rela-
tions. The syntactic level of representation includes syntactic
category information but not semantic information (e.g., the-
matic roles) or lexical content. There is no syntactic move-
ment, but some elements that are not uttered are
represented in the syntax. The syntactic level is separate
from a single sound-based level of representation that
encodes phonology, syllabic structure, and metrical informa-
tion (to which we refer using the blanket term “phonological
information”). We assume one sound-based level, because
there is insufficient evidence to discriminate different
levels (see Sevald et al. 1995; Tooley et al. 2014a).
2.1. Syntactic representation
We begin by motivating the syntactic level of representa-
tion, because this is the level for which there is most evi-
dence from priming. Our account assumes a single level
of syntax that includes constituent structure. There are no
separate levels containing, for example, reordered constitu-
ents (e.g., Deep Structure) or unordered constituents (e.g.,
incorporating hierarchical structure but not linear order).
In addition, this level does not incorporate quantificational
information (which instead forms part of the semantic
representation).
First, syntactic representations do not contain semantic
information. This claim is supported by evidence of
priming between sentences involving different types of
events, predicates, and entities. Bock and Loebell (1990)
found that intransitive active sentences with a by-phrase
expressing a location (The foreigner was loitering by the
broken traffic light) primed transitive passive sentences
where the by-phrase expressed an Agent (The boy was
woken by an alarm clock). Messenger et al. (2012b)
showed priming between passive sentences that involved
different thematic roles (e.g., The girl is being scared by
the pig and The king is being ignored by the bear both
primed The doctor gets licked by the cow); as we discuss
below, these results cannot be explained by closed-class
word repetition (see also Bock 1989). Both studies found
the same magnitude of priming when primes and targets
did not involve the same thematic roles as when they did.
Additionally, priming occurs when the alternatives
involve no discernible semantic difference. Hartsuiker
and Westenberg (2000) found structural priming for the
order of the auxiliary and main verb in Dutch, even
though they involve the same words and do not express dif-
ferent meanings. Konopka and Bock (2009) similarly
showed priming for the position of the particle in
meaning-identical sentences involving phrasal verbs (e.g.,
pulled the sweater off vs. pulled off the sweater). Ferreira
(2003) found priming for the presence versus absence of
the complementizer that (e.g., The mechanic mentioned
the car could use a tune-up vs. The mechanic mentioned
that the car could use a tune-up).
These studies also demonstrate that the relevant repre-
sentations are not bound intrinsically to open-class lexical
content: Priming occurs between sentences that share no
such content. Nor are they bound to closed-class content
(e.g., The secretary baked a cake for her boss and The sec-
retary brought a cake to her boss primed The girl is giving a
paintbrush to the man to the same extent [Bock 1989; see
also Pickering & Branigan 1998]). Other experiments show
Figure 1. Outline model of the representation of A book was begun by every linguist, incorporating a single level of semantic
representation, a single level of syntactic representation, and a single level of phonological representation. Dashed lines indicate
bindings between components of semantic, syntactic, and phonological structural representations, and the semantic, syntactic, and
phonological components, respectively, of lexical entries. Subscripts indicate coindexation between levels.
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structural priming between sentences containing a mis-
match between syntactic structure and the verb’s subcate-
gorization requirements (e.g., The waitress exists the book
to the monk primes PO responses [Ivanova et al. 2012a;
see also Ivanova et al. 2012b]) If syntactic representations
were bound to lexical content, priming should have
occurred only when the syntactic properties of the words
were compatible with the sentence structure.
The finding that priming occurs between sentences with
different phonological content (e.g., for-to in Bock 1989;
was showing-showed in Pickering & Branigan 1998) to
the same extent as priming between sentences with the
same phonological content (to-to; showed-showed) also
implies that syntactic representations do not contain
word-level phonological information. Additionally, Bock
and Loebell (1990) showed that priming did not occur
based on metrical structure (e.g., Susan bought a book
for Susan primed POs, but Susan brought a book to
study did not).
Hence, priming evidence supports the existence of
abstract syntactic representations. It also suggests that
these are shallow and monostratal in a way that corresponds
at least roughly to the assumptions of Culicover and Jack-
endoff (2005) and many other nontransformational theo-
ries (e.g., Gazdar et al. 1985; Goldberg 1995; Pollard &
Sag 1994; Steedman 2000). It does not support a second,
underlying level of syntactic structure or the syntactic rep-
resentation of empty categories associated with the move-
ment of constituents in some transformational analyses.
Thus, Bock and Loebell’s (1990) finding of priming from
intransitive (active) locatives to passives implies that these
structures share syntactic representations, which we take
to be noun-phrase (NP; the foreigner, the boy), verb
(including auxiliary; was loitering, was woken), and PP
(by the broken traffic light, by an alarm clock). Our
account contrasts with many syntactocentric linguistic the-
ories, which assume distinct syntactic representations for
passives and intransitive locatives. Specifically, transforma-
tional accounts assume that the passive involves an empty
category associated with the subject (the boy) immediately
after the verb (woken), whereas intransitive locatives do not
involve an empty category. Converging evidence support-
ing our account comes from Flett’s (2006) finding that
Spanish speakers tended to repeat the order of the
subject and verb in unaccusative sentences to the same
extent following unergative and unaccusative primes,
which transformational accounts assume involve distinct
syntactic representations (with unaccusatives but not uner-
gatives involving subject movement and an associated
empty category).
Similarly, priming from transitive locatives to POs
implies that these constructions share syntactic representa-
tions (Bock & Loebell 1990), whereas many transforma-
tional accounts assume that they have different structures
such that the PP appears as a sister to the verb node in
POs (because it is a complement) but as a sister to a
higher V’ node in locatives (because it is an adjunct). The
only accounts in which POs and transitive locatives have
the same representation are where the structure is
shallow and simple, in the sense that there are nodes for
the verb, NP, and PP, but nothing else. Likewise, Witten-
berg (2014) found (bidirectional) priming between POs/
DOs and “light-verb” sentences (e.g., The kidnapper
gives the government an ultimatum/an ultimatum to the
government), whereas transformational accounts assume
distinct representations, with POs/DOs – unlike light-verb
sentences – involving a V-trace (Hale & Keyser 1993;
2002; Wittenberg et al. 2014).
Syntactic representations also are monostratal in the
sense that they represent hierarchical and linear relations
simultaneously. Pickering et al. (2002) showed that sen-
tences involving the same hierarchical relations but differ-
ent linear relations did not prime each other. Participants
were no more likely to produce a PO (involving V NP PP
order) following a “shifted” PO (the same constituents in
V PP NP order; e.g., The racing driver showed to the
helpful mechanic the damaged wheel) than following an
intransitive sentence. Pappert and Pechmann (2014)
found similar results in German, in which the shifted
order is much less unusual.
The syntactic representations capture local relationships
between a “mother” and its constituent “daughter(s)” (e.g.,
a VP comprising a verb and two NPs), independent of the
larger context in which the phrase appears (e.g., that the VP
occurs within a subordinate clause), or the internal struc-
ture of the subphrases that constitute it (e.g., that the
first NP comprises a determiner, adjective, and noun).5
This assumption is consistent with any approach to
grammar that distinguishes within- and between-phrasal
relations, such as context-free grammars with maximal pro-
jections. It is motivated by evidence that priming occurs
between sentences that share local structure but differ at
other levels. Branigan et al. (2006) found priming when
the prime involved a DO or PO structure in a main
clause (e.g., The racing driver showed the helpful mechanic
the flat tyre), and the target involved a subordinate clause
(e.g., The rumours alleged that the patient showed the
doctor his scar) and vice versa. In fact, priming occurred
to the same extent whether the prime and target involved
the same or different clause types, implying that the
same representations were involved whenever a DO or
PO structure was used, irrespective of the larger context
(see also Melinger & Cleland 2011).
Likewise, priming occurs between sentences that differ in
detailed structure (i.e., constituents’ internal structure).
Pickering and Branigan (1998) found PO/DO priming
when the internal structure of complement NPs differed
between prime and target (e.g., omission or inclusion of
adjectives: The racing driver showed the torn overall to the
manager primed The patient showed his spots to the
doctor). Moreover, Fox Tree andMeijer (1999) found equiv-
alent priming for POs and DOs whether the VPs in prime
and target had the same internal structure (i.e., both
included or did not include a subordinate relative clause)
or different internal structure (i.e., one involved a subordi-
nate relative clause and the other did not). This finding
also demonstrates that priming is not based on a sequence
of phrasal categories (i.e., without hierarchical structure).
Finally, traditional theories of language production refer to
grammatical functions such as subject (e.g., Garrett 1975), for
example assuming that they have their own “deep” level of
representation (corresponding roughly to F-structure in
LFG; Kaplan & Bresnan 1982) that is independent of constit-
uent structure. Many linguistic theories also assume some
form of representation of grammatical functions, even those
that attempt to develop monostratal syntax (see Culicover &
Jackendoff 2005 pp. 152, 538). For John loves Mary, speakers
might compute <JohnSUBJECT, MaryDIRECT-OBJECT, loves> as
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
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an unordered representation separate from [NP John] [VP
[V loves] [NP Mary]]. Such a representation would be incom-
patible with our assumption of a single syntactic level.
Some priming studies have been interpreted in terms of
grammatical functions (see sect. 2.4). Bock et al. (1992)
argued that speakers repeat mappings of animacy features
(encoded in semantic representations) to grammatical
functions (e.g., inanimate to subject). But participants
also might have repeated mappings of animacy features
to word-order positions (e.g., inanimate to first NP).
Chang et al. (2003) reported priming effects that could
have reflected a tendency to repeatedly assign thematic
roles (e.g., Location) to grammatical functions (e.g.,
direct object) or to word-order positions (e.g., immediately
following the verb). Cai et al. (2012) found some evidence
(in Mandarin) for separate priming from thematic roles
to grammatical functions and from thematic roles to word-
order positions, and argued that grammatical functions
should be incorporated into the constituent structure
representation (e.g., [NP JohnSUBJECT] [VP [V loves]
[NP MaryDIRECT-OBJECT]]). However, priming has not yet
resolved the status of grammatical functions, so we do
not incorporate them into Figure 1.
2.1.1. Missing elements.We have argued that priming evi-
dence does not support the existence of empty categories
associated with the movement of NPs or verbs in syntactic
structure and have proposed a monostratal account involv-
ing a single level of syntax linked to a single level of seman-
tics and a single level of phonology. But within this account,
some elements that are not phonologically represented may
be syntactically represented. In fact, priming may allow us
to determine cases in which missing elements are repre-
sented syntactically and cases in which they are not.
More generally, priming potentially allows us to address
the syntactic representation of sentences in which the
semantics and phonology are misaligned: Does the syntax
align with the former or the latter?
We first consider ellipsis. Syntactic accounts of ellipsis
assume that elided elements are represented syntactically
(as well as semantically; e.g., Hankamer 1979; Merchant
2001); semantic accounts assume that they are represented
semantically but not syntactically (e.g., Fiengo & May
1994). Consider The charity needed support so the man
gave some money, in which the semantic representation
specifies the Agent (the man), Theme (some money), and
Recipient (the charity), whereas the phonological represen-
tation specifies the Agent and Theme but not the Recipi-
ent. According to syntactic accounts, the syntactic
representation includes a PP (e.g., V NP PP), so that it is
aligned with the semantic (but not the phonological) repre-
sentation, as in Figure 2a; according to semantic accounts,
it does not include a PP (e.g., V NP), so that it is aligned
with the phonological (but not the semantic) representa-
tion, as in Figure 2b.
Cai et al. (2015) found that missing (elided) NP argu-
ments in Mandarin are represented syntactically. They
showed that full DO targets were primed by DOs in
which the Theme was missing (e.g., Niuzai mai-le yiben
shu hou song-gei-le shuishou; “The cowboy bought a
book and later gave the sailor [the book]”) to the same
extent as by DOs in which the Theme was not missing
(Niuzai mai-le yiben shu hou song-gei-le shuishou naben
shu; “The cowboy bought a book and later gave the sailor
the book”). Similarly, PO targets were equally primed by
POs with or without the Theme. These results suggest
that the missing element was represented in the syntactic
structure in the same way as an overtly expressed
element, as in Figure 2a, and are therefore consistent
with syntactic accounts.
In contrast, Cai et al. (2013) found that elided VPs in
Mandarin are not represented syntactically. They showed
that full DO targets were not primed by DOs in which
the VP was elided (e.g., Fuwuyuan xiang jie-gei shuishou
naba qiang. Yinwei haipa reshi, chushi que bu xiang,
“The waitress would like to lend the sailor the gun. Being
afraid of getting into trouble, the chef would not like to
[lend the sailor the gun]”), compared to when the VP was
overtly expressed (Chushi que bu xiang jie-gei shuishou
naba qiang, “The chef would not like to lend the sailor
the gun”). These results suggest that the internal structure
Figure 2. Accounts of the representation of the missing-argument sentence The man gave some money. The italicized sentences
represent the phonological representation. In (a), the meaning and thematic role of the missing argument are specified in the
semantic representation (top), and the missing argument is specified in the syntactic representation (center); in (b), the meaning and
thematic role of the missing argument are specified in the semantic representation, but the missing argument is not specified in the
syntactic representation. Subscripts indicate coindexation between levels.
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of the elided VP (V NP NP) was not represented syntacti-
cally and are therefore consistent with semantic accounts.
Other priming evidence similarly indicates that some
semantically specified elements are not specified syntacti-
cally. Raffray et al. (2014) examined sentences such as
The celebrity began drinking the champagne (full VP sen-
tence) and The celebrity began the champagne (coerced
sentence). The semantic representation for both sentences
specifies the nature of the predicate (i.e., drinking) involved
in the event. However, Raffray et al. found that The celeb-
rity began the champagne did not prime production of The
clerk began reading the report, suggesting that the coerced
sentence has no syntactic element corresponding to the
missing predicate drinking. Instead, it behaved like a non-
coerced sentence such as the celebrity began the speech (in
which there is no missing predicate, given that the speech
refers to an event).
In addition, Pappert and Pechmann (2013) showed that
PO/DO sentences (e.g., Die Sekretärin backte ihrem Chef
einen Kuchen, “The secretary baked her boss a cake”)
primed benefactive sentences (e.g., Der Soldat hob
seinem Freund eine Zigarette auf, “The soldier saved his
pal a cigarette”), despite their semantic differences: PO/
DO sentences involve a simple transfer event, whereas
benefactives involve a complex event comprising a creation
or preparation event and a potential transfer or change of
possession event (Shibatani 1996). These results suggest
that they are nevertheless syntactically represented in the
same way.6
Overall, these results provide evidence for the syntactic
representation of some but not all missing elements (i.e.,
elements that are semantically but not phonologically rep-
resented). Moreover, they imply that patterns of structural
priming can determine which missing elements are syntac-
tically represented and which are not. More generally, they
suggest that priming can help determine the extent to
which syntactic representations are aligned with semantic
or phonological representations.
2.2. Semantic representation
Our model proposes that the semantic level of representa-
tion contains at least specifications of quantificational infor-
mation, information structure, and thematic roles. We
assume a single level of semantic representation, because
most studies have focused on distinguishing different
aspects of semantics from syntax and have not sought to dis-
tinguish among aspects of semantics. We first consider the
representation of quantificational information and its rela-
tion to thematic roles. Raffray and Pickering (2010)
reported that priming is sensitive to a level of semantic rep-
resentation specifying quantifier scope (see also Chemla &
Bott 2015; Feiman & Snedeker 2016; Viau et al. 2010).
They presented participants with doubly quantified prime
sentences such as Every kid climbed a tree, which are
ambiguous between a universal-wide interpretation (every
kid climbed a potentially different tree) and an existen-
tial-wide interpretation (every kid climbed the same tree),
together with a disambiguating picture that forced one or
other interpretation. When they then read a different
doubly quantified target sentence that also involved a uni-
versally quantified Agent and existentially quantified
Patient (Every hiker climbed a hill), participants tended
to interpret it in the same way.
Participants did not tend to repeat the interpretation of
Every hiker climbed a hill after active primes such as A
kid climbed every tree; hence, they did not simply repeat
whether a referred to one or potentially more than one
entity. In contrast, they tended to repeat the interpretation
of Every hiker climbed a hill after passive primes such as A
tree was climbed by every kid. So, they repeated the use of
an agentive noun with a to refer to a single entity, even
when this noun had a different grammatical function (i.e.,
subject versus oblique object) and was in a different
linear position (i.e., first versus second NP). Participants
therefore repeated mappings of scope to quantified the-
matic roles. Overall, these results support a semantic repre-
sentation that encodes both quantificational and thematic
information (but in which thematic roles are unordered).
Critically, they do not support an account in which logical
form (encoding quantification) constitutes a distinct level
of representation between syntactic representation and
final interpretation (e.g., May 1985).
We also assume that the semantic representation con-
tains a specification of information structure. By informa-
tion structure, we mean the way in which information is
packaged with respect to the current context – for
example, to reflect which information is known to the lis-
tener or is emphasized (e.g. Chafe 1976; Halliday 1967;
Lambrecht 1994; Vallduvi 1992). In our account, informa-
tion structure is specified with respect to thematic roles –
for example, that the Patient is emphasized (roughly corre-
sponding to topic, theme, or given information, depending
on theoretical framework).
In support of this claim, Vernice et al. (2012) showed that
Dutch speakers repeated emphasis of particular thematic
roles across sentences in the absence of syntactic or
lexical repetition. They were more likely to produce pas-
sives with Patient-Agent order, which emphasized the
Patient (e.g., Het meisje wordt overspoeld door de golf,
“The girl is being soaked by the wave”), after Patient-
emphasis WH-cleft sentences with Agent-Patient order
(Degene die hij slaat is de cowboy, “The one who he is
hitting is the cowboy”) than after Agent-emphasis WH-
cleft sentences with Patient-Agent order (Degene die hem
slaat is de cowboy, “The one who is hitting him is the
cowboy”). These results further support a representation
containing unordered thematic roles and imply that these
roles are specified with respect to information structure
(see also Bernolet et al. 2009).
In all of these studies, priming occurred between sen-
tences that involved different entities and/or different
predicates, implying that the relevant representations were
abstracted over these elements. Other priming evidence sim-
ilarly supports a semantic representation framed in terms of
abstract predicates, event components, and entities (Bunger
et al. 2013; Raffray et al. 2014; see sect. 2.4).
2.3. Structural representations and the lexicon
So far, we have been concerned with characterizing the
nature of syntactic and semantic representations, based
on evidence of priming between sentences that share dif-
ferent aspects of structure in the absence of lexical repeti-
tion. These results provide evidence for at least some
abstract representation of both syntactic and semantic
structure. Additionally, however, a particularly robust
finding is that various types of structural priming are
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
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enhanced considerably by repetition of the head of the local
tree (the so-called lexical boost; e.g., Branigan et al. 2000;
Cleland & Pickering 2003; Hartsuiker et al. 2008; Pickering
& Branigan 1998).7 Both the existence of abstract priming and
the lexical boost are informative about the lexical basis for
linguistic representation.
Abstract syntactic priming provides evidence for a repre-
sentation of syntax that is independent of lexical represen-
tation. The existence of priming between, say, Give the
woman a book and Send the girl a letter indicates that
the representation of grammatical information (here,
about the DO structure) cannot be localized entirely to spe-
cific lexical entries. This is incompatible with one interpre-
tation of lexicalist theories such as categorial grammars
(Steedman 2000) and HPSG (Pollard & Sag 1994). Such
theories assume a few very general rules (e.g., function
application, function composition, function substitution;
Steedman 1987), but such rules cannot be the locus of
abstract priming, because the same rules are applied
across alternations such as DO and PO. To explain abstract
priming, lexicalist theories must assume that the syntactic
representations (e.g., VP/NP/NP in categorial grammar)
are shared across lexical entries. Similarly, the occurrence
of abstract semantic priming (e.g., emphasizing the
Patient or producing coerced structures; Raffray et al.
2014; Vernice et al. 2012) implies that such information
is not purely localized to lexical entries.
The existence of the lexical boost, however, also argues
against an extreme structuralist account in which lexical
information is not part of the central syntactic component –
for example, an account in which lexical entries are merely
“slotted in” to a representation derived entirely from
abstract (lexically unspecified) syntactic well-formedness
constraints. Thus, there must be a representation that
encodes a binding between constituent structure and the
lemma (syntactic component) of the lexical entry for the
head. For the sentence The man gives the book to the
woman, this representation is [V[give] NP PP]VP, where
give is a lemma and not a complete lexical entry that addi-
tionally encodes semantic and phonological information.
Importantly, the binding between V and the lemma give
is the same type of binding that connects representations
at different levels of structure (e.g., the syntactic and
semantic representations associated with The man gives
the book to the woman), rather than the links that
connect components of the syntactic representation itself
(e.g., linking VP and V). Repetition of the lemma and the
syntactic well-formedness constraint that licenses the con-
stituent structure (e.g., give and VP → V NP PP) then
leads to an enhanced priming effect.8
This account accords with the finding that the lexical
boost appears to be due to repetition of a particular
lemma (e.g., give) rather than a lemma that is instantiated
for particular feature values (e.g., give [+SING, +PRES,
+PROG]). Pickering and Branigan (1998) found a lexical
boost whenever the verb lemma was repeated, irrespective
of whether the prime and target verbs shared tense,
number, and aspect features (e.g., The racing driver was
showing the torn overall to the mechanic yielded the
same lexical boost as The racing driver showed the torn
overall to the mechanic for the target The patient showed
his wound to the doctor). Such results occur because the
binding is between the constituent structure rule and a
lexical entry without reference to features such as tense,
but presumably with reference to syntactic category (to
ensure that only well-formed bindings occur).
Little is known about priming of unbounded dependen-
cies, and an interesting question is whether a constituent
such as The book that the doctor gave to the patient
would prime a PO, which would indicate whether a
missing and an expressed NP differ in terms of a feature
or a syntactic category. This distinction can be seen in
two versions of Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar
(GPSG). In both versions, The doctor gave to the patient
is captured by VP/NP → V NP/NP PP and NP/NP → Ø.
According to Gazdar et al. (1985; see also HPSG; Pollard
& Sag 1994), the slash-category /NP is simply a feature
“missing NP.” It is therefore similar to other features
such as number (although it differs in having internal struc-
ture), and we have already noted that priming appears
unaffected by feature differences. Thus, this account pre-
dicts that priming should occur in this case just as it does
from a PO prime. But according to Gazdar (1981), slash
categories differ at the categorical level from other catego-
ries. Hence, priming should be eliminated (or at least
reduced) in this case. We know of no evidence that distin-
guishes these accounts.
Similar to syntactic priming, abstract semantic priming
provides evidence for a representation of semantics that
is independent of lexical representation. But there is also
evidence for a lexical boost to semantic priming, even
when the relevant elements are not present in the phono-
logical representation. Raffray et al. (2014) found priming
of coerced sentences when the events that the prime and
target sentences described involved different entities and
different coerced predicates (e.g., The celebrity began the
champagne primed The clerk began the report; see sect.
2.4), implying the existence of semantic representations
that were abstracted over these elements. However, they
found a boost to priming when the coerced predicate was
repeated between prime and target, even though the asso-
ciated verb was not expressed: The celebrity began the
champagne (coerced predicate: drink) was a stronger
prime than The caretaker began the stairs (coerced predi-
cate: sweep) for The banker began the tea (coerced predi-
cate: drink). These results suggest the existence of
bindings between lexical items (whether expressed or
not) and semantic representations.
2.4. Structural representations and their interfaces
An account of structural representations also must specify
mappings between levels of representation. Evidence
from priming supports a range of mappings between infor-
mation encoded in the semantic representation and infor-
mation encoded in the syntactic representation: between
thematic roles and grammatical functions, between the-
matic roles and word order, between animacy and syntactic
structure, and between event structures and syntactic
structures.
Cai et al. (2012) showed priming of mappings between
thematic roles and grammatical functions. After hearing a
Mandarin topicalized PO such as Naben shu niuzai song
le gei shuishou, “The book, the cowboy gave [it] to the
sailor,” participants tended to produce POs (e.g., Jingcha
song-le yiding maozi gei shibing; “The policeman gave a
hat to the soldier”), in which the same thematic roles
were mapped to the same grammatical functions (Theme
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
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to direct object and Recipient to oblique object) but differ-
ent word order positions.
They also showed priming between thematic roles and
word order: Participants also tended to produce POs
(with Theme-Recipient order) after hearing a topicalized
DO (which also has Theme-Recipient order; e.g., Naben
shu niuzai song-gei le shuishou, “The book, the cowboy
gave the sailor [it]”). Köhne et al. (2014) similarly
showed that German participants tended to produce sen-
tences with Theme-Recipient order following a prime with
Theme-Recipient order (e.g., Der Mann verspricht die
Putzhilfe der Ehefrau, “The man promises the cleaning
woman the wife”). Additionally, Chang et al. (2003)
found priming that was compatible with thematic-function
mappings or thematic-order mappings.9 Bock et al. (1992)
found that participants were more likely to produce
descriptions in which an animate entity was a sentence-
initial subject (e.g., The boy is woken by the alarm
clock) after reading and repeating sentences with an
animate sentence-initial subject (Five people carried the
boat, or Five people were carried by the boat) than an
inanimate sentence-initial subject (The boat carried five
people, or The boat was carried by five people). These
results are compatible with priming of animacy-function
or animacy-order mappings. However, other research
has not found priming of animacy to syntactic structure
mappings (Bernolet et al. 2009; Carminati et al. 2008;
Huang et al. 2016).
Bunger et al. (2013) and Raffray et al. (2014) showed
priming of mappings between components of event struc-
tures and syntactic structures. The former researchers
demonstrated that speakers repeated mappings of compo-
nents of motion events to syntactic structure. Participants
who had read sentences in which information about the
manner of a motion event was mapped onto the sen-
tence-initial subject of the sentence (e.g., The zebra on
the motorcycle entered the garage) were more likely to
produce descriptions in which information about the
manner of an unrelated event was similarly encoded in
the sentence-initial subject (e.g., The driver is going into
the cave) than participants in a control condition (who
were not exposed to primes).
Raffray et al. (2014) investigated utterances expressing
complex events in which speakers had a choice of how to
map a complex event (e.g., the clerk beginning to read
the report) onto syntactic structure. Specifically, the
complex event involved three semantic elements: an
event lacking a (subordinate) event (the clerk beginning); an
event lacking an entity (the clerk reading); and an entity
(the report). Speakers could map these semantic elements
to two or three syntactic elements in the VP (i.e., V NP:
began the report; or V V-ing NP: began reading the report).
They were more likely to produce sentences such as
The clerk began the report after sentences that similarly
involved mappings to two syntactic elements (e.g.,
The celebrity began the champagne) than after sentences
that expressed the same meaning (e.g., The celebrity
began drinking the champagne) or used the same syntactic
structure (e.g., The celebrity began the speech) but
did not involve the same mappings. In conclusion,
priming can uncover the relationship between misaligned
syntactic and semantic representations, just as it can
uncover the nature of syntactic and semantic representa-
tions themselves.
3. Implications and predictions
Section 2 discussed the implications of research on struc-
tural priming for many aspects of linguistic representation
in adult native speakers. We now consider how our propos-
als relate to current theoretical linguistic frameworks. We
then consider priming in bilingualism as a means of under-
standing structural representations across languages, and
priming in children as a means of understanding structural
representations during language development. We con-
clude by addressing broader implications and predictions
of our proposals.
3.1. Implications for linguistic theory
We have argued that structural priming supports separate
representations encoding semantic, syntactic, and phono-
logical information. The single semantic level includes
quantificational, information-structural, and thematic infor-
mation, including information pertaining to elements that
are not overtly expressed. The single syntactic level is spec-
ified in terms of grammatical categories (and does not
include semantic, lexical, or phonological information). It
captures local relations specifying linear order and hierar-
chical relations. It represents some missing elements, but
there is no syntactic movement.
Our account is therefore incompatible with “mainstream
generative grammar” (see Culicover & Jackendoff 2005) –
the framework derived from early transformational
grammar (Chomsky 1965) via Government and Binding
Theory (Chomsky 1981) and the Minimalist Program
(Chomsky 1995). This framework assumes that the gener-
ative capacity of language is associated strictly with the
grammar. An initially abstract syntactic structure is
altered sequentially through movement of elements (trans-
formations). The resulting surface syntactic structure forms
the input into both Logical Form (a “covert” level of syntac-
tic representation that interfaces with semantic representa-
tions encoding sentence meaning) and Phonetic Form
(which is concerned with sound-based aspects of the
sentence).
The assumption of autonomous syntax, into which pho-
nological content is subsequently inserted, fits with evi-
dence of priming between sentences without shared
lexical content (e.g., Bock 1989). The assumption that
speakers may represent syntactically some elements that
they do not utter fits with evidence that sentences with
missing arguments prime sentences without missing argu-
ments (Cai et al. 2015). But in other respects, mainstream
generative grammar is incompatible with priming evidence
about linguistic representation. Most fundamentally,
priming studies provide no evidence for movement or a
wide range of associated empty elements (e.g., traces,
copies, or multiply dominated elements).
The clearest example involves passive sentences. Under
a mainstream generative account, passives involve move-
ment of the underlying object to subject position in the
surface structure (leaving an NP trace or equivalent),
whereas intransitive (active) locatives do not. Hence, the
two sentence types involve very different representations.
The mainstream account is therefore incompatible with
evidence that intransitive locatives prime passives (Bock
& Loebell 1990) and that unergatives prime unaccusatives
(Flett 2006). For similar reasons, it is inconsistent with
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
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evidence that transitive locatives prime POs (Bock &
Loebell 1990), and that POs and DOs prime light-verb sen-
tences and vice versa (Wittenberg 2014). The assumption
of a syntactic level of Logical Form (i.e., without specifica-
tions of meaning) is also incompatible with priming evi-
dence for abstract semantic representations that specify
quantifier scope (Chemla & Bott 2015; Raffray & Pickering
2010). Overall, the findings from structural priming do not
support mainstream generative grammar.
Our account is more compatible with a broad range of
alternative frameworks that eschew syntactocentrism and
instead assume nondirectional and constraint-based gener-
ative capacities (i.e., specifying well-formed structures) that
do not involve movement and in which syntactic structure is
shallow and not limited to binary branching. Such frame-
works include the Parallel Architecture (Culicover & Jack-
endoff 2005; Jackendoff 2002), HPSG (Pollard & Sag
1994), and Construction Grammar (Goldberg 1995).10
We focus here on the Parallel Architecture (Culicover
& Jackendoff 2005; Jackendoff 2002); see Jackendoff
(2007) for an accessible and psycholinguistically oriented
discussion. This framework assumes separate generative
capacities for semantics, syntax, and phonology, and
proposes that they are linked via interfaces, or mappings,
that involve input from the lexicon. So the girl was
chased by the dogmight have the syntactic representation
S[NP[Det N]VP[Aux V PP], the semantic representation
CHASED[DOG, GIRL]-[TOPIC]
11 and the phonological
representation /ðəɡɜ:lwəztʃeɪsdbɑɪðədɒɡ/. The syntactic
representation occurs through combination of “constraints”
(stored fragments of structure) such as S[NP VP] and
NP[Det N]. Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) also proposed
a further tier of syntactic structure that captures grammat-
ical function information associated with the ordering of
NP arguments. Lexical entries comprise constraints (again,
stored fragments of structure) such as DEF - Det - /ðə /
and GIRL - N - /ɡɜ:l/ that play a role in the composition of
sentence structure. They act as interface rules constraining
relations between semantic, syntactic, and phonological
representations. Such constraints yield coindexation of ele-
ments at different linguistic levels in parallel – for example
DEF1 GIRL2, NP[Det1 N2], and /ðə/1/ɡɜ:l/2 (with the
indices indicating the links between representational
levels). All linguistic representations (whether semantic/
syntactic/phonological or lexical) are stored in long-term
memory.
In many respects, this account is compatible with
priming evidence. The assumption that speakers and listen-
ers access the same local syntactic constraints that are inde-
pendent of semantics or phonology (e.g., VP[V NP PP] for a
PO) is consistent with abstract syntactic priming over local
structures. Shallow syntactic structure and the associated
assumption that many detailed distinctions are made in
the semantics rather than syntax (and that there is no move-
ment) are compatible with priming between intransitive
locatives and passives. Association of a lexical entry with a
syntactic constraint (e.g., linking the entry for give with
the PO constraint) accounts for the lexical boost. The
assumption of a grammatical function tier as part of syntac-
tic structure is consistent with priming of thematic-function
mappings. The assumptions of abstract semantic represen-
tations based on events, predicates, and entities, which may
include elements not represented in the syntax, together
with interface constraints between semantics and syntax,
are compatible with priming of semantic-syntactic map-
pings in sentences involving complement coercion and
motion events (Raffray et al. 2014; Bunger et al. 2013).
This account is less compatible with evidence about the
relationship between hierarchical relations and word order.
Priming evidence suggests that hierarchical relations and
word order are encoded in a single representation,
because sentences with the same hierarchical relations
but different word orders do not prime each other
(Pappert & Pechmann 2014; Pickering et al. 2002). In con-
trast, Culicover and Jackendoff (2005) proposed that there
are independent constraints on hierarchical relations (con-
stituency) and word order, as in GPSG (Gazdar et al. 1985)
and HPSG (Pollard & Sag 1994). They argued that separat-
ing these constraints allows important generalizations – for
example, about regularities of phrasal ordering that are
independent of hierarchical structure (e.g., about head
position). Though these generalizations may be important,
priming suggests that they do not reflect the representa-
tions used in language processing (see discussion in
sect. 1.1).
Additionally, the Parallel Architecture account assumes
that thematic structure, quantification, and information
structure involve different tiers within semantics. Current
priming evidence supports semantic representations that
are specified for thematic roles in conjunction with quanti-
fication (Raffray & Pickering 2010; priming of patients
taking wide scope) and information structure (Vernice
et al. 2012; priming of patients receiving emphasis).
However, it does not discriminate whether these constitute
one integrated semantic representation (as we have
assumed) or multiple semantic representations for the-
matic roles, quantification, and information structure that
are linked to each other (as in the Parallel Architecture
account). Further research might distinguish these
accounts by investigating whether priming involving two
semantic components (e.g., quantification and information
structure) is independent of another component (e.g., the-
matic roles).
More generally, structural priming has implications for
linguistic theory in offering a means of adjudicating
between alternative analyses that cannot be determined
using other methods. For example, it may be able to
resolve long-standing debates about the appropriate repre-
sentation of English small-clause structures (e.g., He called
the boy a liar, for which acceptability judgments support
both a structure in which the boy and a liar do not form
a constituent, and a structure in which they do; see Mat-
thews 2007): Under the former account, a sentence such
as He called the boy a liar should prime a sentence such
as The doctor gave the pharmacist the pills, whereas
under the latter account it should not. Similarly, it could
resolve the ongoing controversy about Chinese bei-passives
(e.g., Nashan de men bei niuzai chuai-huai-le, “That door
by the cowboy was kicked in,” for which acceptability judg-
ments and constituency tests support both an analysis in
which bei heads a prepositional phrase, and an analysis in
which it heads a verb phrase; see Huang et al. 2009).
3.2. Structural priming and representation across
languages
Our account is based on evidence from a range of languages
with different characteristics (e.g., English, German,
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
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Mandarin, Basque). Importantly, structural priming occurs
in all languages that have been investigated, including
American Sign Language (Hall et al. 2014), and appears
to exert similar effects. Moreover, priming evidence sup-
ports very similar representations for structures across lan-
guages. For example, Mandarin (a language unrelated to
English) has an alternation that appears similar to the
English PO/DO alternation, and Cai et al. (2011) found
very similar priming as in English, with a comparable mag-
nitude of priming and lexical boost. Likewise, evidence
from Basque (a language with ergative properties) supports
syntactic representations that, like those found in English,
are independent of lexical, thematic, and morphological
content (Santesteban et al. 2015). Evidence from typologi-
cally distinct languages therefore suggests that our account
is not restricted to a small range of Western Indo-European
languages with quite specific characteristics.
Many studies have shown strong priming in non-native
speakers, even for structures that do not exist in their
native language, and that priming has similar characteristics
in natives and non-natives (e.g., occurring for the same con-
structions, and demonstrating the lexical boost; Cai et al.
2011; Flett et al. 2013; Kantola & van Gompel 2011; Sala-
moura & Williams 2006; Schoonbaert et al. 2007). Current
evidence therefore suggests that linguistic representation is
similar for natives and non-natives. Of course, it remains
possible that native and non-native linguistic representa-
tions differ in subtle ways (e.g., in relation to unbounded
dependencies; Clahsen & Felser 2006).
Strikingly, structural priming occurs between languages,
with effects often similar to those within languages. It
occurs between many pairs of languages with differing
degrees of similarity (e.g., German and English: Loebell
& Bock 2003; Dutch and English: Bernolet et al. 2009;
Spanish and English: Hartsuiker et al. 2004; Korean and
English: Shin & Christianson 2009; Mandarin and Canton-
ese: Cai et al. 2011; Greek and English: Salamoura & Wil-
liams 2007). These studies, of course, demonstrate abstract
structural priming: The words are different across lan-
guages. But more interestingly, they imply that bilinguals
not only use a common representational vocabulary
across languages, but also the same structural representa-
tions where possible (and these representations are the
same as those of monolinguals). One relevant restriction
on structure sharing is word order: Between-language
priming is reduced or eliminated when the structures
have different word orders across languages (e.g.,
English: the shark that is red vs. Dutch: de haai die rood
is, “the shark that red is”; Bernolet et al. 2007). This restric-
tion follows from our assumption that syntactic representa-
tions are specified for both hierarchical and linear relations.
Other studies of between-language priming support our
claims that semantic representations encode thematic
information and information structure (e.g., Bernolet
et al. 2009; Fleischer et al. 2012).
More speculatively, structural priming might allow
researchers to detect linguistic universals that are accessi-
ble in adult speakers (i.e., not just as an initial state that dis-
appears during development). For example, priming has
not been demonstrated with agglutinative languages. Our
account assumes abstract syntactic structure, independent
of lexical or morphological content, and hence that
priming will occur between examples of the same structure
in which the verb involves considerable morphological
differences. For instance, a sentence with an NP PP V syn-
tactic representation would prime another sentence with
the same representation even if the verb contained many
different morphemes, as is possible in an agglutinative lan-
guage (e.g., Turkish). But if such priming does not occur
(or is affected by morphological overlap), it would suggest
that syntactic representations are morphosyntactically spec-
ified in such languages, so that there is no single well-form-
edness constraint VP à NP PP V, but rather different ones
depending on the form of the verb.
Another possibility is that constituent structure is not
universal (e.g., Evans & Levinson 2009). For example,
some researchers have argued that some languages (e.g.,
Walpiri) are nonconfigurational and do not have hierarchi-
cal constituent structure (Hale 1983; Austin & Bresnan
1996). If so, they should not give rise to constituent struc-
ture priming within or between languages (though careful
comparisons are clearly needed to control for other
sources of priming such as thematic order priming).
We propose that a thorough analysis of priming across a
full range of languages (e.g., agglutinative and isolating lan-
guages, languages with ergative characteristics, nonconfi-
gurational languages, sign languages) is necessary to
determine the extent to which our account holds univer-
sally, or whether different types of languages involve differ-
ent representational structures. If our account does not
hold universally, then it may still be possible to establish
that some properties are universal and some vary across
languages. For example, all languages might involve a dis-
tinction between semantic and syntactic representations,
but in some languages syntactic representations might
include “missing” elements and in some languages they
might not. Priming, therefore, might allow us to develop
a cognitive representational approach to language typology.
3.3. Structural priming and language development
Research on language development has recognized the
importance of priming as a means of investigating struc-
tural representation, perhaps more strongly than research
on adult language (Bencini & Valian 2008; Messenger et
al. (2012b); Rowland et al. 2012; Savage et al. 2003). Struc-
tural priming occurs in children across age groups (e.g.,
3-year-olds: Bencini & Valian 2008; 6- and 9-year-olds:
Messenger et al. (2012a); 3- to 4-year-olds and 5- to 6-
year-olds: Rowland et al. 2012; 3-, 4-, and 6-year-olds:
Savage et al. 2003; 7- to 8- and 11- to 12-year-olds: van Beij-
sterveldt & van Hell 2009), in comprehension as well as
production (4-year-olds: Thothathiri & Snedeker 2008b).
It occurs in children in different languages (e.g., English-
speaking 4- to 5-year-olds: Huttenlocher et al. 2004;
Spanish-speaking 4- and 5-year-olds: Gámez et al. 2009;
Russian-speaking 5- to 6-year-olds: Vasilyeva & Waterfall
2012), and populations, including bilinguals (between lan-
guages; 5- to 6-year-olds: Vasilyeva et al. 2010), deaf chil-
dren (11- to 12-year-olds: van Beijsterveldt & van Hell
2009), children with Specific Language Impairment (4- to
6-year-olds: Garraffa et al. 2015; Leonard 2000; Miller &
Deevy 2006; 6- to 7-year-olds: Riches 2012), and children
with an Autistic Spectrum Disorder (8- to 13-year-olds:
Allen et al. 2011; Hopkins et al. 2016). Of course, some
of these children cannot make grammaticality or accept-
ability judgments, so it simply would not be possible to
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 40 (2017) 15
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000528
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Max-Planck-Institut fuer Psycholinguistik, on 16 Nov 2017 at 07:29:33, subject to the Cambridge ore terms of use, available at
investigate their structural representations if researchers
relied on these methods.
Evidence from these studies suggests that, from a rela-
tively young age, children’s structural representations are
similar to adults’. Like adults, 3- and 4-year-olds appear
to have abstract syntactic representations that are not spec-
ified for lexical or thematic content (e.g., Bencini & Valian
2008; Huttenlocher et al. 2004; Messenger et al. (2012b);
Rowland et al. 2012). Rowland et al. showed that they
tended to produce DOs after hearing and repeating DOs
involving different nouns and verbs (e.g., Prime: The king
brought the queen a puppy – Target: Dora gave Boots a
rabbit). Messenger et al. (2012b) showed they were
primed to produce passives involving Patient/Agent the-
matic roles (e.g., The witch was hugged by the cat) to the
same extent when the prime involved Experiencer/
Theme roles (e.g., The girl was shocked by the tiger) and
Theme/Experiencer roles (e.g., The girl was ignored by
the tiger). There is some evidence of a lexical boost in chil-
dren (3- to 4-year-olds: Branigan & McLean 2016; 7- to 8-
year-olds: van Beijsterveldt & van Hell 2009). Interestingly,
there is no evidence of a stronger lexical boost in young
children compared to older children and adults (3- to 4-
year-olds: Peter et al. 2015; Rowland et al. 2012), as
might be expected on an account in which early grammars
involve “islands” of information associated with individual
verbs, that is, partly lexicalized syntactic structures (Toma-
sello 1992). These priming studies therefore contribute
important evidence to the debate about the extent to
which children’s early structural representations are
abstract versus lexically specified (e.g., Fisher 2001; Gold-
berg 2006; Pinker 1989; Tomasello (2003a)).
Importantly, structural priming experiments also have pro-
vided evidence to discriminate specific theoretical linguistic
accounts (motivated by error and frequency data) of young
children’s syntactic representations. Messenger et al.
(2012a) demonstration of priming between Experiencer-
Theme and Agent-Patient passive sentences provided evi-
dence that 3- to 4-year-olds have an abstract representation
of passive structure that is not semantically restricted
(contra Maratsos et al. 1985). Likewise, Messenger et al.’s
(2011) demonstration of priming between short passives
and full passives suggests that 3-to 4-year-olds do not rep-
resent short passives in a distinct way from full passives
(for example, as an adjectival phrase; Borer & Wexler
1987; Horgan 1976).
Children’s semantic representations also appear similar to
those of adults. For example, Gámez et al. (2009) and Vasi-
lyeva and Waterfall (2012) showed priming of thematic
emphasis in Spanish-speaking 4- to 5-year-olds and
Russian-speaking 5- to 6-year-olds (with passive structures
priming patient-emphasized structures), suggesting that
children have a thematically specified representation of
information structure. Viau et al. (2010) found priming of
abstract quantified representations, with respect to the
scope of negation, in 4-year-olds’ comprehension. Children
were more likely to adopt a negation-wide interpretation
of Every horse didn’t jump a fence after hearing a sentence
with a negation-wide interpretation than after a sentence
with negation-narrow interpretation, even when the prime
differed in syntax and quantifier order (e.g., Not every
horse jumped over a pig). These findings all suggest that,
at least from age 3, children and adults have similar repre-
sentational structures at each level, and similar interfaces
between levels. However, it is clearly necessary to test
further structures, as well as younger children if possible.
3.4. Further implications
We have argued that the method of structural priming is
informative about linguistic representation with reference
to evidence from not only monolingual adults, but also
bilingual adults and children. Other relevant evidence
relates to atypical populations, including demonstrations
of structural priming in aphasia (Hartsuiker & Kolk 1998;
Saffran & Martin 1997), Specific Language Impairment
(Garraffa et al. 2015; Leonard et al. 2000), and amnesia
(Ferreira et al. 2008). For example, aphasic speakers may
produce passives (although often containing morphological
errors) after repeating unrelated passives, despite not pro-
ducing such structures spontaneously. Such findings
suggest that structural representations may be intact even
if not evinced in patients’ spontaneous language behavior;
these findings also may be relevant to therapy. More theo-
retically, priming evidence can be used to determine the
structure of linguistic representations in language patholo-
gies. Additionally, the neural underpinnings of priming are
not well understood (although see Menenti et al. 2011;
Noppeney & Price 2004; Segaert et al. 2012; Segaert
et al. 2013), but priming is likely to be informative about
neurolinguistic representation.
We further propose that structural priming similarly can
be used to investigate other aspects of cognition involving
structured representations. These may include representa-
tions of the results of complex human activities involving
domains such as music, mathematics, and artificial lan-
guages. In such cases, the representations may of course
be derivative of linguistic representations (though it is
also possible that they developed independently). For
example, Scheepers et al. (2011) showed that people
tended to repeat their interpretation of complex arithmet-
ical expressions that lacked brackets (in other words,
copying the bracketing from prime to target) and, more-
over, that language and arithmetic could prime each
other. Similar priming occurred between language and
music (van der Cavey & Hartsuiker 2016) . Another rele-
vant domain is gesture, in which evidence suggests that
people repeat gesture patterns (Mol et al. 2012).
However, there is no clear priming evidence about the
structure of complex gestures expressing events (see
Goldin-Meadow et al. 2008). Additionally, it may be possi-
ble to investigate priming of structured animal calls
(Schlenker et al. 2014). In these cases, there is either
little evidence about structure, or it is simply assumed
that some standard representation (e.g., musical or mathe-
matical notation) is adequate for explaining cognitive repre-
sentations. Priming may be informative about these
representations and, indeed, the relationships between
such representations across domains.
Finally, we return to priming of comprehension: the ten-
dency for comprehension to be affected by comprehension
(or production) of previous utterances that share aspects of
structure. We have not focused on it because the data are
much more limited and less clearly established than
priming of production (e.g., there are contradictions con-
cerning when priming occurs without verb repetition;
Arai et al. 2007; Thothathiri & Snedeker 2008a), and
because experimental conditions often differ extensively
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in both form and meaning (e.g., main clause vs. reduced
relatives; see Traxler et al. 2014).12 But priming of compre-
hension occurs when prime and target differ primarily in
form (e.g., active/passive, PO/DO), and the effects reveal
shared processes with priming of production (Segaert
et al. 2013). Priming in comprehension can be informative
about the representation of structures in the absence of
alternatives (i.e., when participants do not choose
between alternative structures), in a way that appears
hard to demonstrate in production. It also may be valuable
for investigating populations whose ability to produce lan-
guage is restricted (e.g., very young children, some apha-
sics). Importantly, we propose that priming in
comprehension is likely to become a technique of similar
importance to priming in production for determining lin-
guistic representation.13
4. Conclusion
Many linguists assume that acceptability judgments are
pretty much the only valid means of obtaining data that
are informative about linguistic representation. Instead,
we have argued that structural priming can provide a
valid method with many advantages and have shown how
experimental psychology (and not just traditional linguis-
tics) can be informative about the nature of language. We
have now reached the stage at which structural priming is
a mature method that provides extensive evidence about
representation. Thus, we have used that evidence to
develop a general approach to linguistic representation.
This account is largely but not entirely compatible with a
parallel linguistic architecture (e.g., Culicover & Jackendoff
2005), though the data support the existence of some
empty elements in the syntactic representation. Structural
priming provides evidence about linguistic representation
that informs linguistic theory, processing accounts that
are based on such theories, and claims about development
and language universals. It is a method that truly has come
of age and should help integrate linguistics and the psychol-
ogy of language as part of the cognitive sciences of
language.
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NOTES
1. Judgments may be nonbinary, with sentences being judged
more or less acceptable, most obviously when elicited using mag-
nitude-estimation tasks (Bard et al.1996) or Likert scales, but even
researchers who eschew these methods usually assume that some
sentences are “questionable’” or “marginal.”However, these judg-
ments still relate to set membership.
2. Priming effects can also be inhibitory (e.g., Goldinger et al.
1989), and speakers may avoid linguistic repetition on occasion
(see Szmrecsanyi 2006). However, structural priming studies
have focused so far on facilitatory effects.
3. Some models of language processing assume that the repre-
sentations proposed by traditional linguistic theories are an
approximation to statistical generalizations that emerge with expe-
rience (see Seidenberg 2007). If so, structural priming effects are
informative about these generalizations. For example, the evi-
dence that priming occurs between sentences with different
lexical content implies that some such generalizations are not
tied to particular words.
4. The historical division of labor means that priming experi-
ments concerned with representational questions typically have
investigated hypotheses generated on the basis of acceptability
judgments. But priming experiments are not parasitic on accept-
ability judgments any more than any new scientific method is par-
asitic on an older method that addressed the same issues.
Acceptability judgments are chronologically primary to priming
experiments in the history of the language sciences but are not
theoretically primary.
5. Scheepers (2003) found that, when people completed sen-
tences such as The assistant announced the score of the candidate
that, they tended to repeat whether they attached the modifier to
the first or the second NP (e.g.,was the highest vs. was the oldest).
Another experiment ruled out a purely semantic explanation.
Arguably, the sentence types involve the same set of context-
free phrase structure rules (in particular, an NP consists of an
NP followed by a complementized sentence). One possible expla-
nation is that priming may occur over larger elements of structure
than strictly local trees. If so, people may represent frequent or
important “chunks” of more global structure as well as local rela-
tions (see Culicover & Jackendoff 2005). However, this explana-
tion provides no evidence against the existence of locally
defined representations (Branigan et al. 2006).
6. Griffin and Weinstein-Tull (2003) found that people were
more likely to produce Alison wished the bad news to be a
mistake (vs. Alison wished that the bad news was a mistake)
after Rover begged his owner to be more generous with food
than after The teaching assistant reported the exam to be too dif-
ficult. The primes have the same constituent order (NP V NP
Vinf). They differ in semantics (report takes one argument [(the
event[difficult(exam)]), yielding report[difficult(exam)]], whereas
begged takes two (the entity owner and the event generous
[owner]), yielding begged(owner, generous[owner])); but the two
versions of the target have the same semantics, so this cannot
be the locus of priming. A possible explanation is that priming
takes place over a syntactic representation in which an argument
can be represented twice. Thus, his owner is represented twice,
corresponding to its semantic representation as an argument of
begged and as an argument of generous, whereas the exam is rep-
resented once, as an argument of difficult. This explanation
assumes that the syntactic representation includes missing ele-
ments. The authors, however, interpret the priming in terms of
a mapping between semantic and syntactic representations, and
we cannot distinguish the accounts.
7. The lexical boost is not solely due to semantic similarity
between prime and target, though such similarity enhances
priming (Cleland & Pickering 2003): Cross-linguistic priming
(see sect. 3.2) using translation-equivalent verbs is smaller than
would be expected if the lexical boost resulted purely from seman-
tic repetition (Bernolet et al. 2012; Cai et al. 2011; Schoonbaert
et al. 2007).
8. For convenience, we use X → Y Z to express declarative
(non-directional) well-formedness constraints on representations.
9. We argued above that the lack of priming between sen-
tences with V PP NP and V NP PP constituent order (Pappert
& Pechmann 2014; Pickering et al. 2002) supports a monostratal
account of syntactic representation in accord with Cai, Pickering,
and Branigan (2012), there is no effect of unordered constituent
structure, and the thematic-order and thematic-function effects
cancel each other out.
10. A challenge for Construction Grammar is the evidence that
priming seems unaffected by whether prime and target involve
Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
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the same construction (form-meaning pairing) or not. Thus,
Konopka and Bock (2009) found equivalent priming within and
between non-idioms (e.g., The graduating senior sent his applica-
tion in) and idioms (e.g., The teenager shot his mouth off), which
constitute different constructions in Construction Grammar. An
explanation of such findings in terms of Construction Grammar
would have to assume that the form component of constructions
can be primed, and that priming takes place between different
constructions that share form components to the same extent as
it does within a construction. Hence, priming could not be used
to support the existence of form-meaning pairings.
11. In Culicover and Jackendoff’s (2005) account, information
structure forms a separate tier of semantic representation from
propositional structure.
12. Many studies demonstrate facilitation following repeated
presentation of a construction – for example, reduced processing
times for strong garden-path sentences (Fine et al. 2013) or mar-
ginally unacceptable sentences (Kaschak & Glenberg 2004), and a
higher likelihood of judging marginally unacceptable sentences as
acceptable (Luka & Barsalou 2005). But the relationship between
such studies and structural priming studies involving individual
prime-target pairs is unclear.
13. Priming may affect response times in production (Corley &
Scheepers 2002; Smith & Wheeldon 2001), but current evidence
overwhelmingly relates to structure choice.
Open Peer Commentary
The limitations of structural priming are not the
limits of linguistic theory
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000310, e283
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Abstract: Structural priming is a useful technique for testing the
predictions of linguistic theories, but one cannot conclude anything
definitively about the shape of those theories from any particular
methodology.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) present a case that linguistic theory
should pay heed to the results of structural priming studies. I can
agree with this wholeheartedly. Since the pioneering work of Bock
(1986), structural priming has provided interesting evidence for
the construction of linguistic representations as part of the
process of sentence generation and understanding. B&P are
somewhat ambivalent on the question of whether linguistic
theory should pay heed only to structural priming (as seems
implied in the abstract) or simply add it to the repertoire of meth-
odologies for testing the predictions of theories. If simply an addi-
tion to the repertoire, again, I am in thorough agreement.
However, B&P draw unwarranted conclusions about the content
of linguistic theory on the basis of their discussion of structural
priming. B&P mention Chomsky’s (1981) point that one should
look carefully at the experiment, as well as the theory, when
faced with a negative result in an experimental test of a theory.
They write that this has been taken as an excuse for theorists to
ignore experiments. It is, rather, an injunction to think about
what the implications of the result mean. Often, theory is built
on extremely solid empirical premises, and if the experiment
appears to disconfirm the theory, then one has to ask whether
the problem lies with the premises, the theory, or the experimental
design. Inmany cases, the experiment simply does not have enough
sensitivity to overturn an otherwise solid empirical base and con-
comitant theoretical conclusions.
Let’s take a hoary example:
1. We saw the boy with the telescope. As any Lin101 student
will tell you, this is structurally ambiguous. There are numerous
avenues for theoretically modelling this fact about (1). One
approach would be to have some rule system that licenses two dis-
tinct representations: in one, a PP attaches to NP; in another, it
attaches to VP. The hypothesized rule system makes predictions
about the behaviour of other sentences. If a PP can attach to
VP or NP, then this rule system predicts (2), (3), and (4) indepen-
dently. The grammaticality of these sentences (and countless
others, of course) is further evidence that what was hypothesized
to explain the ambiguity is correct.
2. The boy with the telescope arrived.
3. We arrived with the telescope.
4. We saw the boy with the telescope with the telescope.
Combined with the unassailability of the basic facts, the theory’s
deductive complexity is what gives it its epistemic strength.
Now, let us look at what structural priming has to tell us about
(1) and examples like it. In previous work, Branigan et al. (2005)
showed that, when the PP attachment height is disambiguated by
pictures presented to experimental subjects, those subjects will
maintain the same PP attachment height for similarly structurally
ambiguous new sentences – a case of structural priming in com-
prehension. There is a twist, however: Such priming takes place
only when the verb is repeated. There is no significant effect
when the newly presented sentence is structurally ambiguous in
the same way but contains a different verb. So, what can we con-
clude from this? Because structural priming has no effect, the sen-
tences presented with different verbs are not structurally
ambiguous? Imagine no priming effect had been found at all.
Would this mean the theory was wrong? No. It would mean
only that structural priming was insufficiently sensitive. There is
no legitimate inference from the failure of structural priming to
claims about the content of the grammar.
For similar reasons, B&P’s arguments that mainstream genera-
tive linguistic theory is incompatible with evidence from structural
priming do not go through: The problem is that structural priming
is not sensitive enough to pick up on independently verifiable syn-
tactic distinctions. B&P motivate their claim by using, inter alia,
the fact that unergative sentences (such as Lilly danced) prime
unaccusative sentences (such as Lilly froze). Generative syntax
takes these verbs to be in two distinct syntactic classes, with
their subjects having distinct structural properties. The priming
result looks incompatible with this claim, because it places them
in the same class. There is linguistic evidence for this distinction
internal to English, however: Unaccusatives lead to resultative
readings for secondary predicates, while unergatives do not
(compare Lilly froze solid with *Lilly danced tired, which has, at
best, a depictive reading). There is also a great deal of cross lin-
guistic evidence for the distinction, motivated by numerous syn-
tactic differences, including the kind of auxiliary that the verb
appears with, the possible positions for the subject noun phrase,
and the behaviour of pronominal elements in clause structure
(see Alexiadou et al. [2004]). There is also solid processing evi-
dence for the distinction from different experimental paradigms:
Friedmann et al. (2008), in an online cross-modal lexical
priming experiment on native English speakers, showed priming
effects attributable to the two hypothesized structural positions
for subjects; Lee and Thompson (2011) showed that fixation dif-
ferences in eyetracking are sensitive to the unergative/unaccusa-
tive distinction. Does the absence of a structural priming
effect mean we should ignore linguistic, cross-linguistic, and psy-
cholinguistic evidence? Does it mean that we therefore should
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adopt a theory in which no unergative/unaccusative distinction is
made? No, because there is a simple explanation for the disparity
in results. Structural priming is not sensitive enough to capture
this syntactic distinction. B&P’s argument from structural
priming against mainstream generative syntactic theory is too log-
ically weak to carry the burden placed upon it.
B&P take the limitations of structural priming to tell us some-
thing about the shape of the grammar and the representations that
it legitimates. There is no reason to think this, however. There is
no argument that takes us from the particularities of any method
to conclusions about the object being studied, and to think that
there is is to confuse the nature of the world with our ways of
trying to understand it.
Horses for courses: When acceptability
judgments are more suitable than structural
priming (and vice versa)
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000322, e284
Ben Ambridge
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Abstract: Although structural priming is often the most suitable paradigm,
it sometimes misses effects that are detected by more sensitive
acceptability-judgment tasks, thus yielding incorrect conclusions. For
example, Branigan & Pickering’s (B&P’s) claim that “syntactic
representations do not contain semantic information” (sect. 2.1, para. 2),
while supported by structural-priming studies of the passive, is
undermined by an acceptability-judgment study of this construction.
I agree with Branigan & Pickering (B&P) that structural priming is
an excellent method for tapping into speakers’ linguistic represen-
tations. I agree with B&P that “researchers concerned with lin-
guistic representations should not rely solely on [acceptability]
judgments” (sect. 1.2, para. 10). I agree with B&P that, frequently,
“evidence from structural priming will converge with evidence
from acceptability judgments and hence provide strong support
for specific representational claims” (sect. 1.5, para. 2).
I do not agree with B&P that “where acceptability judgment
and priming evidence do not converge, evidence from priming
should be favored” (sect. 1.5, para. 2). Why? The most suitable
method for linguistic research depends on exactly what we want
to know. Sometimes, structural priming is indeed the best
choice: for example, when we want to know whether particular
forms share some underlying representation. Sometimes,
forced-choice comprehension is the best choice: for example,
when we want to know if children understand the meaning of
word order or case marking.
And sometimes, an acceptability judgment paradigm is the best
choice: for example, when we want to know which of two similar
forms is more consistent with adult speakers’ underlying gram-
matical representations (e.g., *The funny clown giggled Bart vs
*The funny clown laughed Bart). This really can be determined
only using a Likert-scale-type judgment. Structural priming is all
but useless here, because no adult native speaker of English is
going to produce either sentence, no matter how much you
prime her. The broader problem is that structural priming
yields a binary outcome measure: You’re primed, or you’re not;
you produce the sentence, or you don’t. In contrast, acceptability
judgments, if set up to do so, yield a continuous outcomemeasure.
Crucially, the use of a relatively insensitive binary measure over a
much more sensitive continuous measure can lead to erroneous
conclusions regarding representation. Here’s a case study.
B&P argue that “syntactic representations do not contain seman-
tic information” (sect. 2.1, para. 2) and that “adults… appear to have
abstract syntactic representations that are not specified for lexical or
thematic content.” A crucial piece of evidence for this claim is a
series of structural priming studies (Messenger et al. 2012a;
2012b) in which passives with agent-patient, theme-experiencer
and experiencer-theme verbs (e.g., The girl is being licked/scared/
ignored by the cow) were equally effective at priming production
of other passives. Hence –B&P’s argument goes – adults’ represen-
tation of the passive (a syntactic representation) does not care about
the identity of the verb (semantic and/or lexical content) or, indeed,
its thematic content (i.e., theway its syntactic arguments aremapped
onto the semantic roles agent, patient, experiencer and theme).
This conclusion is incorrect, however. In one of my own studies
(sorry!) based closely on Messenger et al. (2012b), we asked adults
to rate these types of sentences on a 5-point scale (Ambridge et al.
2016). Passives with experiencer-theme verbs (e.g., ignore) were
rated as less acceptable than passives with agent-patient (e.g.,
lick) and theme-experiencer verbs (e.g., scare), a pattern that did
not hold for actives. This suggests that adults’ representation of
the passive construction is not purely syntactic but contains
lexical/semantic/thematic-role information such that “[B]
(mapped onto the surface subject [of a passive]) is in a state or cir-
cumstance characterized by [A] (mapped onto the by-object or an
understood argument) having acted upon it” (Pinker et al. 1987,
p. 249). In other words, the more the first NP is affected by the
action, the better the passive –which also explains why three
hours can’t be lasted by a film or five people slept by a tent (cf.
The film lasted three hours; This tent sleeps five people).
Why did we find lexical/semantic/thematic-role differences
between passive sentences, but Messenger et al. (2012b) did not?
Simple: We used a continuous DV (“How good is this sentence
on a 5-point scale?”), while they used a less sensitive binary DV
(“Does this sentence prime another passive?). This does not mean
that acceptability judgments are always a better choice than struc-
tural priming; sometimes, the reverse is true. Horses for courses.
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Abstract:With a particular reference to second language (L2), we discuss
(1) how structural priming can be used to tap into L2 representations and
their relationships with first and target language representations; and (2)
how complex networks additionally can be used to reveal the global and
local patterning of L2 linguistic features and L2 developmental
trajectories.
One can draw methodological parallels between linguistics and
astronomy in their development as scientific disciplines. Millennia
of naked-eye astronomical observations (e.g., movement of stars)
had advanced our understanding of the universe, but modern
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astronomy did not take off until the invention of the telescopes
that allowed close (microscopic) examination of celestial bodies
and mathematical formulations (e.g., gravitational attraction)
that provided tools for large-scale (macroscopic) characterisation
of stellar and galactic systems. Linguistics follows a similar track.
Whereas decades, if not centuries, of intuitional data have
offered deep insights into language, the availability of experimen-
tal and mathematical techniques has now afforded the opportu-
nity to uncover the mental representations underlying language
and to verify and advance existing intuition-based theories. In
this sense, we applaud Branigan & Pickering (B&P) for their pro-
posal to use structural priming to map out linguistic representa-
tions. In addition, we propose that mathematical tools such as
complex networks allow us to unveil the laws governing the mac-
roscopic patterning of language. In this commentary, we discuss
how structural priming and complex networks can be used com-
plementarily to approach our linguistic knowledge, with a partic-
ular reference to second language (L2) in adult learners.
The dominant view among L2 researchers is that learners’ linguis-
tic knowledge can be inferred from their grammaticality intuitions
(using acceptability judgments), whereas psycholinguistic methods
(e.g., eyetracking) merely capture language comprehension and pro-
duction processes (e.g., VanPatten 2014). However, as argued con-
vincingly by B&P, acceptability judgement is a crude method
susceptible to plausibility and processibility confounds and deci-
sional biases (all the more so when judgements come for learners,
as in L2 research). Further insight into L2 representations therefore
requires more refined experimental methods. As B&P proposed,
structural priming fits the niche as an implicit method that reflects
representational similarity between the prime and the target.
Indeed, much research in the past decade has employed structural
priming to show that learners have integrated representations for
similar constructions between their first language (L1) and L2
(Chen et al. 2013; Hartsuiker et al. 2004, 2016). Such integrated
representations may reflect a strategy for efficient learning: When
possible, an L2 construction co-opts an existing L1 representation.
This, in turn, may account for the pervasiveness of L1 transfer in
L2 (Chan 2004; Eubank 1996).
Apart from revealing L1-L2 relationship, structural priming can
be used to reveal the extent to which an L2 representation can be
identified with its corresponding representation in the target lan-
guage (TL). L2 learners, it was claimed, do not have as fully
fledged syntactic representations as native speakers do (Clahsen &
Felser 2006). Such a claim can be tested using structural priming
within L2. For example, Cai et al. (2012) showed that a dative sen-
tence with amissing argument behaves similarly to its corresponding
full-form sentence in priming dative sentences, suggesting that
native speakers of Mandarin syntactically represent the missing
argument even though it is not phonologically realised. If L2 speak-
ers do not develop the same level of representational sophistication
for missing-argument sentences, one would then expect reduced
priming from a missing-argument dative compared to its full-form
counterpart in L2. In addition, structural priming can be used to
map out the developmental trajectory for syntactic constructions
(McDonough &Mackey 2006). It has been proposed that L2 learn-
ers initially develop item-specific structural representations and
gradually transit to more abstract representations, as children do
(Tomasello 2000). If so, a syntactic structure should exhibit only lex-
ically driven structural priming when initially learned and lexical-
independent priming at a later stage (Rowland et al. 2012).
Structural priming, however, is less useful when it comes to
evaluating the L2 system at a macroscopic level (e.g., to what
extent L2 syntax or lexicon resembles its TL or L1 counterpart),
an issue that research using complex networks attempts to
address. Network science treats language as a complex system at
each level (e.g., lexicon, syntax, phonology), consisting of intercon-
nected elements (e.g., concepts, words, phonemes) (see Fig. 1 for
an example). Complex networks allow for the characterisations of
these interconnections that are indicative of global and local pat-
terning of linguistic elements (Cong & Liu 2014; Mehler et al.
2015). For example, one can examine the average distance
among syntactic relations to determine the complexity of syntax,
or examine the interconnectivity among lexical concepts to deter-
mine the structure of the lexico-semantic representations. Indeed,
complex networks have been applied to phonology (Siew & Vite-
vitch 2016), morphology (Čech & Mačutek 2009), lexico-seman-
tics (Steyvers & Tenenbaum 2005), syntax (Ferrer i Cancho
et al. 2004), semantics (Liu 2009), language typology (Liu & Li
2010) and L1 acquisition (Ke & Yao 2008; Corominas-Murtra
et al. 2009). In theory, we can apply similar networks to L2 to
explore how L2 is organized at these different levels. Borodkin
et al. (2016) and Wilks & Meara (2002), for example, used
complex networks to show that lexico-semantic organization is
less optimal (e.g., lexical concepts are clustered to a lesser
extent into subcategories such as vegetables and fruits) in L2
than in L1. Apart from examining static patterns in L2, future
work can also explore L2 as a dynamic system by constructing net-
works (e.g., of syntactic relations) at different time points of L2
learning; by examining the changes in the network parameters,
one can explore the development of a particular L2 feature
(e.g., syntax or morphology). By constructing similar cross-sec-
tional networks, one also can map out the dynamic trajectory of
L2 approximation to TL and L2 detachment from L1.
All in all, we believe the time has come to use structural priming
to examine L2 mental representations, and complex networks to
extract the underlying patterning of L2 linguistic features. Such
a convergent approach, making use of both microscopic and mac-
roscopic analysis of linguistic features, is important for construct-
ing a theory of L2 representations and L2 acquisition, and indeed,
a theory of linguistic knowledge in general.
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Figure 1 (Cai & Liu). A syntactic network based on a 5000-word
L2 text. Networks like this can be compared in terms of their
parameters at different learning stages to reveal developmental
trajectories, or the dynamic relations between L2 and L1 and
between L2 and TL.
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Abstract: Structural priming is a sufficient but not a necessary condition
for proving the existence of representations. Absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence. Cognitive science relies on the legitimacy of
positing representations and processes without “proving” every
component. Also, psycholinguistics relies on other methods, including
acceptability judgments, to find the materials for priming experiments in
the first place.
We wholeheartedly agree with the authors about one thing: The
demonstration of priming of a hypothesized representation is suf-
ficient evidence for the existence of that representation. This is
true even if this demonstration is possible only in controlled lab
experiments. (In natural conversation, in fact, people do not
have the “tendency to repeat their own and others’ structural
choices” (target article, abstract) as Healey et al. [2014] have dem-
onstrated convincingly). Using structural priming as a necessary
condition for the existence of representations “of any aspect of lin-
guistic structure,” however, would be guaranteed to lead us astray.
First, here is an obvious methodological pitfall that we would be
throwing ourselves into willingly. Not finding structural priming
for a certain representation might have many different causes,
the representation not existing being only one of them. It might
also be that we haven’t done the right experiment, or that the
effect is too weak to detect. We might be unable to control for
important confounding variables, be unable to find the proper
stimulus materials, or lack the necessary statistical power. The
key principle here is that absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence.
Second, it is possible that the representation under investiga-
tion does, in fact, exist, but is for some reason not primeable in
psycholinguistic experiments. There is no reason to expect that
all linguistic representations posited in our theories are primeable.
To be able to control for possible effects of meaning, most dem-
onstrations of structural priming have involved a relatively small
set of syntactic phenomena, such as the dative alternation or
active vs. passive constructions (Mahowald et al. 2016b). Does
this mean that other syntactic constructions (e.g., small clauses)
do not exist? As an example from a different linguistic domain,
Tooley et al. (2014) found that they could not prime intonational
phrases. But that should not (and did not) lead the authors to con-
clude that intonational phrases lack representation.
More generally, the astounding progress that the cognitive sci-
ences in general, and psycholinguistics specifically, have made
since the cognitive revolution is founded upon the post-behavior-
ist assumption that it is legitimate to posit internal representations
and processes even if not every one of these components can be
proved by direct demonstrations of their existence. Edward
Tolman and his colleagues (Tolman 1948) provided convincing
evidence of the existence of map-like mental representations in
rats, but this never involved priming them.
As for abandoning acceptability judgments, the authors’ pro-
posal amounts to sawing off the branch we’re sitting on. The
success story of structural priming owes a large debt to half a
century of previously developed linguistic theory about syntactic
structures, massively informed by acceptability judgments.
Without linguists identifying grammatical phenomena, determin-
ing their scope, and studying the relationships between different
syntactic forms, we wouldn’t even know where to start looking.
How else would we know that The pirate gave the princess a
parcel and The pirate gave a parcel to the princess (or an active
and a passive version of a sentence) are semantically equivalent
if not through using native-speakers’ judgments to establish that
they are both acceptable for describing a certain state of affairs?
In fact, it would be impossible even to develop experimental
stimuli without using our (implicit) acceptability judgments;
there is a reason that structural priming experiments usually
don’t contain sentences such as Pirate a parcel the princess the
gave.
Structural priming certainly deserves its place in the vast array
of methods available to psycholinguists. But we see no reason to
give it primacy over the many other paradigms that have been,
and still are, essential pillars of cognitive science.
If priming is graded rather than all-or-none, can
reactivating abstract structures be the
underlying mechanism?
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Abstract: In our commentary on Branigan & Pickering (B&P), we start by
arguing that the authors implicitly adopt several assumptions, the
consequence of which is to make further claims necessary and/or
sufficient. Crucially, the authors assume the existence of discrete units
at various levels of linguistic granularity that then must be operated
upon by combinatorial mechanisms and rules (i.e., decomposition/
recomposition). They further argue that structural priming provides a
powerful tool to study abstract, structural representations. We provide
evidence that priming effects in production are characterized better as
graded than as all-or-none and that priming need not arise from a
mechanism that (re)activates a shared but abstract internal structure.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) work within a framework that
posits discrete linguistic units at various levels of granularity that
must be operated upon by combinatorial mechanisms and rules
(i.e., decomposition/recomposition). They argue that structural
priming provides a powerful tool to study abstract, structural rep-
resentations, but there are alternatives that better embrace the
broader communicative function of language (Baayen et al.
2016a; 2016b). However, even within their framework, the exper-
imental priming methodology that B&P depend on for their argu-
ment is more nuanced than what they have explored with choice
between two syntactic structures as their measure of behavior.
They assert that abstract structural processes can be studied inde-
pendently from the contributions of individual words, because
priming arises even when words do not reappear. Often,
however, priming effects are not all-or-none, and effect sizes
depend on what recurs. Thus, systematically graded priming out-
comes challenge the descriptive adequacy of B&P’s theorizing
about how lexical and syntactic knowledge interact. In contrast
to B&P, we assert that priming effects in production are more
informative when characterized as graded than as all-or-none
and that priming need not arise from a mechanism that (re)acti-
vates a shared but abstract internal structure. We present exam-
ples from our own work that show systematic variation among
the “structures” that generate priming, eschew a division
between representation and process, and exploit rather than toler-
ate differences among words.
In a single-word inflected production task, the verb stem consti-
tutes the structure that recurs, and the requisite production – an
inflected verb form – is specified by instruction rather than by a
sentence context. Admittedly, this version of structural priming
is severely constrained. Nonetheless, we have demonstrated that
reaction time (RT) differences between regular ed and ing pro-
ductions differ significantly more when primed by a written
stem than by a drawing of the action depicted by the stem
(Feldman et al. 2013a; 2013b). These prime modality (drawing,
word) differences impact the magnitude of priming rather than
its presence or absence. Relative differences such as these
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constrain the abstractness of lemma representations and impose
limitations on the independence of structural priming from
lexical contributions.
In addition, differences in production times between verbs with
high and low lemma frequency are larger when generating pro-
gressive (ing) than past tense (ed) inflected forms of regular
verbs. These reliable differences (RT, accuracy) between various
inflected word forms of the same verbs pose a challenge to an
account based only on binding between a constituent structure
rule and a lexical representation without reference to “features
like tense, number or aspect.”
Admittedly, we confine structural priming to inflected word
forms rather than sentential syntax. We emphasize, however,
that this is a useful trade-off, in that the task generates RT as
well as accuracy data, and having both eliminates some of the chal-
lenges that typically arise with the dichotomous data generated by
the classical structural-choice priming task. At a minimum, graded
priming effects across variants of the structural priming method-
ology highlight the potential interdependence between lexical
contributions and syntactic processing, and challenge the descrip-
tive adequacy of the B&P account of structural priming.
When verbs recur in prime and target structures, there is a
benefit to production termed a lexical boost (Cleland & Pickering
2003). The existence of the lexical boost argues against a purely
structural account of priming in which lexical information fails
to make contact with the central syntactic component. Nonethe-
less, B&P’s structural priming account fails to anticipate graded,
systematic lexical contributions due to differences among words.
In addition to manipulating degree of lexical specification
(drawing, word) while matching output at production, we exam-
ined inflectional regularity. Lower accuracy for irregularly than
for regularly inflected past-tense forms arose when generating a
past-tense inflection from a verb stem but not from a drawing
of the same action. Here, negative priming between input and
output structures is possible when lexical information is specified
orthographically but not by a drawing. Interactions of prime
modality with regularity – such that a regularity effect manifests
itself with productions from the written stem but not from a
drawing of that same action – challenge the claim that the lexical
boost in production derives simply from repetition of a particular
lemma (e.g., dive) that is unspecified for shared features such as
tense, number, or aspect (Pickering & Branigan 1998). Produc-
tions that share a lemma and convey the same action but prime
differently depending on the availability of the stem, set limits
on the abstractness of the representations that purportedly
produce structural priming.
Absent from the B&P account of structural priming, even when
enhanced by lexical boost, is an appreciation of the communicative
function of language and the requisite system’s priority for reducing
uncertainty and exploiting typicality (cf., Ramscar et al. 2013). Else-
where, we have argued for the benefits of discrimination-based pre-
dictors in priming over more conventional lexical-distributional
predictors (Milin et al. 2017). Key is that priming reflects not
only the “similarities” between prime and target, but also the sim-
ilarities of the prime and the target to other words. Surely an appre-
ciation of systematic differences in the probability distributions of
the various alternatives deserves consideration such that all struc-
tural matches are not equivalent. Similarly, anticipating variation
with respect to particular lexical entries and the syntactic relations
in which they potentially participate by introducing prime and
target items as random effects in analyses enriches insights into
any variant of priming (Milin et al. 2017).
While structural priming may provide a useful method of inves-
tigating linguistic knowledge with significant benefits over accept-
ability judgments, the nuances of stem-based (as distinguished
from drawing-based) priming effects as well as a more functional
characterization of syntactic patterning leads us to question
whether the structural priming effect that B&P endorse is best
characterized in terms of the presence or absence of (re)activation
of purely abstract syntactic representations.
Structural priming can inform syntactic
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Abstract: Branigan & Pickering (B&P) argue successfully that
structural priming provides valuable information for developing
psychologically plausible syntactic and semantic theories. I discuss
how their approach can be used to help determine whether partially
grammaticalized constructions that have undergone semantic change
also have undergone syntactic reanalysis. I then consider cases in
which evidence from priming cannot distinguish between competing
syntactic analyses.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) argue that evidence from structural
priming informs our understanding of abstract linguistic represen-
tations in ways that traditional acceptability judgments do not,
thus providing a valuable tool for developing psychologically plau-
sible theories of syntax and semantics. I agree with them on this
point and believe their approach can shed light on tricky cases
of grammaticalization in progress, as suggested below. However,
I maintain that evidence from structural priming can be ambigu-
ous with respect to the influence of syntactic structure alone
versus syntax-semantics mappings and, therefore, cannot distin-
guish by itself between competing syntactic analyses.
Examining data from dozens of published studies that have
used structural priming to investigate language processing, B&P
propose a theoretical approach similar to Culicover and Jackend-
off’s (2005) Simpler Syntax. According to B&P’s approach, syntax
consists of a “shallow” constituent structure without any move-
ment transformations and minimal null constituents; thematic
roles, event structure, and quantificational information are
included only in semantics. Supporting this view, they cite evi-
dence showing that speakers are sensitive to shallow syntax even
when the semantic argument structure differs between prime
and target (Bock & Loebell 1990; Flett 2006; Wittenberg 2014).
I suggest that B&P’s approach can be fruitfully applied also to
cases in which nouns, verbs, or adjectives have undergone
partial grammaticalization. Such cases are notoriously challenging
for synchronic theories of syntactic representation because the
items in question show mixed properties of lexical and functional
categories (Denison 2010). Francis and Yuasa (2008) argued,
based on evidence from English, Japanese, and Cantonese, that
at least some such cases involve semantic change in the absence
of syntactic reanalysis – a phenomenon they captured synchroni-
cally using a parallel-architecture representation (Culicover &
Jackendoff 2005; Sadock 1991). For example, English quantifica-
tional nouns (e.g., lot, bunch, ton) display mixed properties of col-
lective nouns (e.g., bundle), and quantifiers (e.g., many), with the
quantifier-like properties due entirely to semantics. Thus, quanti-
ficational NPs (e.g., a lot of sticks) share a syntactic representation
with collective NPs (e.g., a bundle of sticks), despite differences in
meaning. In both types of NP, the first noun (lot, bundle) acts as
the syntactic head of the phrase. This analysis relied on attributing
some patterns of acceptability judgments to syntax and others, to
semantics. Following B&P’s proposal, one could test whether col-
lective NPs would prime the production of quantificational NPs
when speakers are asked to describe a set of objects in terms of
quantity. Such a priming effect would support Francis and
Yuasa’s proposal that quantificational nouns really do act as head
nouns in syntax, while the absence of any priming effect would
suggest that quantificational NPs and collective NPs differ syntac-
tically. More generally, at least for cases in which the source con-
struction continues to exist in the language alongside the
grammaticalized form, priming tasks could help determine
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whether a lexical item or construction that has undergone seman-
tic change also has undergone syntactic reanalysis.
It is less clear, however, how to interpret situations in which
priming effects appear in different degrees for different types of
primes. B&P cite studies showing an enhanced priming effect
when the prime and target share not only the same shallow syntac-
tic representation, but also the same abstract syntax-semantics
mapping (Griffin & Weinstein-Tull 2003; Raffray et al. 2014).
Raffray et al. (2014) found that sentences with a coerced
(missing) predicate (e.g., The celebrity began the champagne)
primed target responses with a coerced predicate more effectively
than did syntactically similar sentences with an event NP (e.g., The
celebrity began the speech). However, these two types of NP-V-
NP sentences were alike in failing to prime NP-V-VP responses
(e.g., The celebrity began drinking the champagne). B&P take
the latter fact to mean that the missing predicate of a coerced sen-
tence is not represented in the syntax. But what, then, do we make
of the fact that coerced predicate sentences primed coerced pred-
icate responses more strongly than event NP sentences did?
Raffray et al. (2014, p. 97) propose that speakers were sensitive
to particular syntax-semantics mappings, in addition to being sen-
sitive to shallow syntax. It seems, however, that one could plausi-
bly interpret the different degrees of priming to signal some
subtle difference in the syntactic representations.
Similarly, Griffin and Weinstein-Tull (2003) found that object-
raising infinitives (e.g., John believed Mary to be nice) primed
object-raising responses (as opposed to finite paraphrases) more
effectively than object-control infinitives did (e.g., John persuaded
Mary to be nice). Griffin and Weinstein-Tull (2003, p. 549) inter-
preted these findings to mean that language users are sensitive to
the similarity of abstract syntax-semantics mappings between
prime and target, because object-control infinitives have an addi-
tional argument role. As an alternative to this explanation, B&P
suggest that perhaps the additional argument role in object-control
sentences is associated with a distinct syntactic representation,
meaning that reference to syntax-semantics mapping is not necessary
to explain the results (note 6 in the target article). While Griffin and
Weinstein-Tull’s explanation is compatible with parallel-architecture
theories such as Simpler Syntax (Culicover & Jackendoff 2005) and
Construction Grammar (Goldberg 2006) –which do not permit null
constituents in the syntax –B&P’s alternative requires a null constit-
uent in the syntax. Therefore, B&P’s explanation is more compatible
with the standard generative account of object control, in which the
infinitive subject is a null pronoun (PRO) (Chomsky 1981). As B&P
acknowledge, the evidence does not distinguish between these two
possible syntactic representations.
Evidence from priming is useful for showing speakers’ sensitiv-
ity to structural similarity. As such, it can indicate which elements
must be included in syntactic representations (e.g., syntactic cate-
gories, constituent ordering) and whether historically related con-
structions continue to share a constituent structure. It cannot tell
us, however, whether differences in structure, as reflected in dif-
ferences in degrees of priming, are due to differences in syntactic
representation alone or to syntax-semantics mappings. While
structural priming provides valuable evidence for linguistic
theory building, the abstract representational basis for any partic-
ular facilitation effect remains subject to interpretation. A psycho-
logically plausible theory of syntactic and semantic representation,
therefore, must take into account many different types of evi-
dence, each of which has its own advantages and limitations.
The logic of syntactic priming and
acceptability judgments
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000371, e289
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Abstract: A critical flaw in Branigan & Pickering’s (B&P’s) advocacy of
structural priming is the absence of a theory of priming. This
undermines their claims about the value of priming as a methodology.
In contrast, acceptability judgments enable clearer inferences about
structure. It is important to engage thoroughly with the logic behind
different structural diagnostics.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) wish that structural priming would
get more love as a source of evidence about linguistic structures.
We certainly welcome all sources of relevant evidence. Their case,
however, would be helped if they engaged more thoroughly with
the logic underlying priming and standard acceptability judgment
(AJ) evidence. Their disparagement of linguistics is unhelpful, but
we leave it to other commentators to address those issues.
Most importantly, B&P provide no account of syntactic priming
and the circumstances in which it should obtain, beyond the
obvious fact that priming reflects similarity of some kind. This
makes it difficult to draw clear conclusions from priming findings.
Meanwhile, they miss key aspects of how acceptability judgments
are used to draw inferences about linguistic structure.
B&P claim that AJ merely diagnoses set membership (i.e.,
whether a sentence is possible or impossible), whereas priming
is more powerful because it additionally diagnoses similarity
between strings. This is incorrect. AJ is routinely used to test par-
adigms of closely related sentences in order to diagnose specific
representational properties (e.g., identity [coordination, ellipsis],
structural hierarchy [binding], or locality [relativization, wh-move-
ment]). These tools do not diagnose all properties that we might
care about, but when they work, they allow precise inferences.
In contrast, priming diagnoses similarity in a less precise
fashion. A pair of sentences can be similar in multiple different
ways, so the finding that they prime one another allows us to
draw only weak inferences. A more explicit account of structural
priming could sharpen B&P’s arguments. We suspect that they
assume priming requires a form of structural identity in which
the prime and target include a single piece of structure that is
identical between the two (e.g., a verb phrase), and that structure
has identical daughters (e.g., the verb phrase has a ternary branch-
ing internal structure). This is different from the weaker hypoth-
esis that, for example, the prime and target must share a sequence
of syntactic nodes, even if those nodes are not structured identi-
cally. The evidence for the stronger hypothesis is not provided,
and it is not clear what such evidence would look like.
Priming is not well suited to identifying differences rather than
similarities between structures. We contrast this with arguments
that can be constructed using patterns of AJ. These sometimes
provide evidence that superficially different constructions are
structurally similar (e.g., comparative constructions and wh-ques-
tions are subject to the same locality restrictions [Bresnan 1975]).
Sometimes, the converse is true: Constructions that are superfi-
cially similar are actually structurally different (e.g., control vs.
exceptional case marking constructions).
To take a specific example from the paper: priming between
unaccusative and unergative constructions in Spanish only pro-
vides evidence that the two constructions are similar at some
level, as is evident from their surface syntax. Nobody disputes
that they have something in common. The interesting contribu-
tion from various kinds of AJ evidence is that unaccusatives and
unergatives are not structurally identical and have differences
that are generally not obvious in surface forms (Levin & Rappa-
port 1995).
Therefore, from our perspective, AJ is the more versatile and
cost-effective tool, with a more varied set of specific diagnostics
that can identify hierarchical relations, constituency relations,
and varieties of long-distance relations, in contrast to priming’s
rather vague indication of structural similarity at some level.
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However, we acknowledge that there is a potential for priming
and AJ to provide complementary evidence under a more devel-
oped theory of priming than is currently offered.
B&P are quick to dismiss results from standard AJ diagnostics of
constituency, pointing out the well-known fact that different diag-
nostics do not always converge straightforwardly. This strikes us as
an odd strategy. Reliably conflicting results should prompt one to
re-examine rather than discard the data or the methodology. Con-
stituency diagnostics do indeed produce apparent conflicts under
standard assumptions; this is a gift to the researcher rather than a
threat, however, because it invites us to dig deeper and to under-
stand better how the diagnostics work. Such efforts have proven
fruitful (e.g., Pesetsky 1995; Steedman 2000; Phillips 2003).
As far as we can tell, the priming literature, including almost all
studies carried out by the authors, depends on properties that are
independently diagnosed by AJ. For example, in many studies, the
authors presuppose the existence of PPs, VPs, and NPs, all of
which are constructs derived from AJ. If AJ data are as flawed
as the authors suggest, then this is problematic for priming
studies that take basic AJ findings as a starting point. It is
unclear how constituency could be identified solely by priming.
Finally, B&P argue that priming evidence supports a monostra-
tal view of syntax (i.e., a single level of syntactic representation), in
contrast to transformational accounts in which multiple represen-
tations are related to one another by movement operations. We
acknowledge the importance of the issue, but it is unclear how
the priming evidence bears on it. Everybody acknowledges that
sentences encode different types of relations: thematic roles,
grammatical relations (e.g., subject, direct object), scope, topic/
focus, etc. This is not in dispute. The disagreements surround
the question of how these various relations are structurally
encoded and how the structural encodings are related to one
another. Transformational accounts are one hypothesis about
the relation between the encodings, but all accounts must offer
an account of the same problems. What kind of priming result,
in principle, could falsify the authors’ belief that syntax is mono-
stratal and provide positive evidence for more than one level of
representation? We know of no such evidence.
In sum, the authors should articulate a more explicit theory of
priming, what it can and cannot diagnose, and how it relates to evi-
dence from other tests. Priming evidence has the potential to com-
plement AJ data, but priming evidence will be taken more seriously
by those steeped in AJ (and other methods) if there is a genuine
attempt to engage with the logic behind the various tests.
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Abstract: Assuming that linguistic representation has been studied only by
linguists using grammaticality judgments, Branigan & Pickering (B&P)
present structural priming as a novel alternative. We show that their
assumptions are incorrect for cognitive-functional linguistics, exposing
converging perspectives on form/meaning pairings between generativists
and cognitive-functional linguists that we hope will spark the cross-
disciplinary discussion necessary to produce a cognitively plausible
model of linguistic representation.
We agree with Branigan & Pickering’s (B&P’s) general argument
that, to understand how language works, we must take into
account both representation and processing. However, we take
issue with several of the specific arguments put forth by the
authors. These are:
That acceptability judgments are the only tool available to
linguists;
That structural priming is the only alternative to acceptability
judgments;
That linguists and psychologists don’t work together to investigate
linguistic representation.
These arguments are true only if we assume that linguistic rep-
resentation is as defined by generative grammar: the result of an
encapsulated system in which syntactic structure is divorced
from meaning, and meaning is construed in formalist terms
(Heim & Kratzer 1998; Schiffer 2015). Vis-à-vis the broader lan-
guage research community, the generativist view is mischaracter-
ized as enjoying global consensus when, in fact, it has been
opposed rigorously for decades by other linguistic traditions – in
particular, by researchers within the cognitive-functional tradi-
tion. The direct consequence of this myopia is imagining that
the limitations built into the generativist paradigm, in fact, are lim-
itations on the entire field.
It is a truism in science that how a question is asked determines
the type of answers that can be sought. Cognitive functional linguis-
tics diverges from the generative school by assuming that there is an
intimate connection between the form of language and the
meaning that it communicates, with the consequence that
neither form nor meaning can be studied in isolation. With this
assumption comes Lakoff’s (1990) “Cognitive Commitment”: to
ensure that what is posited regarding linguistic structure and repre-
sentation is in accord with findings from other disciplines regarding
the mind and the brain, along with a recognition that the develop-
ment of cognitively plausible theories of language will require
dialog with scholars in neighboring disciplines (cf., Tomasello
1998; 2003b). These commitments establish from the outset that
understanding linguistic representationmust be amultidisciplinary
undertaking. The fulfillment of these commitments canbe found in
the growing number of research articles and books investigating
linguistic representation using dozens ofmethodologies either bor-
rowed from, or developed in conjunction with, multiple neighbor-
ing disciplines. These commitments are so important that there is a
long-standing workshop series, the Empirical Methods in Cogni-
tive LinguisticsWorkshops, whose primary goal is to bring together
researchers from a wide variety of fields who seek to strengthen
their methodological repertoires for the study of language and
cognition.
As a field, cognitive-functional linguistics has brought together
the following methods, among others:
Analyses of corpus data (e.g., Divjak & Arppe 2013; Yoon & Gries
2016),
Behavioral experiments (e.g., Dabrowska 2014; Feist 2010; 2013; Liu
& Bergen 2016; Bergen & Coulson 2006; Winter & Matlock 2013),
Eye-tracking studies (e.g., Huette et al. 2014),
Integration of acoustic and linguistic cues (e.g.,Walker et al. 2013),
Studies of the interface between language and perception (e.g.,
Winawer et al. 2008; Lupyan 2012),
Gesture research (e.g., Núñez & Sweetser 2006),
Linguistic analyses (e.g., Haspelmath 2008),
Sensorimotor concepts (Ströbel 2016),
Statistical analyses of cross-linguistic variation (e.g., Croft & Poole
2008; Feist 2008; Levinson & Meira 2003),
Neuropsycholinguistic experiments (e.g., Van Petten et al. 1999;
Coulson & Van Petten 2002; Saj et al. 2014; Perry & Lupyan
2014).
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This short list of methods used in the study of linguistic represen-
tation is representative of the massive collective efforts that have
yielded a view of language in which:
1. Prototype structures and schemas are evident in representa-
tional categories at multiple linguistic levels, including semantic
(e.g., Lakoff 1987; Spivey et al. 2004), morphological (Bybee &
Moder 1983), and phonological (Bybee 1994);
2. There is no clear separation between levels of linguistic rep-
resentation (Fillmore et al. 1988; Goldberg 2003);
3. Meaning is based on usage and experience, resulting in the
existence of highly interconnected conceptual networks (Fillmore
1976; Ströbel 2016);
4. Meaning is context-dependent and dynamically created
online, fed by multiple sources of available information (Feist &
Duffy 2015; Lupyan & Casasanto 2015).
There is a gentle irony to the conclusion B&P reach at the end of
their article. Their chosen method, structural priming, led them
away from the classical generativist proposal to conclude that struc-
ture and meaning cannot be studied in isolation, making their views
ultimately consistent with the cognitive-functional tradition. This
convergence suggests a way forward: that we all come to the
table with our disparate lines of research to create a cognitively
plausible model of linguistic representation. A similar suggestion
was made by Jackendoff (2002) when he attempted to create a cor-
nerstone for the convergence of linguistic theory. Unfortunately,
little came of his efforts, because of, in part, the sparseness of out-
reach to researchers in the cognitive-functional tradition (cf.,
Spivey & Gonzalez-Marquez 2003). In reintroducing this issue,
we hope to spark conversations that will help advance our under-
standing of the representation and processing of language.
In sum, we don’t take issue with the view of language B&P ulti-
mately propose; in fact, we tend to agree with it. Our point is to
underline that this view is not novel, and that in integrating
these findings with other proposals and findings, we can
broaden our understanding of the linguistic representations that
underlie speakers’ capabilities.
A usage-based cognitive linguistic (re-)
interpretation of priming evidence
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000395, e291
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Abstract: Usage-based cognitive linguistic (UBCL) theories offer a
unifying interpretation of the different (structural vs. [more] lexical)
priming effects reported by Branigan & Pickering (B&P), and they
provide an ideal basis for explaining contextual influences on priming.
However, they also call into question B&P’s claim that priming
“provides evidence that is directly informative about mental
representation” (sect. 1.5, para. 1).
I fully agree with Branigan & Pickering (B&P) that it is high time
psychologists, psycholinguists, and linguists join forces in investi-
gating linguistic knowledge. I also agree that priming experiments
can contribute to arriving at a better, cognitively more realistic
understanding of language. Priming evidence, however, is not
immune to theoretical bias. I will illustrate this by approaching
the priming effects reported by B&P from the perspective of
usage-based cognitive linguistics (UBCL) (e.g., Croft 2001; Gold-
berg 1995, 2003, 2006; Langacker 2000, 2008; The Five Graces
Group 2009; Schmid 2015); that is, I will (re-)interpret them
based on the following assumptions:
“Language is an integral part of human cognition” (Langacker
1987, p. 12);
Linguistic knowledge is highly dynamic and context-adaptive; it
emerges from situated usage and is therefore potentially
changed by every single usage experience;
Rules emerge from generalization processes; they take the form of
schematic form–meaning pairs (constructions); that is, they are
equivalent in nature and structure to specific lexical items or
multi-word units. Consequently, grammar/syntax and lexicon form
a continuum;
Knowledge of language is organized in a complex network of con-
structions. This network:
. Licenses redundancy, that is, contains both specific linguis-
tic structures and their different degrees of abstractions, as
well as both larger (e.g., sentence-level) and smaller construc-
tions (e.g., single lexical items);
. Is characterized by multiple (types of) relations that the
single constructions (as well as their form- or meaning-sides
only) can hold to each other.
These UBCL principles suggest alternative interpretations of
priming effects to those proposed by B&P.
Most centrally, they allow for structural priming to be inter-
preted differently than as evidence in support of the autonomy
of syntax. In UBCL terms, the only relevant difference between
structural and (more) lexical priming effects is that schematic
rather than specific form–meaning pairs are primed. This inter-
pretation allows for all instances of priming (including lexical
priming) to be modeled in a unitary fashion: as based on the
same mechanisms and as applying to different levels of the
same network of linguistic knowledge. Because this network also
contains semi-specific elements (e.g., [NP go PP]; see, e.g., Gold-
berg 2003), the UBCL view of priming also readily accommodates
lexical boost effects. Thus, from a UBCL perspective, the major
potential of using priming to investigate linguistic knowledge
does not so much lie in differentiating between syntactic and
lexical processes and representations, but in identifying which
level(s) of the constructional network language users actually
and/or habitually access (see also Tomasello 2006, p. 3).
This construction-based UBCL view also suggests that struc-
tural priming effects (just as lexical priming effects; see B&P,
sect. 1.4, para. 3) might not occur only when “prime and target
involve the same construction” (B&P, note 10), but also when
the constructions involved in prime and target processing are
(closely) related. The relations driving priming effects can be of
different types (e.g., schema–instance, part–whole, similarity,
contrast, etc.) and can variably hold between entire constructions
or between their form- or meaning-sides only (e.g., Langacker
1987, p. 13). Findings of priming between idioms and formally
parallel non-idiomatic utterances (Konopka & Bock 2009), there-
fore, do not contradict construction-based UBCL models of lan-
guage (as claimed by B&P, note 10). The same accounts for
priming between sentences in which different thematic roles
and/or syntactic functions are formally realized in the same way
(e.g., B&P, sect. 2.1, para. 2; Pickering & Ferreira 2008).
Instead, from a UBCL perspective, such findings are potentially
informative of the internal relational structure of linguistic knowl-
edge and the way it is used in processing.
Priming experiments thus also prove a valuable tool for lan-
guage research when approached from a UBCL perspective.
However, some UBCL assumptions call into question what
B&P define as one main benefit of structural priming – namely,
that it “provides evidence that is directly informative about
mental representation” (sect. 1.5, para. 1).
One of those assumptions is that information is represented
redundantly in the language network. It suggests that very differ-
ent kinds and combinations of constructions can be involved in the
processing of what is – formally – the same utterance (e.g.,
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Günther 2016, p. 143; Stefanowitsch & Flach 2016, pp. 105–107);
that is, an utterance such as The bottle is on the table might vari-
ably be accessed as a single chunk or involve the integration of
several more schematic and more specific constructions (e.g.,
[NP is on NP] + [the bottle] + [the table], etc.). It is thus hardly
possible to draw reliable conclusions about which and how
many constructions a speaker used when producing or compre-
hending a particular utterance in a priming experiment.
What complicates matters even further is that, on a usage-based
view (e.g., Günther 2016), the sets of constructions language users
access during utterance production or comprehension are highly
likely to differ among individuals and may vary even within indi-
viduals across external (situational, social, and linguistic) contex-
tual conditions, as well as across time. Interindividual and cross-
contextual variation mainly constrain the generalizability of
observations from priming, and therefore call for a more system-
atic investigation of individual- and context-specific effects. Varia-
tion across time –which derives from the UBCL principle that
every single episode of language use can have a permanent
impact on linguistic knowledge – proves more problematic: It
entails that, by testing it, priming experiments are changing the
very representational system they wish to investigate. In usage-
based understanding, such training effects are far from trivial: They
affect the very essence of a language system that consistently recon-
stitutes itself through change and adaptation (e.g., Schmid 2015).
In sum, UBCL-based interpretations of priming effects prove
to be very different from those made by B&P based on different
theoretical (pre-)assumptions (e.g., that syntax and semantics are
separate, sect. 2, para. 3. They thus also yield a very different
picture of what can be the function of priming in language
research. This clearly illustrates that priming experiments
cannot “discriminat[e] among… accounts” of linguistic represen-
tations (B&P, sect. 1.2, para. 10) – or at least cannot do so if used
as a single method and if conducted and interpreted with specific
preconceptions about the nature of linguistic knowledge in mind.
Don’t forget the neurobiology: An experimental
approach to linguistic representation
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000401, e292
Peter Hagoort
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behaviour, Max Planck Institute for
Psycholinguistics, 6500 HB Nijmegen, Netherlands.
peter.hagoort@donders.ru.nl
www.mpi.nl
Abstract: Acceptability judgments are no longer acceptable as the holy
grail for testing the nature of linguistic representations. Experimental
and quantitative methods should be used to test theoretical claims in
psycholinguistics. These methods should include not only behavior, but
also the more recent possibilities to probe the neural codes for
language-relevant representations.
I am in full agreement with Branigan & Pickering (B&P) that an
experimental approach to linguistic representation is necessary.
Despite the central role of grammaticality judgment in the field
of linguistics, it does not suffice. The reason is that, in many
cases, this procedure does not obey the same quantitative stan-
dards (including the proper statistics) that are state of the art in
the rest of cognitive science (cf. Gibson & Fedorenko 2010).
When I made this argument in a panel discussion at a major lin-
guistics conference, the following counterargument was pre-
sented in a commentary:
When linguists evaluate contrasts between two (or more) sentence types,
they normally run several different examples in their heads, they look for
potential confounds, and consult other colleagues (and sometimes naive
participants), who evaluate the sentence types in the same fashion. The
fact that this whole set of procedures (aka, experiments) is conducted
informally does not mean it is not conducted carefully and systematically.
(Almeida 2010, in Talking Brains blog debate, June 14, 2010)
Running sentences in your head and consulting a colleague is
fine for discovering interesting phenomena and possible explana-
tions (for the context of discovery, anything goes), but it does not
suffice as the context of justification. We all are subject to confir-
mation bias. The fallibility of introspection is equally well known;
it is a method that hence has fallen out of grace in psychology a
long time ago. Therefore, to justify one’s theory, empirical data
have to be acquired and analyzed according to the quantitative
standards of the other fields of cognitive science. In many circum-
stances, claims by an expert linguist of the form Sentence A is
grammatical and sentence B is ungrammatical will not suffice as
a valid empirical data point in support of a specific linguistic
theory. That is why I endorse an experimental and quantitative
approach to investigations of linguistic representations.
Moreover, I concur with B&P that the experimental results of
the many sentence priming studies that they reviewed are in
agreement with the Parallel Architecture that Jackendoff (2002;
in press) has proposed and for which the Memory Unification
and Control (MUC) model is a neurobiological specification
(Hagoort 2005; 2014; Hagoort & Indefrey 2014). The MUC
model specifies non-overlapping neuronal network contributions
for the unification of semantic, syntactic, and phonological infor-
mation, in accordance with the separate generative capacities
for semantics, syntax, and phonology that Jackendoff proposes
(2002; in press; Culicover & Jackendoff 2005).
I believe that, next to the behavioral methods that B&P advo-
cate, it might be helpful to take experimental methods from neu-
robiology on board as well (cf., de Groot & Hagoort, in press). For
instance, a direct correlate of priming in behavior is fMRI adapta-
tion. This is the phenomenon that the blood-oxygen-dependent
(BOLD) response in neuronal populations sensitive to a stimulus
attribute is suppressed or enhanced when that attribute is
repeated (Grill-Spector et al. 2006). Using such an fMRI adapta-
tion paradigm during speech comprehension and production, we
found a clear segregation for areas involved in lexical processing,
syntax, and semantics. However, for each of these domains, the
same areas were recruited in speaking and listening (Menenti
et al. 2011; Segaert et al. 2012). This supports the claim that
lexical, syntactic, and semantic representations are segregated
but shared for production and comprehension. In general, repeti-
tion suppression of the BOLD signal can provide insight into the
representational features that a particular population of neurons
codes for. In recent years, the method of Representational Simi-
larity Analysis has been developed (Kriegeskort et al. 2008) to
determine how representational information might be encoded
in distributed patterns of brain activity.
The toolkit of cognitive neuroscience has expanded in the last
few decades (cf., De Groot & Hagoort, in press). This does not
take away the need for linguistic theory and theory-driven ques-
tions. However, the context of justification has to meet the stan-
dards of the other branches of cognitive science. Clearly,
acceptability judgments can no longer be seen as the holy grail
for testing the nature of linguistic representations. There is no
excuse for leaving the available experimental and quantitative
methods unused in this domain of research.
Acceptability judgments still matter: Deafness
and documentation
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000413, e293
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Abstract: The target article’s call to end reliance on acceptability
judgments is premature. First, it restricts syntactic inquiry to cases were
a semantically equivalent alternative is available. Second, priming studies
require groups of participants who are linguistically homogenous and
whose grammar is known to the researcher. These requirements would
eliminate two major research areas: syntactic competence in d/Deaf
individuals, and language documentation. (We follow the convention of
using deaf to describe hearing levels, Deaf to describe cultural identity,
and d/Deaf to include both. Our own work has focused on Deaf signers,
but the same concerns could apply to other deaf populations.)
In their abstract, Branigan & Pickering (B&P) assert that the advent
of syntactic priming should “end the current reliance on acceptabil-
ity judgments.”We argue that this claim is too strong; although syn-
tactic priming is useful for some research questions, acceptability
judgments are still needed for other important questions.
B&P anticipate one of our two major objections: that studying
syntactic priming in production requires an alternative syntactic
structure that expresses a semantically equivalent idea. Setting
aside reasonable objections from construction grammarians,
who may question whether different structures could ever be
semantic equivalents (e.g. Goldberg 1995), such a restriction dra-
matically narrows the scope of syntactic inquiry, both within and
across languages. B&P’s proposed solution is to measure syntactic
priming in comprehension, where an alternative structure is not
necessary. They also acknowledge, however, that the evidence
for syntactic priming in comprehension has been much more
scarce and fragile; this appears to contrast with their belief that
syntactic priming research has reached maturation. Even if
there were robust and reliable methods of measuring syntactic
priming in comprehension, that would not reach the goal of
achieving a unified theory of syntactic representation, in the
same way that current research on language production mecha-
nisms has not been particularly informative about theories of lan-
guage comprehension.
Our second major objection is that syntactic priming studies
require (1) that groups of participants be linguistically homoge-
nous and (2) that their hypothesized grammar already be known
to the researcher. These requirements would eliminate two criti-
cal areas of inquiry: (1) the study of the mental grammars of deaf
individuals who were not exposed to language until after early
childhood, and (2) traditional linguistic fieldwork.
Deaf individuals with delayed access to language cannot be
assumed to share the internal grammar of native users or even of
other late learners. Indeed, the nature of their mental grammar
is often the very question under investigation. Furthermore, it is
uncommon for these individuals to be available to participate in
the numbers that are typically necessary to detect priming
effects. What these questions require, then, is not a method that
averages across many participants, but one that allows for the
description of syntactic performance within and between individu-
als. Acceptability judgments allow this; syntactic priming does not.
Previous work, much of it accomplished using acceptability
judgments, has shown that deaf individuals who are first
exposed to an accessible language after early childhood exhibit
variation in both phonology and morphosyntax compared with
individuals immersed in language from birth, particularly with
respect to more complex syntactic structures (Boudreault & May-
berry 2006; Mayberry et al. 2002). Low syntactic performance,
revealed by acceptability judgments, led us to ask whether Deaf
non-native signers of American Sign Language (i.e., those first
exposed to ASL after early childhood) would exhibit patterns of
syntactic priming that varied from those of Deaf native ASL
signers, or of hearing individuals who learned ASL as an L2 in
adulthood (Hall et al. 2015). Contrary to our expectation, Deaf
adults who had learned ASL after early childhood showed patterns
of syntactic priming that were identical to those of Deaf native
signers and hearing L2 signers.
If syntactic priming were our only tool, we might conclude that
late exposure to a first language does not perturb syntactic repre-
sentation. We view such a claim as premature, given substantial
evidence that late learners struggle with syntax (especially with
complex syntax) if they were not exposed to any linguistic
system in childhood. For example, an fMRI study revealed sub-
stantial differences in the neural organization of ASL sentence
processing in such individuals using acceptability judgments
(Mayberry et al. 2011). Although we did not administer an accept-
ability judgment task to the participants in our ASL syntactic
priming study, the Deaf late learners did show unusual patterns
in phonological similarity judgments (Hall et al. 2012), suggesting
that the results of the priming study may have failed to detect dif-
ferences in syntactic processing.
One possible explanation relates to our first objection above:
the type of structures that we can study with a priming paradigm
is limited. ASL grammar is only partially described and syntactic
processing differences among Deaf, atypical, learners are most
pronounced on more complex structures, such as object relative
clauses (Boudreault & Mayberry 2006; Mayberry & Lock 2003).
However, ASL does not have an alternative structure for express-
ing object relative clauses; therefore, we were restricted to study-
ing a simpler structure (prenominal vs. postnominal adjectives; cf.,
Cleland & Pickering 2003), where prior research has not detected
differences between early and later learners (Boudreault & May-
berry 2006; Mayberry & Lock 2003).
One way to investigate syntactic acquisition in this population is
the case study approach using well-established methods to study
language acquisition longitudinally in a few individuals (Ferjan
Ramirez et al. 2013). Syntactic priming is simply not a viable meth-
odology for single-subject or small-group designs. This limitation
applies to any case in which there is concern that an individual’s
grammar deviates from that of the broader linguistic community.
The second research area that would be jeopardized by exclusive
reliance on syntactic priming is field linguistics. In many situations
of language documentation, it is common for very few informants to
be available (let alone cooperative). Gathering acceptability judg-
ments from a small number of speakers enables documentation
of the range of structures used by the world’s languages, which,
in turn, is essential to our understanding of linguistic representa-
tion. Syntactic priming is an insufficiently powerful tool to investi-
gate these theoretically important situations.
Acceptability judgments can reveal what an individual implicitly
knows about syntax in a way that syntactic priming cannot. In our
view, both methods have their place, and more progress will be
made by judiciously deploying each tool in its proper context.
Syntactic levels, lexicalism, and ellipsis: The
jury is still out
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000425, e294
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Abstract: Structural priming data are sometimes compatible with several
theoretical views, as shown here for three key theoretical claims. One
reason is that prime sentences affect multiple representational levels
driving syntactic choice. Additionally, priming is affected by further
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cognitive functions (e.g., memory). We therefore see priming as a useful
tool for the investigation of linguistic representation but not the only tool.
We are very sympathetic to Branigan & Pickering’s (B&P’s)
general idea of proposing structural priming as a central part of
a research programme aimed at understanding the nature of lin-
guistic representation. Our concern with this programme,
however, is that it overlooks important limitations of structural
priming research. Such limitations concern the multiple levels at
which priming can take place and the fact that priming experi-
ments do not only recruit linguistic representations, but also
other aspects of cognition such as memory and attention. Some
of the key inferences B&P make from priming results, therefore,
can be accounted for differently. We argue that this is the case for
the claims that (1) there is only a single syntactic level; (2) the
lexical boost supports a lexicalist architecture; and (3) priming
can straightforwardly detect whether there are syntactic represen-
tations for elided constituents.
B&P claim that there is only one level of syntactic representa-
tion, in contrast to the two-level view taken in some parts of the-
oretical linguistics (Pollard & Sag 1994), speech error research
(Garrett 1975), and computational modeling (Kempen & Hoen-
kamp 1987). The main argument for the one-level view is Picker-
ing et al.’s (2002) finding that “shifted” datives in English (1) do
not prime the production of Prepositional Object (PO) datives
(2) relative to a baseline (also see Pappert & Pechmann 2014).
B&P argue that, if there were an intermediate syntactic level
that specifies syntactic relations but not order, the shifted and
PO structures would share a representation at that level. The
two-level view, therefore, would predict priming from shifted to
PO structures (albeit weaker than priming from PO to PO, as
both POs, of course, would share representations at both
levels). However, this line of reasoning ignores the possibility of
priming at the level of thematic roles (in terms of order or empha-
sis), a possibility B&P do propose in several places. After all, a
shifted dative has the same ordering of thematic roles as a
Double Object (3), and indeed, priming at that level is supported
by Bernolet et al. (2009), Chang et al. (2003), and Vernice et al.
(2012). Thus, the data pattern is entirely compatible with an
account in which a shifted sentence primes the PO because of
overlap in non-linearized structure but also the DO, because of
similarity in the ordering of thematic roles – resulting in compara-
ble proportions of DO and PO responses in the baseline and after
shifted datives.
(1) The racing driver showed to the helpful mechanic the
problem with the car
(2) The patient showed his leg to the doctor
(3) The patient showed the doctor his leg
Another central claim is that the lexical boost to priming is
directly reflective of the relation between the lexicon and
syntax. However, alternative conceptualizations of this relation
account for the lexical boost differently (e.g., Chang et al. 2006).
Such accounts acknowledge that the results of structural
priming experiments, as with any psychology experiment, are
task-dependent, and therefore a function of participants’ strate-
gies, attentional foci, and memory. Specifically, participants in
structural priming experiments may use explicit memory of previ-
ous sentences to help find a structure for the current sentence,
and repeated lexical items may be particularly strong retrieval
cues for this (Chang et al. 2006; Hartsuiker et al. 2008). Consistent
with this account, Hartsuiker et al. (2008) demonstrated that the
lexical boost is much shorter-lived than the priming effect itself,
compatible with the idea that multiple fillers separating the
prime and target sentences reduce the effectiveness of a repeated
item as a retrieval cue (see Bernolet et al. 2016 for further discus-
sion). In summary, although it may be tempting to make direct
inferences about the representational level from priming patterns,
such inferences may overlook the role of memory (and perhaps
other aspects of the person, task, context).
A final claim is that structural priming is informative about the
syntactic representation of constituents that are represented
semantically but not phonologically, as in ellipsis and coercion.
In several examples, however, the interpretation rests on tacit
assumptions. Take Cai et al.’s (2013) example: The waitress
would like to lend the sailor the gun. Being afraid of getting into
trouble, the chef would not like to [lend the sailor the gun].
There was no DO priming for sentences with ellipsis, but there
was DO priming for sentences containing the full constituent.
The logic here depends on the tacit assumption that, in the sen-
tences with ellipses, any syntactic representation of the elided
constituent must be parallel to the initial version of that constitu-
ent. If this assumption is not correct, however, and participants
have a tacit syntactic representation for lend the gun to the
sailor in a reasonable number of cases, little DO priming can be
expected. Additionally, in Raffray et al.’s (2014) study on coercion,
no difference in priming of coerced sentences was found for the
coerced sentence The celebrity began the champagne compared
to the control sentence The celebrity began the speech, suggesting
that there is no syntactic representation for a missing predicate
(drinking) in the coerced sentence. This conclusion again
depends on a tacit assumption, namely that, in the control sen-
tence, the status of speech as an event prevents participants
from postulating a predicate. But if participants would postulate
a predicate (they might represent the celebrity beginning to
read, say, or practice the speech), the control and coerced sen-
tence should behave alike
Although we fully agree that structural priming is a promising
tool for investigating syntactic representation, we doubt whether
it should be the only tool. As we have argued here, priming pat-
terns are often compatible with several accounts, and complicat-
ing factors are that (1) priming likely affects several levels of
representation; (2) priming is not only a function of processes
within the system of linguistic representations, but also of pro-
cesses outside of it such as memory; and (3) the interpretation
of priming experiments sometimes hinges on a priori assumptions.
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Abstract: As Branigan & Pickering (B&P) argue, structural priming has
important implications for the theory of language structure, but these
implications go beyond those suggested. Priming implies a network
structure, so the grammar must be a network and so must sentence
structure. Instead of phrase structure, the most promising model for
syntactic structure is enriched dependency structure, as in Word
Grammar.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) rightly argue that we theoretical lin-
guists should pay attention to the massive evidence for structural
priming which they review, but their argument actually suggests
an even more radical direction for linguistic theory. In a nutshell,
structural priming shows that grammars are networks; and if that’s
true, then linguists should be developing network-based models of
grammar and of sentence structure.
Take Bock’s classic experiment with which B&P open their
case. One passive sentence primes another – e.g., an experimental
subject is more likely to produce a passive sentence describing
lightning hitting a church tower after reading The referee was
punched by one of the fans than in a neutral control situation.
How does this influence work? For B&P, “the neural
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underpinnings of priming are not well understood,” but the stan-
dard explanation for priming (Reisberg 2007, pp. 257–80) sees it
as the effect of activation in a neural network spilling over from
the intended target to network neighbours, thereby making the
latter more accessible. In lexical priming, for example, reading
nurse primes this word’s network neighbours so that doctor
becomes easier to retrieve than it would be otherwise. This expla-
nation, however, makes sense only if knowledge is stored as a
network of interconnected nodes; so the relevant units must be
connected in a network, and if the units concerned are grammat-
ical categories such as active and passive, these, too, must be part
of a network.
This argument is familiar from the literature on connectionist
models of processing and learning (Dell et al. 1999; Elman
et al. 1996), but linguistic theories are pitched at a higher level
of abstraction than the neurons that carry activation, so the two
streams of research have hardly met. For B&P, as for most lin-
guists, language consists of abstract units such as words, phrases,
categories, and relations; so, if these are part of a network, this
must be a symbolic network. On the other hand, the activation
responsible for priming in this network is a property of neural net-
works, so it is reasonable to assume that language is a symbolic
network supported by a neural network. In other words, language
belongs to the mind, while activation belongs to the brain.
The network view of language is widely accepted in modern
theories of the lexicon (Allan 2006), with its multiple types of rela-
tion (meaning, realization, spelling, word class, and so on) and its
many-to-many mappings. Structural priming shows that networks
are just as relevant to syntax: A sentence’s structure combines a
network of patterns such as voice, tense, transitivity, and so on,
each of which is sufficiently active to prime other examples of
the same pattern. These patterns are the constraints of any con-
straint-based theory of syntax, including B&P’s preferred linguis-
tic model, Parallel Architecture. In short, a sentence’s
grammatical structure must be a rich network of interacting and
active nodes.
Where does this leave phrase structure, however, which is taken
for granted in virtually every modern theory of syntax (and, disap-
pointingly, by B&P themselves)? Phrase structure is an extremely
impoverished theory of the human mind that recognises only one
possible mental relation: the part-whole relation between smaller
and larger units. According to phrase structure, direct relations
between individual words are not possible. For example, in the
sentence Linguistic theories should work, the only possible rela-
tions are those shown in a tree such as the one above the words
in Figure 1. For example, the word linguistic can be related to
the phrase linguistic theories, but not to theories. Moreover, if
phrase structure is right, phrases cannot intersect; so, if linguistic
theories is part of the phrase linguistic theories should work, it
cannot also be part of linguistic theories work. As we all know,
however, both of these assumptions are really problematic:
Words do relate directly to one another (e.g., for agreement and
government), and complex relations such as raising (from work
to should) do exist.
Suppose, however, that syntactic theory is actually a network,
not a tree. In that case, words can relate directly to one
another, and multiple links are also possible. One such analysis
is shown by the labeled arrows below the words in the figure for
Linguistic theories should work. The labelled dependencies
from theories to linguistic and from should to theories are
typical of the very ancient tradition of dependency analysis (Per-
cival 1990) and of more recent work in theoretical and descriptive
linguistics (Tesnière 1959; 2015; Sgall et al. 1986; Mel’c ̌uk 2009)
as well as computational linguistics (Kübler et al. 2009) and psy-
cholinguistics (Futrell et al. 2015; Gildea & Temperley 2010;
Jiang & Liu 2015; Ninio 2006). All this work builds on the
simple idea that our minds are free to recognise relations
between words – an idea espoused some time ago by one of
B&P (Pickering & Barry 1991).
The network notion, however, takes us further than this, to the
idea that such relations need not be formally equivalent to a tree.
In the example, theories is the subject not only of should, but also
of work – a pattern that goes well beyond the formal limits of
trees. This example illustrates the enriched dependency structure
of one particular modern theory of grammar, Word Grammar
(Duran-Eppler 2011; Gisborne 2010; Hudson 2007; 2010). In
this theory, syntactic structure is so rich that it can even recognise
mutual dependency in cases such as Who came?, in which who
depends (as subject) on came and came depends (as complement)
on who. Mutual dependency is absolutely impossible in any tree-
based theory, but of course, it is commonplace in ordinary cogni-
tion (e.g., in social structures).
In conclusion, structural priming shows not only that a grammar
is a network, but also that enriched dependency structure is more
plausible than phrase structure as a model of mental syntax.
Action sequences instead of representational
levels
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Abstract: Despite enthusiastic agreement that experimental data are
directly relevant for determining grammar architecture, we present one
main objection to the conclusions that the authors draw from their
results: The data are perfectly compatible – in fact, much more in line –
with an alternative that does not rely on syntactic representations.
Instead, it is processing actions whose activation for comprehension/
production explains intra-/inter-speaker priming.
The target article is part of a welcome recent trend to take psycho-
linguistic results as able to adjudicate among competing theoreti-
cal proposals, rather than being treated as simply presupposing
linguists’ constructs. We wholeheartedly agree with this stance;
in fact, we endorse it to a much greater extent than the authors
advocate: From our point of view, the paper presents a rather con-
servative interpretation of the cited results in that it persists with
the preoccupation of abstracting over behavioural/neuronal data
to underlying abstract knowledge representations presumed to
underlie their explanatory mechanisms (Gregoromichelaki &
Kempson, forthcoming; cf. Ferreira et al. 2008).
Linguist theories should work 
Linguistic theories should work 







Figure 1 (Hudson). Phrase structure compared with network
structure.
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We support the claim that methods of structural priming com-
parisons can be informative about mechanisms underlying linguis-
tic processing. However, the authors argue that structural priming
results are explainable only by assuming separate linguistic repre-
sentations encoding semantic/syntactic/phonological information.
Here, perhaps surprisingly, the authors seem to adopt the stan-
dard linguistic stance that theoretical frameworks/explanations
need to presuppose an abstract, static view of linguistic knowl-
edge, separating models of competence from accounts of
performance.
In contrast, we propose an alternative formal architecture based
onDynamic Syntax (DS) as the syntactic engine (Cann et al. 2005;
Kempson et al. 2001; 2017) enhanced with incremental construc-
tion of Type-Theory-with-Records (TTR; Cooper 2012) concep-
tual representations (DS-TTR; Gregoromichelaki et al. 2013;
Hough 2015; Kempson et al. 2016; Purver et al. 2010). While
eschewing a level of syntactic representation and any compe-
tence/performance distinction, such a framework is able to
account directly for the priming data as well as standard linguistic
generalisations.
Concentrating on syntax, the main focus of the paper, the data
presented provide no evidence for theoretical or implementa-
tional perspectives on syntactic knowledge that would necessarily
assume string-level hierarchical representations or accessing of
stored well-formedness constraints in some kind of context-free-
grammar format. Instead, a formal grammar adopting a DS-
TTR-style architecture consisting of routinised sequences of
processing actions with no syntactic representations is much
more compatible with the overall data. From this perspective,
the appearance of abstract structural pattern-matching is epiphe-
nomenal on the incrementality/predictivity of the processing of
time-linearly unfolding stimuli. In contrast, the methodology
that involves abstracting a level of syntactic representation over
the actions impedes straightforward analyses of patterns of inter-
locutor coordination in dialogue (Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011).
Instead of syntactic hierarchical structure, according to DS-
TTR, a small set of elementary domain-general processing
actions underpins both parsing and generation: Cross-linguisti-
cally available sequences of such actions cluster into higher-
order sequential patterns (macros) that can be learned online,
activated long-/short-term, and stored as chunks triggered by spe-
cific word forms (Eshghi et al. 2013). It is the reuse, and potential
for adjustment, of such sequences that accounts for the authors’
findings of “syntactic-pattern” repetitions appearing as distinct
and/or independent from semantic interpretations. These results
can be explained more explicitly in DS-TTR because the frame-
work addresses the pervasive local ambiguity problem of incre-
mental parsing/generation by predictive activation of various
potential probabilistically weighted processing paths (sequences
of actions). These processing paths are taken to constitute part
of the context and some of them lead to identical TTR conceptual
structures (Hough 2015; Hough & Purver 2017; Sato 2011). For
example, PO/DO or active/passive alternations in DS-TTR
reflect the invocation of distinct sequences of actions to construct
or linearise equivalent conceptual event frames (with distinguish-
ing information-structure aspects reflected in the processing
order). The parser/generator initially pursues the highest-ranked
option, with the rest maintained in the context for conversa-
tional-repair purposes (Eshghi et al. 2015; Hough 2015).
Success of one such path in achieving the intended conceptualisa-
tion will enhance the probability of perception/execution of the
same action sequence subsequently if the word forms accessed
make it available, while inhibiting the pursuance of alternatives.
Cumulative priming effects are predicted with additional repe-
tition of the triggering word forms (the lexical boost effect),
because phonological forms are stored in context for conversa-
tional purposes like clarification. Facilitation of retrieval is pre-
dicted even when repetition of the same word forms in
conjunction with the same word order leads to distinct conceptual
frames (Bock & Loebell 1990), a mechanism independently
needed for ellipsis resolution, or in priming across languages
(given that code-switching in DS-TTR does not involve shift of
processing environment [Gregoromichelaki 2017]).
The TTR conceptual frames invoked in processing explain the
observation that speakers may show behaviour indicating that
they represent semantic elements they do not hear/utter.
However, with sequences of actions modelling incremental con-
ceptual integration of stimuli, there is no need for postulating
movement or empty categories while it is also predicted that
long-distance dependencies of the standard kind should trigger
parallel sequential patterns subsequently even in the absence of
semantic parallelism. Finally, given that the DS-TTR modelling
of the grammar itself is driven by the generation of predictions
of upcoming sequences of actions, any already pursued action
paths will always be prioritised (Myslín & Levy 2016), tuning pro-
cessing accordingly and thus explaining why comprehension is
cross-primed by production and vice versa within and between
speakers.
From this perspective, syntactic knowledge is not autonomous
but derivative upon other forms of procedural knowledge, namely
sequential action planning and comprehension with gradual elab-
oration of conceptual representations expressing stimuli categori-
sation as it occurs across cognition (Gregoromichelaki 2013).
Consequently, such knowledge needs to be modelled in an archi-
tecture that integrates simultaneous qualitatively related con-
straints from various sources, rather than separate modular
components expressed in distinct vocabularies, as the authors
advocate. For this reason, we believe the consequences of struc-
tural priming, while transparently operative when isolated in care-
fully controlled experimental designs, seem to disappear in
investigations of corpora that reflect multiple other sources of
constraints such as frequency, creativity, affective, and social
effects (Healey et al. 2014).
In conclusion, an explanation of the structural-priming results
from a DS-TTR perspective dispenses with the heterogeneous
multilevel representational nature of the grammar proposed by
the authors. Yet, this more radical move we propose turns out
to be much more supportive of the general conclusion the
authors draw, namely, the relevance of psycholinguistic explora-
tions in determining the nature of linguistic theories. It is also
more compatible with recent neuro-physiological evidence
(e.g., Covington & Duff 2016). In fact, from our perspective,
priming experiments provide valuable tools for guiding the for-
malisation/implementation of grammar models – for example,
by providing measures estimating the temporal course of
pattern memory decay, investigating the competition among
alternatives resulting in inhibitory effects, and determining vari-
able probability distributions of available sequences, all currently
being theoretical and observation-based assumptions in need of
further substantiation.
Moving beyond the priming of single-language
sentences: A proposal for a comprehensive
model to account for linguistic representation
in bilinguals
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Abstract: In their target article, Branigan & Pickering (B&P) briefly
discuss bilingual language representation, focusing primarily on cross-
language priming between single-language sentences. We follow up on
this discussion by showing how structural priming drives real-life
phenomena of bilingual language use beyond the priming of unilingual
sentences and by arguing that B&P’s account should be extended with a
representation for language membership.
In their target article, Branigan & Pickering (B&P) argue for
structural priming as a key implicit methodology to probe the
nature of linguistic representations. They provide extensive data
supporting their model, ultimately arguing that structural
priming provides a tool to understand the nature of language.
The authors also discuss the implications of their proposal for
language representation in bilinguals, focusing primarily on
cross-language structural priming between single-language sen-
tences. This research has led to vital insights on cross-language
activation at the syntactic processing level (cf., e.g., Hartsuiker
& Pickering 2008), adding to the accumulation of evidence that
language use in bilinguals involves ubiquitous cross-language acti-
vation at multiple levels of processing (cf. e.g., de Bot et al. 2009;
Kootstra et al. 2009; Kroll et al. 2006). Importantly, however,
everyday bilingual communication does not normally happen
according to a scripted cross-language priming paradigm with
primes in one language and targets in the other (cf. Fricke &
Kootstra 2016). To truly understand the nature of language in
all its respects, as is B&P’s ambition, we propose that their
model and approach should be further developed to explain a
larger number of bilingual language scenarios as they occur in
real life.
One such bilingual language scenario – and a true hallmark of
bilingualism – is code-switching, i.e., the use of multiple languages
within one single sentence. Code-switching is susceptible to
exactly the same structural priming mechanisms as the production
of unilingual sentences, in the sense that bilinguals’ syntactic
choices in the production of code-switched sentences are
primed by those of their dialogue partner (Kootstra et al. 2010).
But priming also occurs with dependent variables that are specific
to code-switching, namely priming of the sentence position of
code-switching (Kootstra et al. 2012), priming of the language
of the inflected verb (i.e., matrix language; Fricke & Kootstra
2016; Kootstra et al. 2010), and priming of the actual choice to
code-switch or not (Fricke & Kootstra 2016; Kootstra et al., in
revision). Importantly, these findings are based on both experi-
mental and corpus research. This indicates that structural
priming is more than a method to investigate linguistic represen-
tations; it is a core mechanism of language use that, together with
adaptive control processes (cf., Green & Abutalebi 2013), appears
to guide bilinguals’ linguistic behavior in real-life language use.
The critical implication of this code-switching evidence is that
B&P’s model should be extended with a representation of language
membership. After all, for priming of linguistic elements from mul-
tiple languages to take place, these multiple languages must
somehow be encoded within the representational system. In most
models of bilingual language processing, this is implemented by
assuming a language node that is linked to linguistic representations
(e.g., Hartsuiker & Pickering 2008; Kroll et al. 2006). Based on the
omnipresence of cross-language activation at all levels of process-
ing, we assume this language node is linked to linguistic represen-
tations at all levels of processing (de Bot 2004; de Bot et al. 2009;
Kootstra et al. 2009; 2010). Primed code-switching can then be
explained in the form of persisting co-activation of language
nodes from the recently experienced discourse (see Fricke & Koot-
stra 2016; Kootstra et al. 2010).
In addition to code-switching, the just-described extension of
B&P’s structural priming account also may serve to explain
another fascinating bilingual language scenario: first language
(L1) attrition (i.e., loss of or decreased access to L1 representa-
tions, mostly due to immersion in a second-language environ-
ment, leading to infrequent use of the first language [e.g.,
Schmid 2011]). Recently, a number of psycholinguistic paradigms
have been used to study first-language attrition using offline,
online, and neural measures of language comprehension and pro-
duction (Rossi et al., in revision), but the mechanism of priming so
far has not been used to study first-language attrition. Based on
B&P’s point that priming can be seen as evidence of access to lin-
guistic representations, it can be predicted that, if L1 representa-
tions are completely inaccessible as a consequence of attrition, L1
structural priming should be nonexistent, whereas if L1 represen-
tations merely become less accessible as a consequence of attri-
tion, rates of L1 structural priming may well be relatively
strong. This would be consistent with inverse-frequency and sur-
prisal effects found in structural priming studies (e.g., Bernolet &
Hartsuiker 2010; Bock 1986; Ferreira 2003; Jaeger & Snider
2007; 2013). Another prediction that can be made is that struc-
tural priming can serve as a very sensitive measure of changing
levels of access to L1 linguistic representations, thus making it
possible to boost L1 activation for speakers who are undergoing
L1 attrition, much along the lines of what has been proposed
for aphasic speakers (Rossi 2013). To continue, under the assump-
tion that structural priming boosts access to linguistic representa-
tions by easing the demands on cognitive abilities such as memory,
structures that are difficult and/or cognitively taxing should benefit
the most from structural priming. Interestingly, these predictions
not only show how B&P’s model and its bilingual extension can be
utilized to further test existing issues in L1 attrition, but also show-
case the intricate relation between structural priming and implicit
language learning (e.g., Chang et al. 2006; Dell & Chang 2014;
Ferreira & Bock 2006).
In sum, we propose to extend B&P’s account with the notion of a
language node connected to linguistic representations at all levels of
processing. This extended account makes it possible to capture the
dynamics of real-life bilingual language use beyond cross-language
priming of unilingual sentences, explaining the processes of both
cross-language interactivity (e.g., code-switching) and language
accessibility (e.g., L1 attrition). Given that more than half of the
world’s population is bilingual (e.g., Grosjean 2010), this extension
is by no means trivial; it is relevant and necessary, and strengthens
the generalizability of B&P’s account.
What structural priming can and cannot reveal
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Abstract: The nature of mental representations of linguistic expressions in
relation to the time course from intention to articulation is a major issue.
We discuss Branigan & Pickering’s (B&P’s) proposal to use structural
priming to tap into this process. We show that their interpretation of
their findings cannot be maintained. We reinterpret these results and
suggest a revision of their conclusions.
How can we determine the mental representation of linguistic
expressions in relation to the time course from intention to articu-
lation and vice versa (Levelt 1989)? A new experimental technique
to tap into this process like Branigan & Pickering’s (B&P’s) contri-
bution is very welcome. Their review of priming experiments shows
that expressions with a particular linguistic structure can facilitate
the use of other expressions with a certain structural similarity.
From this, they draw strong conclusions. Their interpretation is
not compelling, however, and occasionally reflects a misanalysis
(e.g., the Mandarin topicalization in section 2.4 shows only that
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an (A’-bound) empty object is visible for priming). We suggest an
alternative interpretation of their findings.
Under mainstream generative accounts, B&P argue, passives
involve movement of the underlying object to subject position
(leaving an NP trace/copy), whereas intransitive (active) locatives
do not. Hence, the two sentence types involve different represen-
tations. B&P, however, report experiments in which intransitive
locatives prime passives. The mainstream account is – they con-
clude – incompatible with this result.
They also discuss the unergative-unaccusative contrast, which is
captured standardly by assuming that the unaccusative argument
is first inserted in the DO position and next moved to the canon-
ical subject position. Unergatives don’t exhibit such movement.
B&P show that, nevertheless, intransitive sentences with unerga-
tives and unaccusatives prime each other. Hence, B&P argue,
their difference is not syntactically represented. Syntactic repre-
sentations, then, must contain much less detail than generative
approaches assume: There is no syntactic movement, and syntac-
tic representations do not contain copies/traces.
However, B&Pmistakenly infer that anything you cannot see with
structural priming is “inaccessible” (notused) inprocessing (sect. 1.1).
As is well known, all experimental techniques aren’t sensitive to the
same processes. If a property established by one technique is not
observed with another technique, it is a fallacy to conclude more
than that there is a discrepancy to be explained. Crucially, there is
abundant evidence that certain properties that, according to B&P,
are not visible for priming are, in fact, visible to the processor.
For example, B&P’s claim that the contrast between unaccusa-
tives and unergatives is purely semantic and not syntactically
encoded is untenable. First of all, the original tests from Perlmut-
ter (1978) and Burzio (1981) show that, unlike the subject of uner-
gatives, the subject of unaccusatives shares syntactic properties
with direct objects. Second, these verb types display a difference
in processing that is independent of semantic roles (e.g., Agnew
et al. 2014; Koring et al. 2012). It follows from a difference in
the structural representation, which, consequently, must be
visible to the processor, contra B&P.
A second misconception concerns their claim that structural
priming reveals the exact nature of syntactic representations. As
B&P point out themselves, priming displays similarities in repre-
sentation of a pair of sentences A and B relative to the pair A and
C (pp.19–20). As such, this measure cannot tell us directly what
the representation of a sentence looks like. A priming effect can
tell us at most that particular sentences share some aspects of
their representation, but this does not entail that their representa-
tions can be identified.
B&P’s appeal to parsimony in their argumentation also fails due
to inaccuracies in their exposition (including references to obso-
lete concepts like Deep Structure). Moreover, the absence of
explicit mapping rules between syntax and semantics makes
their preferred alternative impossible to assess. In generative
theory (see Chomsky 1986; 1995; 2001; also 1955/1975), the
role of grammar is not so much to characterize what is grammat-
ical as opposed to ungrammatical, but to characterize the relation
between forms and their interpretations. Due to the phase-based
organization of derivations, B&P’s reference to levels misses the
point. Properties reflecting steps in this derivational process are
accessible to the processor, as shown by a variety of experimental
techniques currently employed in addition to grammaticality judg-
ment tasks (which B&P fail to acknowledge) (e.g., Bever & Sanz
1997; Brennan & Pylkkänen 2016; Crain & Thornton 1998; Fried-
mann et al. 2008; Koornneef et al. 2011; Sprouse et al. 2016).
Unlike what B&P presume, (Narrow) Syntax is independently
characterized, namely as involving operations subject to restric-
tions (e.g., locality constraints) that are independent of intended
meaning. Consider resumptive pronouns in wh-questions. The
formation of wh-questions is subject to locality conditions. Inter-
estingly, wh-questions that violate a locality condition can be
“saved” by using a resumptive pronoun. The resumptive
pronoun does not contribute to the meaning but makes an
otherwise ungrammatical dependency licit. This shows that the
interpretation itself is not blocked, but a particular syntactic der-
ivation to realize that interpretation (for a similar contrast in
binding dependencies, see e.g. Reuland 2011a; 2011b; Koornneef
& Reuland 2016). Therefore, B&P’s argument that there is no
level of detailed syntactic representation because the priming
tool does not track that level is misguided.
Yet, we share B&P’s concern “[to identify] which aspect of
structure that priming taps into” (sect. 1.4, para. 7). We suggest
that the method of structural priming tracks no more, but also
no less, than a particular aspect of detailed linguistic representa-
tions – namely, what is visible to the external systems. Phase
theory helps us identify this aspect. Phase theory hypothesizes
that, once the derivation of a relevant chunk – a propositional
structure, a DP/PP – is complete, it is handed over to the realiza-
tion and interpretation systems. Its internal structure – copies/
traces – becomes inaccessible at that point. Hence, at this hand-
over point, what is accessible in unergative and unaccusative struc-
tures will be quite similar, yielding the priming data unsurprising.
The same applies to passives. What is visible of their internal
structure will lack detail at the handover point, making them suf-
ficiently similar to locatives for priming. Finally, given that scope
marking is structurally represented, and the scope marker is exter-
nal to the core proposition, the latter’s internal structure, but not
the scope marker, will have become inaccessible at the handover
point. This reinterpretation in terms of phases provides a straight-
forward account of B&P’s findings. In short, phase theory can help
understand what structural priming shows.
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Abstract: Like Branigan & Pickering (B&P), we agree that processing
evidence is important for linguistic theorization; however, without much
evidence of priming of hierarchical argument structure independent of
linear ordering, the nature of “structure” in structural priming remains
unclear. Consequently, it is an empirical question whether structural
priming and acceptability judgments tap into cognitive processes of a
similar nature.
In the Chomskyian tradition, a clear distinction is made between
competence and performance (Chomsky 1965), and linguistic the-
orization has been primarily concerned with native speaker’s meta-
linguistic judgments of sentences. Branigan & Pickering (B&P)
depart from this tradition and argue that grammar is directly
accessed during language processing, so processing evidence is as
relevant for linguistic theorization as acceptability judgments are.
To be specific, B&P argue that structural priming can be taken
as evidence for linguistic representation. We agree with B&P that
structural priming is a useful tool in the study of language;
however, we would like to point out that structural priming also
has the issue of “source ambiguity” (similarly to acceptability judg-
ments noted by B&P; Chomsky 1977), crucially in the context of
structural representation assumed in the proposal.
When the processing of input A affects the processing of input
B, which shares an aspect of linguistic structure with input A but
otherwise is unrelated, the phenomenon is viewed as an instance
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of structural priming. What if there is more than one aspect that
both input A and B share? In this case, the source of the
priming effect remains ambiguous. Unfortunately, most evidence
taken in support of structural priming has this source ambiguity
issue – in particular, ambiguity between sequential and hierarchi-
cal relations. For example, although structural priming effects
were reported in many studies of structural alternations without
meaning change – e.g., alternations between prepositional/
double-object sentences (henceforth, POs/DOs), passive/active
sentences, different orderings of the auxiliary and main verb,
and different positions of a particle in phrasal verbs (Bock 1986,
1989; Hartsuiker & Westenberg 2000; Konopka & Bock 2009;
Messenger et al. (2012b); Pickering & Branigan 1998), the
prime and target sentences in these studies shared both linear
ordering and hierarchical argument structure (cf. Hare & Gold-
berg [1999] for discussion of potential semantic influences).
Thus, in these cases, it is not clear whether structural priming
effect arises due to linear or hierarchical relations.
B&P ambiguously state that syntactic representations that they
assume are “shallow” and “monostratal” such that they “represent
hierarchical and linear relations simultaneously” (sect. 2.1, para. 7,
8). Under this assumption, the priming effects found with PO/DO
or passive/active alternations above would not have “source ambi-
guity” as distinction of linear vs. hierarchical relations becomes
irrelevant, a notion with which we do not agree. An alternative
account, however, is that priming is sensitive to cognitive compu-
tations of linear relations but may not be so sensitive to hierarchi-
cal relations of linguistic representation. Under this hypothesis,
the priming evidence with the potential source ambiguity dis-
cussed above is accounted for straightforwardly in terms of
priming of linear ordering, which is also consistent with the find-
ings of Pickering et al. (2002), in which sentences that share hier-
archical but not linear relations did not prime each other.
Word order is closely related to hierarchical argument structures;
however, we believe that these two cannot be equated. Take sen-
tences with a reflexive (e.g., “Johni told Tomk to be kind to him-
self*i/k” vs. “Johni seemed to Tomk to be kind to himselfi/*k”; cf.
Sturt & Kwon 2015). Although local proximity is a factor, these
examples clearly illustrate that the proximity is defined in terms
of hierarchical relations and not linear ordering (Reinhart 1983;
cf. Langacker 1969). Thus, syntax cannot be reduced to simple
sequential structure, and hierarchical relationships are an integral
aspect of human language syntax. As such, we believe that we
need clear evidence in support of priming of hierarchical relations
for the proposal of B&P to work (cf. Scheepers et al. 2011).
Thus, while structural priming seems convincing with many rep-
lications in various languages and participant populations, its nature
remains unclear, and therefore, the use of priming experiments in
lieu of (or alongside) acceptability judgments is a limited approach
to understanding grammatical structure. The proposed approach
would benefit greatly from experimental results using various syn-
tactic constructions with which the priming of hierarchical structure
can be clearly evaluated independently of linear ordering. In short,
clearer evidence of priming of hierarchical argument structure as
well as word order is necessary before it can be argued that
priming paradigms can be used to answer questions of structure,
a core feature of human language syntax.
Considering experimental and observational
evidence of priming together, syntax doesn’t
look so autonomous
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Abstract: We agree with Branigan & Pickering (B&P) that structural
priming experiments should supplant grammaticality judgments for
testing linguistic representation. However, B&P overlook a vast (corpus-)
linguistic literature that converges with – but extends – the experimental
findings. B&P conclude that syntax is functionally independent of the
lexicon. We argue that a broader approach to priming reveals cracks in
the façade of syntactic autonomy.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) make a compelling case for the utility
of experimental methods – in particular, priming – for understand-
ing linguistic representation. We whole-heartedly support this
position. As linguists, however, we must note that B&P have mis-
represented the state of affairs within linguistics. The claim that
linguists rely solely (i.e., “on a single method,” “dominantly,”
“almost exclusively”) on acceptability judgments is an exaggeration.
Said judgments have indeed been prevalent in the work of some
linguists, but – especially in the last two decades – this is far from
the sole method used. A glance at the papers forthcoming in Lan-
guage finds just one paper using acceptability judgments, but four
using analyses of observational data or corpora and two using
advanced statistical techniques. Furthermore, several major
schools of linguistic thought have flatly rejected the validity of
acceptability judgments for more than three decades (e.g.,
Bybee 2006; Chafe 1994; Givón 1983; Thompson & Mulac 1991).
Much of what we discuss below relies on corpus data. Pickering
and Branigan (1999) argue that such data cannot speak to the
nature of priming, given their relatively low level of control com-
pared to well-controlled experimental designs. This assumption
reflects a common prejudice among experimental psychologists:
That the “found data” nature of corpora makes them unsuitable
for disentangling target effects from confounds. Modern statistical
techniques now enable distinguishing the influences of many con-
founding variables. In fact, many variables important to priming
are more difficult to control for in experimental paradigms than
in corpus studies (e.g., distance effects between prime and
target, beta-persistence [Szmrecsanyi 2006]; effects of non-vari-
able structures on variable contexts, cumulative priming effects
[Jaeger & Snider 2013]).
B&P argue that syntactic representations are independent of
semantics and lexicon. This assertion is ambiguous (Croft 1995).
We all agree that syntactic aspects are (explicitly or implicitly) rep-
resented in the mind. However, saying that syntax is functionally
and/or representationally encapsulated apart from lexicon and
semantics is more contentious. B&P support this claim by
showing that abstract clausal templates (e.g., prepositional-object
[PO] or double-object [DO]) are primed even without lexical
overlap between the prime and target. Further, semantically dis-
similar but syntactically similar structures prime each other. For
example, intransitive + locative-PP constructions prime passives.
However, these intransitives and passives have more in common
than acknowledged by the authors. For instance, ergative languages
align such structures along both syntactic and semantic dimensions
(Keenan 1984). Moreover, semantic similarity beyond lexical
overlap has been found to drive syntactic choice of PO/DO, even
in the absence of syntactic similarity (Hare & Goldberg 1999).
Another strong indicator of the semantic properties of clausal
constructions is the statistical association between verbs and con-
structions (Goldberg 2006; Ellis & Ferreira-Junior 2009; Stefano-
witsch & Gries 2003). These associations co-determine the
magnitude of priming (e.g., Gries 2005). Importantly, they do
not merely boost priming but may actually resist priming (and
these relationships may change depending on context [Jaeger &
Snider 2013]). Lexical choices also often dictate syntactic
choices, both in production and in comprehension (e.g., Jaeger
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2010; Novick et al. 2003). Importantly, such choices may be influ-
enced by syntactic information that prima facie should be irrele-
vant to the syntactic alternation under consideration (Wasow
et al. 2011). Furthermore, words – even syntactically impover-
ished bare nouns – are never processed in isolation from the
entirety of their syntactic distributional information, and may
prime each other via such distributions (Lester & Moscoso del
Prado Martín 2016; Lester et al. 2017).
B&P survey clear evidence of priming among words, syntactic
structures, and semantic structures. They also explain how simulta-
neous overlap between any two of these levels results in increased
priming (the so-called boosts). One can account for these findings
in two ways: (1) relationships among syntax, semantics, and lexicon
are captured by additional interfaces whose only job is to combine
information from separate modules (e.g., Jackendoff 2013); or (2)
the relationships constitute connection weights between words
and structures, which are directly related in memory (Diessel
2015). B&P appear to prefer the first option. However, short of
undisputed neuropsychological evidence for the separation
between these representational levels (which is not known to us),
there is no way of distinguishing among three separated levels
with connections between them, and a single level of representation
with different degrees of overlap. Considering that priming effects
are very similar in the three levels, and that overlap among them
interacts, it seemsmoreparsimonious to assume a single layer of rep-
resentation, rather than positing three such encapsulated layers plus
interconnections.
B&P’s arguments rely on binary choices (such as PO/DO).
However, it is unlikely that these choices could benefit from struc-
tural overlap in phrasal constituents; the critical variable depends
only on where those phrases are placed. If there is no additional
reason to adjust structures to accommodate the accessibility of sub-
clausal units, then why would one? Whether there may be a task-
driven confound remains a question for further study. However,
notice that chronometric studies show that the locus of priming
may not always be the clause, even when clause-structural
overlap is present (Smith & Wheeldon 2001). Further, more com-
prehensive models of linguistic reproduction exist, whichmake dis-
tinctions beyond simple identity priming. Consider Dialogic Syntax
(Du Bois 2014; Du Bois et al. 2014), which distinguishes among
framing resonance, the locus of syntactic priming, and focal reso-
nance, the aligning of meanings within syntactic alignment.
We emphasize that we are not advocating the position that syn-
tactic priming is reducible to lexical, semantic, or pragmatic effects.
To truly understand linguistic representation on the basis of pro-
cessing, we must consider all possible sources of information
from processing across all levels that are brought to bear on lan-
guage use, including data from both experimental and observed
contexts. This trend is already well underway in several major
branches of linguistics. B&P’s bold proposal to establish “a new
basis for understanding the nature of language” stands to benefit
from a full partnership with researchers drawing on a broad
range of evidence to account for a system that dynamically responds
to linguistic, cognitive, and interactional contexts.
Structural priming, action planning, and
grammar
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000498, e301
Maryellen C. MacDonalda and Daniel J. Weissb
aDepartment of Psychology, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI
53705; bDepartment of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University,




Abstract: Structural priming is poorly understood and cannot inform
accounts of grammar for two reasons. First, those who view performance
as grammar + processing will always be able to attribute psycholinguistic
data to processing rather than grammar. Second, structural priming may
be simply an example of hysteresis effects in general action planning. If
so, then priming offers no special insight into grammar.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) argue that structural priming
methods have “reached maturity” (target article, para. 2) to the
point that they can inform not only language production and com-
prehension processes, but also the nature of grammar, as typically
studied by linguists using different analytical tools and methods.
This view appears overly optimistic; structural priming remains
widely used but poorly understood, with little consensus about
why the effect is observed or exactly what production and compre-
hension processes are promoted from prior exposure to a sen-
tence. Moreover, the larger class of priming methods, to which
B&P link structural priming, has been the target of extensive crit-
icism and reassessment of what can be gleaned from the tasks
(Cesario 2014). Here, we consider two perspectives on the
nature of structural priming and their consequences for B&P’s
claims for grammar.
One perspective is that structural persistence is a strongly syn-
tactic phenomenon: Encountering/producing a sentence
somehow biases the language processing system to expect or
produce a similar syntactic structure. B&P’s logic is that,
because the processing system draws on the grammar, patterns
of priming must reveal the nature of the grammar. This thinking
raises the classic issues of the competence-performance distinc-
tion. If language use is grammar + processing, there is a credit
assignment problem for psycholinguistic data: Any linguistic
behavior might reflect the grammar, processing mechanisms, or
some combination. B&P make exactly this criticism of other psy-
cholinguistic methods – for example, that Franck et al.’s (2010)
studies of subject-verb agreement production might illuminate
the nature of the grammar, or alternatively they might reflect pro-
duction or comprehension processes and be uninformative about
grammar. Crucially, this assignment problem applies equally to
priming. Haskell et al. (2010) used priming to study agreement
production and found that subject-verb agreement is sensitive
to the statistical patterns in prior usage (the primes). These
results could support a graded grammar in which statistical pat-
terns shape grammatical representations (Bybee 2006). Research-
ers rejecting this approach, however, could instead attribute these
priming data to processing, leaving the grammar untouched by the
statistics of usage. Thus, given B&P’s assumption of usage=gram-
mar + processing, structural priming is just as much subject to
interpretive uncertainty as any other measure.
Even more interpretive uncertainty arises from an alternative
view of structural priming – that it is not strictly syntactic but
rather a language example of a more general tendency to repeat
prior actions. Cognitive models of motor planning suggest these
reuse effects (termed hysteresis effects) arise because it is easier
to recall a previously executed motor sequence than to generate
alternative plans de novo (Rosenbaum et al. 2006). Our own
research investigates the link between structural priming and
domain-general plan reuse, and we have developed parallel
tasks that yield reliable structural priming for dative sentence
structures and priming of nonlinguistic manual actions in the
same participants (Koranda et al. 2016). We also observed a par-
allel effect of priming strength in both domains: Preferred sen-
tences and movements are more easily primed than unpreferred
ones, a phenomenon previously observed in structural priming
(Bock 1986). These findings raise the possibility that plan reuse
may be a domain-general property of action planning. MacDonald
(2013) suggested that a general plan reuse bias would ground
patterns of language use in basic planning mechanisms, and the
existence of a general plan reuse bias may also explain why
some nonlinguistic motor sequences such as stacking blocks
appear to prime sentence structure choices in language
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production or comprehension (Allen et al. 2010; Kaiser 2012). On
this domain-general view, sequences in one type of action may
potentiate an analogous sequence in another domain under
certain task demands (Van de Cavey & Hartsuiker 2016).
Clearly, the space of such domain-general priming effects is cur-
rently poorly understood, but if structural priming proves to be
emergent from broader components of action planning, then
there is little reason to expect that the phenomenon offers privi-
leged insight into grammar.
Further investigation of the domain specificity versus generality
of plan reuse will therefore be critical for gaining insight not only
into priming as a tool, but also into the forces that shape implicit
action choices, including, but not limited to, choices of syntactic
structure. The mechanisms supporting plan reuse are likely to
be highly conserved across domains and species, given that nonhu-
man primates exhibit homologous hysteresis effects (see Weiss &
Wark 2009). A signature characteristic of hysteresis is asymmetry,
such that a transition point between implicit action choices varies
with prior history. For example, in studies in which reaching
targets shift gradually clockwise or counterclockwise across
trials, both human children and tamarin monkeys transition
from left- to right-hand use at different points depending on
past targets (Rostoft et al. 2002; Weiss & Wark 2009). Our
ongoing work investigates whether similar perseverative asymme-
tries are found in both motor and language production tasks with
gradual changes in parameters that promote one versus another
hand/syntactic choice. If so, these findings would suggest that
structural priming is a subcategory of a broader cognitive heuris-
tic. A related opportunity to study the domain-general versus spe-
cific nature of planning is the investigation of individual
differences in plan reuse across domains. For example, working
memory tasks are a classic locus of individual differences in cogni-
tive performance, and both spatial and verbal working memory
loads appear to interact with hysteresis effects in motor planning
(Spiegel et al. 2013). Such interactions are most consistent with a
domain-general planning system, and individual differences in
these interactions should further constrain theoretical accounts
and also inform our understanding of priming. Indeed, individual
differences in structural priming (Kaschak et al. 2011a; Kidd
2012) seem inconsistent with B&P’s claims that priming reveals
grammar, which is conceived as an abstract representation with
only trivial variation across a language community. As we learn
more about priming, we suspect that the lessons for grammar
will not be the ones B&P promote but instead will suggest that
the nature of domain-general action planning has an important
role in patterns of syntactic structures in language use.
Structural priming is most useful when the
conclusions are statistically robust
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Abstract: Branigan & Pickering (B&P) claim that the success of structural
priming as a method should “end the current reliance on acceptability
judgments.” Structural priming is an interesting and useful
phenomenon, but we are dubious that the effect is powerful enough to
test many detailed claims about specific points of syntactic theory.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) claim that the success of structural
priming as a method should “end the current reliance on
acceptability judgments.” The basis of such a claim rests on the
premise that, not only is structural priming a robust psychological
phenomenon, but also can be used to adjudicate between finer
points of syntactic theory. While we agree that structural
priming is an interesting and useful phenomenon, we have reser-
vations as to whether there is sufficient statistical evidence to
support all of the detailed claims made about specific points of
syntactic theory.
For example, as a case study of what they call the “clearest
example,” B&P discuss what priming studies tell us about
passive constructions and, specifically, how priming studies push
back against the standard generative grammar accounts of pas-
sives. The details of this argument rely on priming studies that
go beyond asking whether Structure X in a prime sentence
leads to an increased likelihood of a participant producing Struc-
ture X in a target sentence. Rather, it relies on evidence that loc-
atives prime passives (Bock & Lobell 1990), that unergatives
prime unaccusatives (Flett 2006), and that POs and DOs prime
light verbs (Wittenberg 2014). Often, there is only one paper
that investigates a particular research question, and B&P typically
accept the results of that paper as delivering a statistically valid
conclusion about the phenomenon in question.
In a meta-analysis in Mahowald et al. (2016b), we give evidence
that structural priming is a robust and well-replicated phenome-
non, but caution that studies of the type that B&P rely on for
some of their conclusions (specifically, studies that ask whether
some priming effects are greater than others or whether certain
factors, such as age or L2 status, moderate priming effects) are
statistically underpowered (with an average power of 53%, as
determined by a p-curve analysis) and often do not use enough
participants to warrant the conclusions drawn. Indeed, in
studies of this sort, we recommend using several hundred partic-
ipants –which almost no existing priming studies do.
While this is not evidence that the conclusions drawn in any one
study that B&P referenced are misleading, we should be cautious
not to assume that every individual study can be used as a building
block in a larger syntactic theory. Rather, we should expect some
studies to reach statistically significant conclusions (or fail to reach
statistically significant conclusions) based on chance alone – and
not just because of the experimental manipulation. This is of par-
ticular concern when there is only one unreplicated study on a
particular phenomenon.
Of course, none of this is to say that structural priming should
not be used alongside and sometimes instead of acceptability
judgments (which have their own host of pitfalls). In the often
messy world of empirical science, the availability of diverse,
orthogonal methods that explore the same research question
using different techniques is a feature, not a bug. So, insofar as
B&P argue against the hegemony of one particular technique
(acceptability judgments) in linguistics research, we agree.
Insofar as they argue for the hegemony of a different technique
(priming), we urge a healthy skepticism.
Priming methods in semantics and pragmatics
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000516, e303
Mora Maldonado,a,b Benjamin Spector,a and
Emmanuel Chemlab
aInstitut Jean Nicod, Département d’Études Cognitives, École Normale
Supérieure, PSL Research University, CNRS, EHESS, 75005 Paris, France;
bLaboratoire de Sciences Cognitives et Psycholinguistique, Département
d’Études Cognitives, École Normale Supérieure, PSL Research University,






Commentary/Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 40 (2017) 35
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000528
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Max-Planck-Institut fuer Psycholinguistik, on 16 Nov 2017 at 07:29:33, subject to the Cambridge ore terms of use, available at
Abstract: Structural priming is a powerful method to inform linguistic
theories. We argue that this method extends nicely beyond syntax to
theories of meaning. Priming, however, should still be seen as only one
of the tools available for linguistic data collection. Specifically, because
priming can occur at different, potentially conflicting levels, it cannot
detect every aspect of linguistic representations.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) argue that structural priming is a
powerful method to inform theories of linguistic structure, and
they even suggest that it could supersede other methods such as
acceptability judgments. We will argue that the method extends
nicely beyond syntax to theories of meaning, in which priming
can serve to reveal abstract interpretive operations. In doing so,
however, we will see why structural priming should still be seen
as one among many of the tools available for linguistic data collec-
tion. In particular, because priming can occur at different, poten-
tially conflicting levels, it cannot detect every aspect of linguistic
representations.
The primary data used in formal semantics/pragmatics are
truth-value and inferential judgments. These methods document
the result of interpretive processes: what a sentence ends up
meaning. Priming methods can be useful here just as in syntax:
Schematically, acceptability judgments target the output of a cog-
nitive process, and priming data may offer a window into some
aspects of this process. In formal semantics and pragmatics, the
relevant elementary interpretive processes are often abstract
“invisible” operations. Here are two prime examples:
1. A silent distributivity operator whose meaning is akin to each
has been postulated to explain why sentences involving more than
one plural expression, such as Two boys read three books, have
both a cumulative interpretation (i.e. Two boys read three books
in total) and a distributive interpretation (i.e. Two boys read
three books each). See Champollion (in press), for a survey.
2. Sentences such as Some of the students came tend to acquire
a strengthened meaning amounting to Some but not all of the stu-
dents came (scalar implicature). On some accounts, this strength-
ening is a pragmatic process, while on others, it is due to the
presence of a covert exhaustivity operator. In both approaches,
however, the very same mechanism is responsible for the
strengthening of some into some but not all, may into may but
does not have to, three into exactly three (though this last case is
more controversial).
Distributivity and exhaustivity operators are often thought of as
covert linguistic operators, which are part of syntactic representa-
tions (Chierchia et al. 2012; Link 1987). Alternatively, exhaustivity
operators also can be seen as precompiled proxies for late, post-
compositional pragmatic processes (Spector 2007; van Rooij &
Schulz 2004). In either case, the possibility of priming exhaustive
or distributive interpretations across sentences featuring different
trigger words would confirm the posited abstract mechanisms,
beyond their mere interpretive effects. Indeed, recent studies
using typical priming paradigms (e.g., Raffray & Pickering 2010)
have provided evidence in favor of an abstract mechanism for dis-
tributivity (Maldonado et al. 2017 ) and exhaustivity (see Bott &
Chemla 2016; Chemla & Bott 2014; Rees & Bott, submitted): sche-
matically, the presence of a distributivity/exhaustivity operator in a
sentence primes the presence of this operator in a subsequent dis-
tinct sentence, showing that the cognitive representations associ-
ated with both sentences share an abstract property.
Because priming can occur at different levels (e.g., syntax and
semantics), it is tempting to assume that every aspect of linguistic
representations can be primed. From there, B&P suggest that we
could use the absence of priming effects triggered by certain
hypothetical operations as an argument against theories that
posit such operations. This is too radical, however – as we will
briefly argue, focusing on scope assignment in doubly quantified
sentences (B&P; Chemla & Bott 2015; Feiman & Snedeker
2016; Raffray & Pickering 2010). First, a specific operation can
be well motivated independently of priming. Second, the
absence of a particular priming effect may be due to a conflict
with another potential source of priming.
The Quantifier Raising (QR) operation has been hypothesized
to explain cases of mismatch between the surface ordering of
quantifiers and their relative semantic scope: the sentence A girl
invited every boy can receive the interpretation For every boy x,
a girl y invited x, in which the universal quantifier takes scope
above the existential, reversing the surface ordering at the inter-
pretive level. Importantly, QR is not the only possible mechanism
to derive inverse scope (through movement). Crucially, all frame-
works, including the Parallel Architecture view (Culicover & Jack-
endoff 2005) endorsed by B&P, need to characterize the mapping
between syntax and semantics, and therefore need some mecha-
nism to account for inverse scope interpretations.
Given that semantic operations can be primed (cf. above), the
inverse-scope operation (whatever it is, under any account)
might be primed in principle. As observed in the target article,
recent studies (Chemla & Bott 2015; Raffray & Pickering 2010)
did not observe priming of the inverse-scope operation. Instead,
these studies revealed priming of the scopal relation itself: A sen-
tence interpreted with a universal quantifier taking scope over an
existential quantifier would prime a similar interpretation of a sub-
sequent sentence, with a universal taking scope over an existential
quantifier, regardless of whether these interpretations require
inverse-scope of the prime sentence and/or of the target.
Priming of the inverse scope operation was not found, but this
potential priming effect was pushing in a direction opposite to
that of priming of relative scope. The only conclusion we can
draw, then, is that the latter is stronger than the former, and cer-
tainly not that an inverse scope mechanism does not exist (espe-
cially given that such a mechanism is necessary in any
framework to account for interpretive judgments).
Priming can be used to reveal the existence of a (primable)
aspect of linguistic representations, in syntax and in semantics as
we have shown, but not so much to argue against the existence
of a (less primable or potentially non-primable) feature. Linguistic
theories should (a) represent the primable features, and (b)
provide the means to distinguish between more or less primable
features. Although (a) is consistent with B&P, one may under-
stand B&P as implying that all aspects of linguistic representations
in principle can be equally primed, thus rejecting (b). Such a
radical view might lead to an unwarranted bias in favor of less
expressive theoretical frameworks, by allowing researchers to
ignore all aspects of linguistic phenomenology that are not detect-
able in priming experiments.
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Abstract: Structural priming makes a valuable contribution to
psycholinguistics, but it taps into implicit memory representations and
processes that may differ from what is deployed during online language
processing. As a result, the strength of inductive inference regarding
linguistic representation is rather limited. We question whether implicit
memory for language can and should be equated with linguistic
representation or with language processing.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) assert that structural priming reveals
the nature of linguistic representation and does so over and above
other available psycholinguistic methods -acceptability judgments
in particular. We wholeheartedly agree with B&P on the limita-
tions of acceptability judgments, and on structural priming
being an interesting phenomenon that is of use to language
researchers. However, if the scientific aim is to study linguistic
representation, we argue that the structural priming paradigm is
also limited in many important ways because of its reliance on
domain-general implicit memory representations and processes,
and because it only allows unidimensional inferences.
Priming is a form of implicit learning that stems from implicit
memory formed during recent processing (sect. 1.4), measured
through its effect on current processing. This begs the question
whether structural priming can indeed separate representation
from process. B&P assume that priming reflects changes in avail-
ability of the representations needed for processing, but that pro-
cessing itself is somehow not affected (sect. 1.4, para. 8). We think
that this assumption is untenable. Very little is known about the
implicit memory of recent language processing, the representa-
tions that underlie priming. How stable are these representations?
How do they relate to the representations formed during online
language processing? Are they implemented in language-specific
and/or domain-general memory processes? It seems these ques-
tions are ignored at our peril if structural priming is to be a
method for understanding linguistic representations. B&P claim
to work toward a theory of linguistic representation, but the
domain-general nature of priming does not allow inferences
about whether representations are linguistic or non-linguistic. In
our view, structural priming is best seen a more limited experi-
mental approach to understanding implicit memory for language.
Whether that suffices as an approach to linguistic representation
we leave to the reader.
As an experimental approach, structural priming allows for
rather limited inferences. One problem is that it suffers from
the same source ambiguity and response bias (sect. 1.2) that con-
founds other behavioral measures (e.g., two-alternative forced
choice or reaction time measures; see Macmillan & Creelman
2004; Martin 2016; McElree 2006). The relationship between
representation and process necessarily is blurred in measure-
ments like these, because participants can trade speed for accu-
racy, and vice versa, using an internal criterion that can be
related to either representational quality, bias, or the time it
takes for a process to occur. Unlike techniques such as speed-
accuracy tradeoff modeling (McElree, 2006; Reed 1973), struc-
tural priming cannot tease apart effects stemming from represen-
tational quality and those from processing speed.
Another problem with structural priming is that it allows
only unidimensional inferences (count in production, RT in
comprehension), so we can observe only “greater than” and
“less than” effects. This is problematic because observing
similar priming effects (i.e., null results, sect. 2.4, para. 2)
does not necessitate the conclusion that underlying representa-
tions are similar, and observing different priming effects do not
necessitate the conclusion that underlying representations are
inherently different. Furthermore, because structural priming
is not time-resolved, nothing can be learned about when lin-
guistic representations are used, or about how these represen-
tations change over time. Moreover, structural priming (in
production at least) is limited to sentence structures that
have an alternative structure describing the same event approx-
imately equally well, and therefore has very limited scope in
terms of what can be tested.
Some of these issues can be overcome with neuroimaging tech-
niques such as ERPs and fMRI. B&P discount these techniques
because of a lack of one-to-one mapping between the measure
of brain activity (ERP component or localized brain activity) and
levels of linguistic representation. We think that this is both
unfair and misguided. Recent neuroimaging findings suggest
that semantic and syntactic levels of representation are inextrica-
bly linked in processing (e.g., Nieuwland et al. 2013) and that lin-
guistic representations are implemented in a dynamically-bound
network configuration (e.g., Hagoort 2014; Skipper 2015; for
modelling evidence see Martin & Doumas 2017). However, this
does not disqualify neuroimaging as a general method to study
the processing of linguistic representations, especially with the
advent of new decoding techniques (King & Dehaene 2014), it
merely shows that the actual implementation of linguistic pro-
cesses and representations in the human brain is very complex
and not sufficiently understood.
In sum, we challenge the claim that “evidence from structural
priming supports quite specific proposals about linguistic struc-
ture” and question the extent to which it “can be used to
develop linguistic theory and discriminate among competing
accounts” (para. 2), mostly because we question the definition
of a linguistic representation in the context of structural
priming. As far as we can ascertain, it is an implicit memory rep-
resentation with an indeterminate relationship to online represen-
tation and subsequent processing.
Our deeper concern is that priming doesn’t explain how repre-
sentations, either in production or in comprehension, are formed
in the first place, nor how language processing unfolds and pro-
duces meaning. Furthermore, we think that the mechanism
through which activation of comprehended structure influences
produced structure is at stake for the theoretical advances that
the authors are interested in, and we believe that progress
towards a truly mechanistic theory of language cannot be made
until processing mechanisms are formalized and computationally
specified. Only then can the interaction between representations
and processes during language use begin to be understood.








Abstract: Branigan & Pickering (B&P) propose that the structural
priming paradigm is a Royal Road to linguistic representations of any
kind, unobstructed by influences of psychological processes. In my view,
however, they are too optimistic about the versatility of the paradigm
and, more importantly, its ability to provide direct evidence about the
nature of stored linguistic representations.
I agree with the authors that the way language is represented in
the human mind is a central question for the language sciences;
that the question must be studied empirically; that obtaining
acceptability judgements from experts or laypersons is not suffi-
cient to do so; and that important evidence about the nature of lin-
guistic representations can be gleaned from structural priming
(SP) experiments. The fruitfulness of the paradigm is amply illus-
trated in the theoretical part of the target paper and by the papers
in Dell and Ferreira (2016).
I am not convinced, however, that the paradigm is as versatile as
the authors suggest. Designing and running SP experiments is not
trivial. As Mahowald et al. (2016b) show in a meta-analysis, SP
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effects are usually small to moderate, and for adequately powered
designs, many items and/or participants are needed. This limits
the usefulness of the paradigm for studies involving children
and patients. Moreover, for secure interpretation of SP effects,
many conceptual and linguistic variables (frequencies of words
and word combinations, plausibility, etc.) must be taken into
account; for production experiments, suitable ways of reliably elic-
iting the target utterances must be found.
Of course, similar considerations hold for other paradigms. One
issue, however, pertains specifically to SP – in particular, to the
canonical variant of the paradigm in which the speakers’ choices
of grammatical structures are recorded. As the authors discuss,
the design of SP experiments requires the existence of pairs of
roughly equivalent structures (e.g., active and passive) for partic-
ipants to choose between. Therefore, it is challenging to use SP in
research on properties of grammatical representations, such as
subject-verb agreement or fixed word order (e.g., in English
polar questions), for which no alternatives exist in the language.
Thus, the authors’ statement that “priming can be used similarly
to investigate the representation of any aspect of linguistic struc-
ture” (sect. 1.4, para. 4) seems overly optimistic.
I am also not convinced that, as B&P propose in section 1.4 of
the target paper, “priming effects arguably implicate a direct rela-
tionship between representation and behavior” (sect. 1.4, para 2;
see also sect. 1.5, para. 1: “It [structural priming] provides evi-
dence that is directly informative about mental representations”).
They propose that comprehension-to-production priming reflects
on shared representations rather than processing components
specific to production or comprehension; they also argue that
SP effects differ from judgements, chronometric, or neurobiolog-
ical data collected in other paradigms by being uncontaminated by
processing influences: “It is hard to see how the explanation of
priming could depend on processing assumptions” (sect. 1.4,
para. 9). The authors acknowledge that priming may occur for
reasons other than similarity of representations, but they believe
that such effects should be easy to identify through careful
experimentation.
It is not clear to me why comprehension-to-production priming
necessarily reflects on shared representations rather than shared
processes, and why the authors believe that it is easy to separate
effects of the similarity of representations from other causes of
priming. They point out that priming effects occur “without
awareness or explicit recall of the prime stimulus and are generally
believed to be automatic and resource free” (sect. 1.4, para. 2).
However, processes that occur without awareness and that are
largely automatic are still processes. Most important, these pro-
cesses change the speaker’s language use: After presentation of
a prime, the primed structure is more readily available than it
was before. Thus, SP effects do not only reflect on the degree
of similarity between linguistic representations or processes, but
also on their malleability. This is why SP often is seen as a form
of implicit learning (e.g. Bock & Griffin 2000; Chang et al. 2006).
In addition to changing the availability of known structural alter-
natives, SP can introduce new constructions into a person’s reper-
toire. For instance, in a reading study, Fraundorf and Jaeger (2016)
showed priming for sentences such as The car needs cleaned, which
featured a structure (need + past participle) that was not part of the
participants’ dialect. This effect generalized to structurally similar
sentences featuringwill + past participle, as in The copier will recy-
cled. Interestingly, facilitation for will sentences after exposure to
need sentences occurred only in participants who were not familiar
with the need + past participle construction before the experiment
but not in participants whose dialect permitted this construction.
Fraundorf and Jaeger speculated that this pattern arose because
only the former group expected encountering unfamiliar struc-
tures. Whatever themerits of this specific account, the results illus-
trate, first, that SP can alter a person’s linguistic repertoire, and,
second, that such changes are subject to multiple influences,
including the person’s expectations about the utterances likely to
occur in the current context. This latter conclusion is supported
by several other recent studies (e.g., Myslín & Levy 2016). Fraun-
dorf and Jaeger reported a comprehension study. Maybe speakers’
choices in production experiments are less readily affected by
other variables than prime-target similarity. It seems highly
unlikely, however, that they are entirely impervious to such influ-
ences, or, as B&P suggest, that it is trivial to separate them from
structural similarity effects.
In sum, the claim that SP offers an unobstructed route to lin-
guistic representations seems incorrect to me. SP shows how
grammatical choices change with experience. Choices are behav-
iour, and like any other type of complex behaviour, they are based
on stored knowledge and cognitive processes using this knowl-
edge. The authors note that acceptability judgements suffer
from “source ambiguity” – uncertainty about the origins of
observed effects. Exactly the same holds for SP and, in fact, any
other psycholinguistic
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Abstract: Priming reflects the reactivation of processing routines that map
strings of words onto semantic representations (and vice versa) without the
mediation of syntactic structure, including the “flat structure” that
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) propose. Key evidence for this claim
comes from the possibility of priming relations involving subject-verb
sequences, which are not syntactic constituents.
Language provides a way to map meaning onto form and vice
versa. We know, from direct observation, that the form side of
the mapping consists of a string of words, inflected in some lan-
guages and bare in others, arranged in a particular order. And
we know, from inference, that the meaning side includes at its
core a representation of a predicate and its argument(s), along
with ways to express information-related contrasts and scopal
relations.
We do not know how form and meaning are related to each
other. It is generally assumed that the relationship is mediated
by a syntactic representation that organizes words into ever-
larger hierarchically organized constituents. Drawing on the
hypothesis that priming is sensitive to constituent structure, Bra-
nigan & Pickering (B&P) argue for a comparatively flat syntactic
structure, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Another idea, common in work on cognitive science, proposes a
direct mapping between strings of words and semantic represen-
tations, mediated by processing operations that make no refer-
ence to traditional syntactic structure (e.g., O’Grady 2015). On
this view, a sentence such as Andy reads books to children is
mapped onto a semantic representation by the processing opera-
tions paraphrased in (1).
(1) Andy reads books to children.
a. Andy is identified as the first argument of the predicate
read: (a = Andy)
READ
<a…>
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In this approach, priming is the product of processing: The acti-
vation of the three operations in (1) favors their reactivation, in the
same order, at the next opportunity – the classic priming effect.
One way to tease apart the two views of priming is to focus on
VP constituents, whose existence is posited by the flat-structure
theory (see Fig. 1) but not by the direct-mapping theory, which
eschews syntactic structure. A constituent-based account of
priming such as B&P’s makes two predictions: (1) constituents
(such as VP) should trigger priming effects; and (2) non-constitu-
ents should not. I will focus here on the latter prediction, with
special attention to the subject–verb relation.
Because subjects and verbs do not form a constituent, B&P’s
theory predicts an absence of priming effects for this relation.
In contrast, the direct mapping view predicts that there could
and should be priming effects of this type, because there is a pro-
cessing operation that associates a clause’s first argument with the
verb (see [1a]). To my knowledge, there have been no specific
tests of this claim, but several candidate phenomena come to
mind, of which I will mention four here.
First, it is well known that certain items manifest variation in
the type of agreement they trigger in the verb. Neither is one
such word (for a discussion of a similar effect with certain collect-
ives, such as couple, see Bock et al. 2007).
(2) a. Neither is satisfactory.
b. Neither are satisfactory.
If the choice of number agreement (is versus are) in these pat-
terns could be primed by the choice made in a previous pattern
with a similar type of subject, we would have prima facie evidence
of priming by a subject-verb combination, contra the constituent-
based theory.
A second candidate phenomenon occurs in languages that allow
partial agreement with a coordinate NP subject. As illustrated in
(3), verbs in Tsez can agree either with a full coordinate NP, yield-
ing a plural form, or with just the nearest conjunct, giving a singu-
lar form. (Tsez is a Nakh-Dagestanian language spoken in the NE
Caucasus; the data below are from Polinsky [2009]; ABS = absolu-
tive, PL = plural, PST = past, M =masculine, SG = singular.)
(3) a. Full agreement with the subject:
kid-no uži-n b-ik’-s.
girl-ABS boy-AND PL-go-PST
The girl and the boy went.
b. Partial agreement with the subject’s second conjunct:
kid-no uži-n Ø-ik’-s.
girl-ABS boy-AND M,SG-go-PST
The girl and the boy went.
Here again, evidence that either pattern of subject-verb agree-
ment triggers a priming effect would create a challenge for a con-
stituent-based theory but not for a theory based on processing
operations and direct mapping.
A third phenomenon of interest involves optional subject
marking, which is especially common in ergative languages. The
following example is from the Tibeto-Burman language
Mongsen Ao (McGregor 2009, p. 496). (ERG = ergative, DET =
determiner, PRS = present, DECL = declarative)
(4) a-hən (nə) a-tʃak tʃàʔ-ə`ɹ-ùʔ
DET-chicken ERG DET-paddy eat-PRS-DECL
The chickens are eating paddy.
Because ergative case marks a relationship between a subject
and a transitive verb, its primability would further challenge
either the existence of VPs, or the viability of the view that
priming faithfully reflects constituent structure, or both.
Finally, given possible independent restrictions on certain types
of inflectionally triggered structural priming (Santesteban et al.
2015), it is important to consider subject-verb relationships that
do not involve this phenomenon. The scopal ambiguity illustrated
in (5) is a case in point.
(5) Everyone didn’t finish the project.
This sentence permits two interpretations:Not everyone finished,
with wide scope for the negative, and No one finished, with wide
scope for the universal quantifier. Viau et al. (2010) showed that
children’s access to the first interpretation increases significantly
when primed by exposure to similar sentences in contexts that
support the not every reading. Although B&P suggest that scopal
relations are represented at a special level of semantic structure,
the fact they can be primed by a subject–verb combination
creates a potential problem for the constituent-based account.
Priming is important in its own right and as a window into the
workings of language. In the best case, it may even provide
insights into the nature of syntactic representations. Crucially,
however, those insights may well point to a type of sentential
architecture quite different both from the widely held view and
from B&P’s proposal.
Structural priming is a useful but imperfect
technique for studying all linguistic
representations, including those of pragmatics
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Abstract: Structural priming is a useful tool for investigating linguistics
representations. We argue that structural priming can be extended to
the investigation of pragmatic representations such as Gricean
enrichments. That is not to say priming is without its limitations,
however. Interpreting a failure to observe priming may not be as simple
as Branigan & Pickering (B&P) imply.
We agree with Branigan & Pickering’s (B&P’s) central thesis:
Structural priming is a good methodological candidate for investi-
gating linguistic representations. Structural priming, however, can
be used to investigate representations used in pragmatics, as well
as in semantics and syntax.
Bott and Chemla (2016) and Rees and Bott (2015; 2016) find
that scalar implicatures – the prototypical pragmatic enrichment
can be primed. For example, Bott and Chemla showed that sen-
tences with enriched interpretations of some (some à some but
not all) prime higher rates of enrichment in subsequent target
sentences than sentences with basic some (where some takes its
literal meaning; i.e., some and possibly all). These results
suggest that another layer of representation could be added to
Figure 1 in B&P, with corresponding links to the lexicon. The rep-
resentations involved would be at the sentence level (S & not[S’]),
where S refers to the basic, unenriched sentence, and S’ to the
informationally stronger sentence (a sentence involving a stronger
expression, e.g., all in the case of some). Evidence that such a rep-
resentation was independent of lexical material was given by the
demonstration that sentences with implicatures associated with
one expression, for example, some, could prime implicatures asso-
ciated with another – for example, the numbers (from at least N to
Figure 1 (O’Grady). Flat syntactic structure.
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exactly N), and evidence of links to the lexicon was shown by a
lexical boost to the priming effect (some → some generated
more priming than some → numbers). Finally, evidence that the
priming effect was independent of the processes accessing the
representations was provided by Rees and Bott (2016), who
showed that production of implicatures could be primed by
comprehension.
Why should these results demonstrate a separate level of repre-
sentation, as distinct from the semantic level of B&P? The distinc-
tion between semantics and pragmatics is fuzzy in the case of
scalar implicatures (see so-called Grammatical Theories of scalar
implicature, e.g., Chierchia [2013]). There are at least two differ-
ences between the representations described above and those
included in Figure 1. The first is that representations used to gen-
erate scalar implicatures must take alternatives as part of their
input – that is, sentences that the speaker could have said but
didn’t, for example, sentences involving all instead of some, as
Grice (1975) and many others have argued. Correspondingly,
Rees and Bott (2015) showed that sentences involving the alterna-
tive prime enrichment just as much as sentences involving the
enriched scalar expression, and more than sentences involving
the unenriched scalar expression. This type of input, and corre-
sponding priming effects, do not apply to the semantic represen-
tations described by B&P. The second difference is that
implicature representations are applied optionally (or defeasible),
as in the standard Gricean model, for example, in the case of com-
prehension, application of the implicature representation would
be blocked if the speaker is not judged to have had sufficient
knowledge to have uttered the stronger expression. The sorts of
representations discussed by B&P are not optional in the same
sense. Overall, then, while the use of structural priming so far
has been used primarily to discover syntactic representations, it
also can provide useful insight into how pragmatics can be inte-
grated into a representational language system.
In the remainder of the commentary, we make two methodo-
logical comments on structural priming. The first is that structural
priming provides causal information about similarities in repre-
sentations, whereas many traditional linguistic techniques, such
as analysis of corpora, provide only correlational information.
Bott and Chemla (2016) illustrate this. They tested whether
expressions that are uncontroversially enriched using Gricean
mechanisms share derivation properties with other, more debat-
able implicature enriched meanings. They showed that enriched
some primes enriched numbers but not enriched plural morphol-
ogy ( + s). Consequently, they argued that some enrichment and
the numbers shared a common derivation mechanism that was
at least partially separate from the mechanism used to derive
plural enrichment. Previous work addressing this question inves-
tigated the similarities in the enrichment distributions across
expressions and context. For example, Horn (1972) observed
that the numbers have an enriched meaning (exactly N) in the
same contexts as some has an enriched meaning (some but not
all), while Breheny (2008) and others found differences in the dis-
tributions. Distributional analyses, however, require considering
examples in situ, complete with linguistic material that may or
may not be relevant. Conversely, in structural priming, the poten-
tially redundant material can be stripped away (or even investi-
gated, as in the case of the lexical boost). The causal inferences
that arise from structural priming make it a particularly powerful
technique for discovering overlapping mechanisms and represen-
tations across linguistic phenomena.
The second point relates to the inferences that can be drawn in
the absence of a priming effect. When two sentences that are
hypothesized to use overlapping representations fail to prime
each other, does this mean that the hypothesized representations
are inaccessible (i.e., non-existent)? For example, if Bott and
Chemla (2016) had failed to find that enriched some and
numbers primed each other, would this constitute evidence that
there are no abstract scalar implicature representations? B&P
do not directly address the issue, but they imply that
representations are accessible only if they can be primed (sect.
1.4). While it is true that many representations are primable
(i.e., they remain active across time), we do not feel that, to be
accessible, representations necessarily must be primable. Prim-
ability confers many advantages, including the facilitation of align-
ment and prediction in dialogue (Pickering & Garrod 2004; 2014).
For some representations, however, these factors may not be
important. Such representations would clearly not be detectible
using structural priming methodology but might be accessible
using other techniques. Therefore, a failure to observe a
priming effect is an ambiguous result: Either the representation
is not accessible, or it is not primeable. This is problematic,
because a weakness in the alternative hypothesis makes null struc-
tural priming effects difficult to interpret and positive findings less
persuasive (e.g., a “file drawer” effect is more likely when publica-
tion of a null effect is difficult).
Developmental psycholinguistics teaches us
that we need multi-method, not single-method,
approaches to the study of linguistic
representation
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Abstract: In developmental psycholinguistics, we have, for many years,
been generating and testing theories that propose both descriptions of
adult representations and explanations of how those representations
develop. We have learnt that restricting ourselves to any one
methodology yields only incomplete data about the nature of linguistic
representations. We argue that we need a multi-method approach to the
study of representation.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) rightly state that acceptability judg-
ments access linguistic representations only indirectly via lan-
guage comprehension and production processes. This makes it
difficult to draw strong conclusions about the nature of represen-
tations, because “the data are compatible with particular
grammar-processor pairings, not just with particular grammars”
(sect. 1.1, para. 4–5).
This problem, however, applies to all methodologies, including
priming. In developmental psycholinguistics, we generate and test
theories that propose both descriptions of adult representations
and explanations of how those representations develop (e.g.,
Goldberg 2006; Pinker 1984). We have learnt that restricting our-
selves to any method – even a well-studied method like priming –
yields only incomplete data about the nature of linguistic repre-
sentation. For example, in priming studies, we access children’s
linguistic representation through the lens of a still poorly under-
stood effect of priming on children’s sentence production. To
interpret our data, we must make inferences about the mecha-
nisms underlying priming and how these mechanisms use the
child’s emerging linguistic knowledge. If our inferences about
those processes (and how they use linguistic representations)
are flawed, the conclusions we draw about representations will
be flawed. In other words, if we rely on priming only, we will
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generate an incomplete theory of linguistic representations, which
is likely to fail once tested using different methodologies.
The solution is a multi-method approach. As we have argued in
Monaghan and Rowland (2017), by gathering evidence from dif-
ferent methods, we can converge on a more holistic understand-
ing of the child’s developing representations. Below, we illustrate
our argument with two examples.
First, we examine how to determine the linguistic representa-
tions children hold at different ages. Structural priming studies
have been informative here, showing that even young children’s
syntactic representations are abstract enough to support general-
isation across verbs. For example, 3-year-old children produce
more double-object datives (DODs) after a double-object dative
prime than after a prepositional dative (PD) prime, even when
the prime and target sentences share no content words (Peter
et al. 2015; Rowland et al. 2012; see Thothathiri & Snedeker
(2008b) for similar results in comprehension).
It is tempting to conclude from this that children’s dative rep-
resentations are not only abstract, but also adultlike – that “evi-
dence from these studies suggests that, from a relatively young
age, children’s structural representations are similar to adults”
(sect. 3.3, para. 2). Although priming studies tell us that children’s
dative representations are abstract, however, they are not neces-
sarily adultlike. This would be to assume that the priming mech-
anism requires adultlike representations, which is yet to be
ascertained.
In fact, findings from other methodologies reveal asymmetries
in the pattern of PD and DOD acquisition, which suggest that the
two are not equally adultlike early on. Although naturalistic
studies show that children produce DODs earlier than PDs
(Snyder & Stromswold 1997), early DOD use is restricted to a
small set of high-frequency verbs (Campbell & Tomasello
2001). Children are more productive earlier with the PD, in the
sense of being more willing to use PD structures in novel verb
experiments. For example, Conwell & Demuth (2007) showed
that 3-year-olds were more likely to generalise a novel verb
heard in a DOD to a prepositional form (e.g., to produce he
pilked the cup to Toby after hearing I pilked Toby the cup) than
they were to generalise a novel verb heard in a PD to a double-
object form. There is a similar asymmetry in novel verb compre-
hension (Rowland & Noble 2011).
A number of explanationsmight integrate these findings. Perhaps
children’s very early double-object datives are restricted to a few,
frequent verb-specific patterns, which become so entrenched that
it remains difficult to generalise the structure to novel verbs, even
when representations become more abstract (Tomasello 2000).
Alternatively, PD representations may have a “head start on the
process of becoming abstract” because of their structural similarity
to the early acquired transitive structure (Campbell & Tomasello
2001, p. 266). More work is needed here. Our point is simply
that, without a multi-method approach, we would not gain these
insights into the nature of children’s developing knowledge.
Our second example demonstrates how a multi-method
approach combining computational modelling with experimental
work enables us to test the complex interplay between represen-
tation and the processing of those representations. Distinguishing
processing from representation is far from trivial, as defenders of
acceptability judgments have indicated (sect. 1.2, paras. 1–2).
Consequently, a theoretical model, as presented by B&P, provides
only a first step as a description of representational features and
the likely processes that operate over these representations. Com-
putational modelling of experimental findings is needed to test the
necessity and sufficiency of representation and processing in the
language system, as well as the extent to which there is separability
between representations and the processes operating over them.
Chang et al. (2006) showed that a computational model with dis-
tinct event semantics and syntactic knowledgewas able to simulate a
series of syntactic priming effects, but only when points of interac-
tion between those representations was limited. Language,
however, is acquired and processed in a rich, multimodal situation
that goes far beyond the representations described in Chang et al.
(2006). For instance, Smith et al. (2017b) constructed a computa-
tionalmodel of processing in visual-world paradigm tasks, determin-
ing how phonological, visual, and semantic representations are
integrated during speech perception. They demonstrated that the
behavioural data could be simulated most effectively only when
these representations interpenetrated throughout processing,
rather than assuming autonomy of these representations, cohering
at the outcomeof processing. Anextension of thismodel to language
development showed that differences in quantity of exposure to a
rich, multimodal language environment was sufficient to simulate
child and adult behavioural differences in visual world paradigm
tasks (Smith et al. 2017a). In other words, combining insights
from the rich interactivity of multimodal information with the pos-
sible advantages of modular processing of this richness requires
computational implementations to distinguish alternative accounts.
In sum, the process of determining linguistic representations
from empirical data is far from straightforward and requires a
multi-methodological approach.
The malleability of linguistic representations
poses a challenge to the priming-based
experimental approach
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Abstract: Recent findings show that experience with a syntactic structure
has long-term consequences for how that structure will be processed in the
future, which suggests that linguistic representations are not static entities
that can be probed reliably without alteration. Thus, leveraging the effect
of previous exposure to a syntactic structure appears to be an inappropriate
method for studying invariant properties of language.
We agree with Branigan & Pickering (B&P) that understanding the
nature of linguistic representations is a key question for psycholin-
guists and linguists alike, but relying on acceptability judgments
imposes serious limitations on what can be learned. Further, we
agree that implicit processing measures can provide valuable
insights about linguistic representations. We have concerns,
however, about the use of syntactic priming as the primary
measure for the investigation of purportedly stable linguistic repre-
sentations. The first concern is of a practical nature: Syntactic
priming effects are often subtle, and many of the potential links
between structures of interest may be very difficult to detect reli-
ably, rendering the picture more uncertain rather than clearer.
Second, and more important, recent evidence suggests that lan-
guage representations are not stable but rather continuously
updated based on recent experience. The current proposal for a
unified model of language representations, as seen through the
lens of syntactic priming, can provide only a partial and possibly
inaccurate account if it ignores the multiple timescales and contexts
in which learning, and thus, language change, takes place.
The logic of the proposed method as described in the target
article requires that (1) the facilitatory effect of a prime structure
on a test structure be a direct reflection of how closely related
those structures are in representational space; and (2) that the
underlying representations of the language not be affected by
recent exposure to either of the structures or their prior co-occur-
rence. In order for a syntactic priming paradigm to be a useful tool
for understanding the structure of linguistic representation, it must
be assumed that the act of processing the prime and target
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structures has no effect on that same language user’s syntactic rep-
resentations, or that such effects are transient (Branigan et al.
1999).
In contrast, recent findings show that experience with a syntactic
structure has long-term consequences for how that structure will be
processed in the future, both in comprehension (e.g., Fine et al.
2013; Fine & Jaeger 2016; Kamide 2012; Long & Prat 2008;
Luka & Barsalou 2005; Ryskin et al. 2017; Tooley et al. 2014b;
Wells et al. 2009) and production (e.g., Bock et al. 2007; Bock &
Griffin 2000; Branigan et al. 2000; Hartsuiker et al. 2008; Jaeger
& Snider 2013; Kaschak et al. 2014; 2011a; 2011b). These results
point to an error-based learning mechanism underlying syntactic
priming across modalities (Chang et al. 2006; Chang et al. 2012).
On this account, exposure to the prime sentence makes a sentence
with that same structure more expected, and this up-weighting
process is cumulative, such that the target sentence also serves
the same function. Further, by the same error-based learning
mechanism, the co-occurrence of structures with particular
lexical items in the sentences should lead to an increased expecta-
tion for that combination in the future. Indeed, repeatedly exposing
listeners to a novel pairing of a verb and a syntactic structure –Rub
the duck with the lollipop which is high attachment (the ambiguous
PP, with the lollipop attaches to the verb) if the visual context con-
strains the lollipop to be an instrument, but low attachment (the
ambiguous PP attaches to the head noun) if the lollipop is an acces-
sory tied to the duck – leads listeners to form a new verb bias
(Ryskin et al. 2017). In other words, the representation of a verb
and its link to a structure is malleable and shaped by the context
in which that verb appears. This context may consist of the other
words in the sentence, the visual environment, or even the identity
of the speaker (Kamide 2012).
Does this present a challenge for the use of syntactic priming as
a tool for studying language representations? Evidence for the
cumulative learning underlying syntactic representations suggests
that syntactic priming experiments often may miss the links inves-
tigators wish to uncover. In a paradigm where test stimulus A is
preceded by primes B or C, the presentations of A, B, and C
lead to those representations becoming more active or more prob-
able. Given that priming experiments typically involve repeated
measures, over the course of the task the activation level for all rel-
evant structures may be brought to some ceiling level at which the
additional facilitation conferred by B is no longer detectable.
Indeed, cumulative priming may contribute to the small effect
sizes observed in the priming literature (Mahowald et al. 2016b;
Tooley & Traxler 2010; see Fine et al. 2013 for a similar method-
ological point). Continued use of syntactic priming to test more
and more subtle connections between structures will likely lead
to many null findings from which no conclusions about the true
nature of syntactic representations can be drawn.
From a theory-building perspective, the proposed approach
overlooks a large swath of the current literature and thus can
provide only an incomplete picture of language representation.
On many current accounts (Chang et al. 2006; Chang et al.
2012; Jaeger & Snider 2013; Fine et al. 2013), syntactic priming
effects are a byproduct of the continuous learning that shapes lan-
guage representations. Based on these findings, we can infer that
experiences with individual prime or target structures will accu-
mulate to change the relative probabilities of these structures.
Further, the probabilistic bindings between lexical items (e.g.,
verbs) and structures are subject to the same cumulative learning
through verb-structure co-activation. In this context, the question
of whether structure A is more similar to B or C may be ill posed.
The answer provided by a syntactic priming experiment may be
entirely dependent on the particular time-point at which the lan-
guage user is probed and what linguistic experiences preceded
this sampling. To understand the nature of linguistic representa-
tions, then, a more useful approach will be to examine how the
learning prompted by interpretation of a single utterance in a
given context, scales up to support language learning and language
change throughout the lifespan.
The relationship between priming and
linguistic representations is mediated by
processing constraints
doi:10.1017/S0140525X17000589, e310
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Abstract: Understanding the nature of linguistic representations
undoubtedly will benefit from multiple types of evidence, including
structural priming. Here, we argue that successfully gaining linguistic
insights from structural priming requires us to better understand (1) the
precise mappings between linguistic input and comprehenders’ syntactic
knowledge; and (2) the role of cognitive faculties such as memory and
attention in structural priming.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) provide a strong argument that
structural priming (and priming paradigms more generally) may
provide a useful avenue to better understand the nature of linguis-
tic representations. We wholeheartedly agree that structural
priming can yield useful insights about individuals’ underlying lin-
guistic representations. However, just as insights from metalin-
guistic acceptability judgments require us to understand how
these judgments are made, insights from priming paradigms
require us to understand the processes underlying structural
priming – specifically, how priming can be influenced by online
processing and cognitive constraints.
To understand structural priming, we first need to understand
the precise mappings between linguistic input (prime sentences)
and comprehenders’ syntactic knowledge. There is now consider-
able evidence that comprehenders’ parses do not always reflect
the input veridically. Instead, parses reflect comprehenders’
recent experiences, prior beliefs, and predictions of upcoming lin-
guistic material (review: Traxler 2014). Critically, these factors not
only influence sentence interpretation, but also influence syntactic
parses themselves. An important question, then, is “What aspects
of the parsing process influence patterns of structural priming?”
On one hand, there is evidence that structural priming reflects
comprehenders’ eventual parses, which may be the result of correc-
tion or reconstruction of the original linguistic input. For example,
structural priming can occur from isolated verbs: Verbs that occur
only, or mostly, in one construction can prime that construction
(Melinger & Dobel 2005). However, counterintuitively, structural
priming also can occur from sentences with missing verbs (e.g.,
The waitress the book to the monk), and such priming has a
similar magnitude to priming from well-formed primes (e.g., The
waitress gives the book to the monk; Ivanova et al. 2017). These
data suggest that comprehenders can reconstruct missing verb cat-
egories as well as missing post-verbal syntactic constituents, and
these reconstructed representations give rise to priming effects.
Structural priming even can reflect apparent corrections of parses
that would result in implausible scenarios. That is, after implausible
double-object datives such as The waitress gave the book the monk,
speakers can be primed to produce prepositional datives and not
double objects as might be expected based on a syntactic analysis
alone (Slevc & Momma 2015). These data suggest that non-syntac-
tic factors such as plausibility can influence a comprehender’s final
parse, thus changing or even reversing expected patterns of struc-
tural priming. Crucially, in all three examples, priming effects
appear to reflect listeners’ final parses rather than the structure
of the original input.
On the other hand, structural priming can reflect intermediate
aspects of parsing, such as erroneous abandoned partial analyses,
instead of, or in addition to, the intended and presumably eventual
parse. For example, an incomplete sentence fragment that is sub-
sequently corrected to another syntactic structure still can
produce structural priming. That is, speakers were more likely
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to describe a picture with a prepositional dative after hearing a
sentence fragment that started as a prepositional dative but was
corrected to a transitive (e.g., The mechanic is giving the new
part… uh… is recognizing the new part) than after a fragment
starting as a double-object dative and corrected to a transitive
(Slevc & Ferreira 2013). Similarly, participants completed more
sentences as transitives after temporarily ambiguous sentences
such asWhile the man was visiting the children who were surpris-
ingly pleasant and funny played outside than after identical sen-
tences disambiguated by a comma (van Gompel et al. 2006).
Importantly, the priming effects observed in these studies
reflected temporarily suboptimal or erroneous parses that arose
from the processing demands of online parsing.
Of course, structural priming reflects active processing even in
the absence of errors or temporary ambiguity. Thus, the role of
underlying cognitive faculties is a second aspect of structural
priming that deserves more investigation. One such faculty is
attention: Priming effects are greater when primes are directly
attended (e.g., when a comprehender is addressed directly in a
dialogue) compared to when she or he is not directly addressed
(e.g., when a comprehender simply overhears a conversation).
This result suggests that the depth of processing of a prime sen-
tence directly affects the magnitude of priming (Branigan et al.
2007). A second relevant faculty is working memory. Although
there is evidence that structural priming effects can be long
lasting (e.g., Bock & Griffin 2000; Kaschak et al. 2011b) and
may reflect implicit learning rather than short-term maintenance
(e.g., Chang et al. 2006), working memory nonetheless has been
implicated in structural priming. Ivanova et al. (2013) found
that increased working memory demands during the production
of target picture descriptions reduced priming (at least for
datives in a picture description paradigm; note that priming the
presence/absence of the complementizer that in a recall paradigm
was unaffected by memory load). These data suggest that atten-
tion and memory demands can influence priming effects,
although we still know very little about these influences.
These examples illustrate that the relationships among linguis-
tic input, syntactic knowledge, and structural priming are indirect
and mediated by processing constraints. This does not undermine
the usefulness of structural priming to shed light on linguistic rep-
resentations. It does suggest, however, that more work is needed
to understand how specific task and stimuli details affect both
parsing and structural priming. Of course, processing dynamics
influence metalinguistic acceptability judgments as well (e.g.,
Lau & Ferreira 2005), and so it will be important to compare
how processing demands affect these different paradigms. More
generally, structural priming (like any method) has both advan-
tages and limitations. We agree with Branigan and Pickering
that it can be a useful tool to investigate the nature of linguistic
representations, but we also caution that this tool still requires
careful work to unpack the processes underlying our tendency
to reuse recently experienced structure.
Setting the empirical record straight:
Acceptability judgments appear to be reliable,
robust, and replicable
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Abstract: Branigan & Pickering (B&P) advocate the use of syntactic
priming to investigate linguistic representations and argue that it
overcomes several purported deficiencies of acceptability judgments.
While we recognize the merit of drawing attention to a potentially
underexplored experimental methodology in language science, we do
not believe that the empirical evidence supports B&P’s claims about
acceptability judgments. We present the relevant evidence.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) advocate the use of syntactic priming
to investigate linguistic representations. We support the use of any
data types that scientists find relevant for specific research ques-
tions, including syntactic priming. We regret, then, that B&P
appear to repeat unsubstantiated claims that paint a relatively mis-
leading picture of acceptability judgments (AJs), a data type that
linguists have been using fruitfully for decades. From our perspec-
tive, much of the literature criticizing AJs has repeatedly focused
on logically possible concerns about their use without investigat-
ing whether those concerns are empirically attested. This risks a
vicious circle: Articles can cite each other for support, giving the
illusion of empirical support. In this commentary, we highlight a
number of studies that have pursued this issue head on, which
we leverage to examine six of B&P’s claims about AJs in detail.
Claim 1: Linguists standardly ask a single informant about the
acceptability of a few sentences (sect. 1.2, para. 2). Claim 1 is a
caricature of linguistic methodology that, to our knowledge, has
never been supported by evidence. Nonetheless, a charitable
interpretation of this claim reveals two separate concerns: (1)
the routine use of small sample sizes, and (2) the susceptibility
of AJs to investigator bias (Claim 2, below). An obvious conse-
quence of using small samples sizes in research is an increase in
errors (probably of all four types identified by Gelman & Carlin
2014: I, II, Sign, and Magnitude). By performing a large-scale
comparison of the published results in linguistics with retests of
those results using large samples of naïve participants, one can
evaluate the quality of their convergence rate. This cannot identify
specific errors, but it can tell us whether the differences between
methods actually produce different results.
Sprouse and Almeida (2012) tested every English data point
from a popular syntax textbook (Adger 2003) using large
samples of naïve participants. Out of 365 phenomena, they con-
servatively estimate a minimum convergence rate of 98%.
Sprouse et al. (2013) randomly sampled 148 phenomena from
a leading linguistics journal (Linguistic Inquiry), and conserva-
tively estimate a convergence rate of 95% ( ± 5% because of
the random sampling). These high (conservative) convergence
rates suggest that the sample sizes used by linguists (whatever
they are) historically have introduced little error to the empirical
record for any combination of the following reasons: (1) the
samples are larger than what critics claim; (2) the effect sizes
are so large that small samples still yield good statistical power;
or (3) AJ results are highly replicated before and after publication
(e.g., Phillips 2009).
Claim 2: Acceptability judgments are highly susceptible to the-
oretical cognitive bias because linguists tend to use professional
linguists as participants (sect. 1.2, para. 3). This can also be
addressed by the studies discussed above. Cognitive bias should
predict sign reversals between naïve and expert populations.
Sprouse and Almeida (2012) found no sign reversals from the text-
book data. Sprouse et al. (2013) reported a 1–3% sign reversal rate
in the journal data. Mahowald et al. (2016a) and Häussler et al.
(2016) have replicated the latter without reporting an increased
sign reversal rate (0–6%). Comparisons of naïve and expert popu-
lations also were conducted by Culbertson and Gross (2009), who
report high inter- and intra-group correlations on 73 sentence
types, and by Da˛browska (2010). The latter found that, while
experts gave less variable ratings than naïve participants on
several sentence types, experts rated certain theoretically interest-
ing syntactic violations as more acceptable than naïve participants,
in apparent conflict with their theoretical commitments. Taken
together, these results are not what one would expect if AJs
were highly susceptible to cognitive bias.
Commentary/Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 40 (2017) 43
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000528
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Max-Planck-Institut fuer Psycholinguistik, on 16 Nov 2017 at 07:29:33, subject to the Cambridge ore terms of use, available at
Claim 3: Acceptability judgments are susceptible to differences
in instructions (sect. 1.2, para. 3).Claim 3 has been directly inves-
tigated by Cowart (1997), who reports that the systematic manip-
ulation of instructions does not change the pattern of acceptability
judgments for factorial designs.
Claim 4: Acceptability judgments are impacted by sentence
processing effects (sect. 1.2, para. 5). Claim 4 is technically
true, but B&P exaggerate its consequences. First, many classic
lexical and sentence processing effects have relatively small or
negligible effects on acceptability (e.g., Featherston 2009; Phillips
2009; Sprouse 2008; Sprouse et al. 2012). Second, very few syn-
tactic phenomena have been proposed to be fully reducible to
sentence processing effects. The lone exceptions to this appear
to be constraints on long-distance dependencies (e.g., Kluender
& Kutas 1993; Hofmeister & Sag 2010), but in that case, a
number of experimental studies have disproven the reductionist
predictions (Phillips 2006; Sprouse et al. 2012; Yoshida et al.
2014). Thus, to the extent that AJs are impacted by sentence pro-
cessing, it appears as though the effects can be dealt with like any
other source of noise in an experimental setting.
Claim 5: Acceptability judgments reveal only set membership
(sect. 1.2, para. 7). Claim 5 is confusing. It is false in the sense
that, if one is interested in set membership, this property still
needs to be inferred from acceptability data, using a logic that
maps that data type back to the relevant cognitive computations.
In this, AJs are like any other data type in cognitive science: No
data types, including priming, directly reveal the underlying com-
putations of the human brain, and all data types require a linking
hypothesis between the observable data and the unobservable
cognitive process.
Claim 6: Acceptability judgments have yielded no consensus
theory among linguists (sect. 1.2, para. 9). Claim 6 is a strange
criticism to make of any data type, especially AJs. First, the
beliefs of scientists are a subjective issue based on how they
weigh different kinds of evidence. Second, AJs are, by all
accounts, a robust and replicable data type. Whatever disagree-
ments there are in linguistics literature, they appear to obtain
mostly at the level of interpreting, not establishing, the data
(e.g., Phillips 2009).
In conclusion, we support B&P’s desire to bring new evidence
to bear on questions about linguistic representation. We caution,
however, that advocacy for one method should not be bolstered by
misleading comparisons, especially with methods such as AJs,
which yield data that are demonstrably robust, highly replicable,
and comparatively convenient and inexpensive to collect.
Priming is swell, but it’s far from simple
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Abstract: Clearly, structural priming is a valuable tool for probing linguistic
representation. But we don’t think that the existing results provide strong
support for Branigan & Pickering’s (B&P’s) model, largely because the
priming effects are more confusing and diverse than their theory would
suggest. Fortunately, there are a number of other experimental tools
available, and linguists are increasingly making use of them.
Branigan & Pickering (B&P) tell a straightforward tale. Linguists
rely on grammaticality judgments to uncover representations.
Judgments have limitations, but no other psycholinguistic
methods systematically reveal linguistic structure. Fortunately,
priming offers a direct window onto representation, providing evi-
dence for two distinct levels: a surface syntactic form, indepen-
dent of meaning and void of lexical content, and a semantic
form that includes information about thematic roles, quantifier
scope, and information structure.
We are fond of priming ourselves, but this elegant story is mis-
leading in several ways. First, the priming literature does not
strongly support the theory that B&P propose. As they dive
deeper, the loose ends and contradictions emerge, but their
final conclusions bypass this complexity. If we rearrange the evi-
dence a bit, the theoretical ambiguity becomes clearer.
The primary evidence for syntactic representations comes from
studies of argument alternations (dative or active-passive) that
perfectly confound surface syntax with thematic mappings. B&P
note that a few foundational studies demonstrated that syntax
can be primed independent of thematic mappings (sect. 2.1).
Thus, they privilege syntax in their theory. But there is now an
equally robust literature demonstrating that thematic mappings
can be primed independent of syntax (e.g., Cai et al. 2012;
Chang et al. 2003; Cho-Reyes et al. 2016; Hare & Goldberg
1999; Salamoura & Williams 2007; Ziegler & Snedeker 2016b).
B&P acknowledge this work (sect. 2.4) but treat it as a secondary,
interface phenomenon: Thematic information remains separate
from syntax (Fig. 1).
Similarly, the observation that priming can occur in the absence
of lexical overlap motivates a theory in which the syntactic skele-
ton is separate from the lexical content. To account for the lexical
boost, B&P must complicate their story, by linking lemmas to
structures (sect. 2.3). But perhaps we should revisit the claim
that the syntactic structure lacks lexical nodes. Indeed, function
words can be a locus of priming (Bencini et al. 2002; Ferreira
2003). We know that only partial overlap in the syntactic skeleton
is needed for structural priming (sect. 2.1), but we don’t assume
that the unnecessary pieces are removed from the syntactic repre-
sentation. Lexical content may be similar: always present and
sometimes contributing to priming via overlap.
The evidence for their semantic level is also sparse. We know:
(1) Quantifier scope can be primed, (2) this priming is isolated to
the particular quantifier used (e.g., each does not prime every),
and (3) it abstracts away from the nouns and verbs in a sentence
(Feiman & Snedeker 2016; Raffray & Pickering 2010).
However, B&P’s claim that scopal priming is bound to thematic
roles and cannot be captured by an LF representation is contro-
versial (Chemla & Bott 2015). It rests on a single null result
with prime stimuli (A boy climbed every tree) that have not
been shown to produce priming when thematic roles are the
same. Furthermore, the manipulation used confounds verb-spe-
cific roles, thematic roles, and the notion of deep subject/object.
It’s just too early to conclude that scope and thematic roles are
tightly coupled, or that LF isn’t the locus of scopal priming.
It seems that, under the right conditions, almost any linguistic
representation, mapping, or process can be primed. Conse-
quently, evidence for priming is always interpretable to some
degree (it demonstrates a commonality between prime and
target). But the absence (or magnitude) of an effect is often less
constraining, because there is so much variability across tasks
and stimuli. In some comprehension tasks, there is no priming
in the absence of verb overlap (Arai et al. 2007), while in others,
abstract priming is robust (Thothathiri & Snedeker 2008a;
2008b). This problem isn’t unique to comprehension. The
pattern of effects in production can depend on how the sentences
are elicited (stem completion vs. full sentence generation; Ziegler
& Snedeker 2016a).
Understanding this instability is critical; we suspect that the
answer lies in thinking through the processes involved in each
task and how they engage both stored representations and repre-
sentations that are constructed on the fly. To do this, we will have
to move beyond the notion of priming as a static, atemporal
Commentary/Branigan and Pickering: An experimental approach to linguistic representation
44 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, 40 (2017)
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X17000528
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Max-Planck-Institut fuer Psycholinguistik, on 16 Nov 2017 at 07:29:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
phenomenon that targets stable representations independent of
the process of production (or comprehension).
While priming is not the transparent window that B&P promise,
psycholinguists do have a much wider range of tools than the paper
suggests. Some are behavioral. Novel word generalization studies
going back to the 1950s have revealed structural regularities in
the representation of linguistic form and meaning (Berko 1958;
Fisher 2002; Gropen et al. 1989; Naigles 1990; Prasada & Pinker
1993). Similarly, artificial language learning sheds light on the rep-
resentations that learners extract from linguistic data and use to
guide generalization (Pothos 2007; Reber 1967; Saffran et al.
2008; for review, see Erickson & Thiessen 2015).
New methods for analyzing imaging data also provide greater
constraint on representational theories. For example, multi-
voxel pattern analysis, a class of machine-learning algorithms
that examine patterns of neural activity (Haxby et al. 2001), has
revealed regions of the left temporal cortex that appear to bind
arguments to something roughly like thematic roles (Frankland
& Greene 2015). Structural priming is therefore only one useful
tool of many.
Finally, we think that B&P are too pessimistic in their assess-
ment of linguists and their tools. There are longstanding traditions
of experimental work in phonetics, phonology, and language
acquisition. In recent years, experimental work has also become
common in syntax, semantics, and pragmatics (e.g., Arunachalam
2013; Cowart 1997; Myers 2009; Sorace & Keller 2005). Indeed,
the question of how armchair judgments translate into generaliz-
able conclusions has received considerable attention (Sprouse &
Almeida 2012; Sprouse et al. 2013). From our perspective, the
remaining disputes do not reflect an over-reliance on grammati-
cality judgments or a dearth of appropriate methodologies; they
stem from: (1) the close parallels between the theories that are
still standing (similar operations assigned to different theoretical
levels), (2) the lack of falsifiability for the contrasting features,
and (3) the danger we all face of letting our “affection for [our]
intellectual child[ren]” (Chamberlin 1897) guide our interpreta-
tion of the data.
Authors’ Response
Structural priming and the representation of
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Abstract: Structural priming offers a powerful method for
experimentally investigating the mental representation of
linguistic structure. We clarify the nature of our proposal, justify
the versatility of priming, consider alternative approaches, and
discuss how our specific account can be extended to new
questions as part of an interdisciplinary programme integrating
linguistics and psychology as part of the cognitive sciences of
language.
In our target article, we argue for an experimental approach to lin-
guistic representation and demonstrate how structural priming
can be used to develop a psychologically motivated account of
how people represent linguistic structure. If one utterance
primes another, then we argue that they share structure. Patterns
of priming are therefore informative about the way in which
people represent language. While acknowledging the continuing
value and importance of acceptability judgements in developing
representational hypotheses, we proposed that priming is in
many ways superior: It is an implicit behavioral measure that
taps representation. It also allows us to study representation in
all groups, including those such as young children who cannot
make acceptability judgments.
In recent years, many experimental studies using structural
priming have helped us understand language users’ representa-
tions. These studies suggest that semantic information is repre-
sented separately from syntactic information. The single
semantic level encodes information about scope relations, infor-
mation structure, and thematic structure. The single syntactic
level, which draws on well-formedness constraints concerning
local linear and hierarchical relations, includes syntactic category
information and some missing elements (i.e., elements that are
not uttered) but does not involve syntactic movement. At
present, linguists propose incompatible theories, and there is no
sign that the nearly exclusive use of acceptability judgments is
ever going to determine which type of theory is correct. In con-
trast, the findings from priming are compatible with some theories
and incompatible with others.
The commentators take a unified view that researchers from
different disciplines should cooperate in investigating linguistic
representation, as a single integrated programme of research.
They unanimously agree that an experimental approach to linguis-
tic representation is valuable and largely accept that structural
priming is informative in this regard. In other words, they do
not feel that it is relevant only to the study of how language is pro-
duced and comprehended. They differ, however, about the versa-
tility of priming, how directly it taps into representation, and its
advantages over other methods (in particular, acceptability judg-
ments). They also take different views about our conclusions
regarding aspects of linguistic representation and make specific
proposals for further research.
We are pleased that our proposal has met with such interest and
hope that it will encourage a future programme of cooperative
interdisciplinary research on linguistic representation. In what
follows, we have grouped our responses to their insightful com-
ments under 11 headings.
R1. How can linguistic representation be
investigated?
We begin by clarifying the nature of our proposal. Although com-
mentators agree about the importance of experimental methods
for investigating linguistic representation, some of them seem to
assume that we advocate entirely renouncing the use of accept-
ability judgments. But as we make clear throughout the article,
our argument is that researchers interested in linguistic represen-
tation should not be restricted to using only acceptability judg-
ments. Specifically, we contend that “the representations
underlying language use need not and, in fact, should not be inves-
tigated only via [acceptability] judgments” (sect. 1, para. 2). We
further argue that “[our] goal is to consider alternative (experi-
mental) methods to acceptability judgments that potentially
address the linguistic representations implicated in language pro-
cessing” (sect. 1.1, para. 5), that “acceptability judgments are not
enough,”(sect. 1.2) and that “researchers concerned with linguistic
representations should not rely solely on such judgments, and
should call on additional methodologies” (sect. 1.2, para. 10).
Moreover, we argue that “acceptability judgments can be used
(with appropriate controls) alongside structural priming (and
perhaps other experimental methods; see sect. 1.3) as a means
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of developing representational hypotheses” (sect. 1.5, para. 2).
(Emphasis added throughout.)
We therefore do not propose abandoning acceptability judg-
ments as a linguistic method (Adger; de Ruiter & de Ruiter;
Hall, Mayberry, & Ferreira [Hall et al.]), nor do we argue
that structural priming is the only tool that can be used to study
linguistic representation (González-Márquez, Feist, &
Ströbel [González-Márquez et al.]; Hartsuiker & Bernolet;
Ziegler, Snedeker, & Wittenberg [Ziegler et al.]). (We
suspect that some commentators may have misinterpreted the
phrase “end the current reliance on acceptability judgments” in
the abstract as an exhortation to “end the current use of accept-
ability judgments.”)
We do argue, however, that priming has a privileged status. It is
an implicit method that provides access to linguistic structure (i.e.,
strong generative capacity), and it is unaffected by an intervening
theory “P” (Chomsky 1981, p.283, footnote 39); see section 1.1, par-
agraph 7 of the target article. Acceptability judgments (whether
obtained informally or formally) provide extensive and valuable,
but suggestive, data (in the “context of discovery”; Hagoort). In
this respect, they stand alongside the use of large-scale corpora to
identify the types of utterances that occur and the contexts in
which they occur (as Lester, Du Bois, Gries, & Martin [Lester
et al.] note). Both of these methods provide evidence about the
classes of acceptable sentences but need further assumptions to
help determine linguistic structure – and here is where they encoun-
ter the problem of constituency tests. Other behavioral and neuro-
scientific methods (i.e., apart from priming) may provide evidence
about linguistic structure without the need for constituency tests,
but it is much harder to rule out explanations relating to the process-
ing theory “P.”
Adger argues that linguists use experimental tests of a theory “as
an injunction to think about what the implications of the result
mean.” We agree that they should do this, but we do not believe
that they typically do so (or else, papers in theoretical linguistics
would make far more reference to experimental findings than
they do). In sum, we wholeheartedly agree with Hagoort that
there is no excuse for failing to use the available experimental and
quantitative methods.
R2. How useful is priming?
A number of commentators express concerns about the versatility
of structure priming in practice and the extent to which structural
priming studies are able to provide support for specific represen-
tational proposals (de Ruiter & de Ruiter; Feldman & Milin;
Francis; Hall et al.; Hartsuiker & Bernolet; MacDonald &
Weiss;Mahowald, Futrell, & Gibson [Mahowald et al.];Mal-
donado, Spector, & Chemla [Maldonado et al.]; Martin,
Huettig, & Nieuwland [Martin et al.]; Meyer; Rees & Bott;
Ziegler et al.).
As Mahowald et al. note, the meta-analysis carried out by
Mahowald et al. (2016b) shows that structural priming is robust
and highly replicable. Therefore, criticisms of other priming par-
adigms (e.g., in social psychology) are not relevant (MacDonald
& Weiss). The meta-analysis also highlights limitations in
studies that compare the magnitude of priming under different
circumstances. We stress that a large number of converging find-
ings may be necessary to produce confidence in theoretical claims.
With respect to our specific account, our claims concerning the
monostratal nature of syntactic representation are based on many
individual studies that, together, argue against some level of
underlying structure. Our intention in proposing the account in
section 2 is to encourage researchers to address both specific
and general representational questions, in order to broaden the
evidence base for theory development. Some of our specific
claims, of course, may prove incorrect or incomplete in light of
further research.
Hence, we acknowledge a need for reliable, replicable results,
and for caution about underpowered studies, the interpretation
of null results, and so on (e.g., de Ruiter & de Ruiter; Maho-
wald et al.; Maldonado et al.; Meyer; Rees & Bott; Ziegler
et al.). These concerns apply to any scientific method. Clearly,
priming studies require careful design, and some studies may be
difficult to carry out in practice. Structural priming, however, is
not inherently more limited than other experimental (or non-
experimental) approaches.
Other commentators are concerned that the value of priming is
limited to cases involving pairs of roughly equivalent structures
(e.g., de Ruiter & de Ruiter; Meyer). As we note, most
current evidence comes from choices in language production,
when a speaker can use one structure (e.g., passive) or another
(e.g., active) to describe the same situation. In such cases, it is
clearly necessary for alternatives to exist (and to be sufficiently fre-
quent that, in practice, participants can be induced to produce
both alternatives). But there are other methods of inducing
priming, such as priming of alternatives that differ in meaning
(Scheepers 2003), priming choices in comprehension (e.g., Brani-
gan et al. 2005), priming of eye movements during comprehen-
sion (e.g., Arai et al. 2007), priming response times in
production (Smith & Wheeldon 2001; Segaert et al. 2016),
priming response times in comprehension (Knoeferle 2014), or
repetition suppression of the Blood Oxygen Level Dependent
(BOLD) signal in functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI) adaptation (Segaert et al. 2012). These methods do not
always require semantically similar alternatives, and they should
allow us to use priming more extensively in the future.
A particular set of priming effects might appear compatible
with more than one linguistic account (e.g., Francis; Hartsuiker
& Bernolet). In some cases, there are ways to rule out one alter-
native (see sect. R10 for some specific examples). In other cases,
the data may fail to distinguish between accounts – and this is why
priming should be established as a general method in which con-
clusions are drawn from large numbers of studies considered
together.
Some commentators raise concerns about the fact that priming
effects reduce with increasing exposure (Lester et al.; Ryskin &
Brown-Schmidt). Experimenters can take this into account
(especially when small effect sizes are anticipated) through
careful decisions about the size and composition of the stimulus
set, testing adequate number of participants and items, or appro-
priate statistical analyses. Ziegler et al. observe that magnitudes
of priming may vary across tasks. This simply means that, just as
for other experimental tasks (e.g., sentence recall versus picture
description tasks), researchers should be careful about comparing
results across tasks.
Finally, we do not shareMeyer’s pessimism concerning the rel-
evance of priming for studying children and patients. For
example, priming studies have successfully addressed longstand-
ing questions about the extent to which typically developing chil-
dren and children with a specific language impairment have
abstract syntactic representations (Bencini & Valian 2008; Foltz
et al. 2015; Garraffa et al. 2015; Messenger et al. 2011;
Rowland et al. 2012).
R3. The directness of the relationship between
grammar and processing
MacDonald & Weiss, Martin et al., andMeyer raise questions
about the directness of the relationship between grammar and
processing. Comprehension-to-production priming cannot be
simply procedural because comprehension and production are
different processes. Therefore, we suggest it provides access to
representation (as argued in Branigan et al. 2000). Of course, it
could reflect a shared sub-process – for example, accessing a lin-
guistic constraint. But if this sub-process is the same across pro-
duction and comprehension, it is hard to see what it could
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reflect except for the representation itself. In fact, any form of
structural priming (including production-to-production) is infor-
mative about linguistic representation, and researchers do not
need to conduct comprehension-to-production priming studies
to constrain linguistic theory. Note that a linguistic theory could
treat the frequency of a syntactic constraint (e.g., V → V NP
PP) as part of its linguistic representation (see MacDonald &
Weiss), but our concern is with the representation of the con-
straints themselves rather than their frequency.
We do not claim that the apparent automaticity of priming is
necessary for making claims about representation rather than pro-
cesses. Instead, it suggests that priming is not affected by strate-
gies or metalinguistic processes – concerns that may affect
acceptability judgments. In other words, apparent automaticity
gives us more confidence about linguistic representations.
R4. Does priming access all representations?
Some commentators suggest that priming may be insensitive to
some linguistic representations (Koring & Reuland; Maldo-
nado et al.; Rees & Bott). In other words, there may be levels
of linguistic representation that are unaffected by priming.
Some representations may be inaccessible to any method,
whether because they have been compiled into different repre-
sentations online (Berwick & Weinberg 1984) or because they
have undergone attrition (see Kootstra & Rossi). The commen-
tators, however, are more concerned with the possibility that rep-
resentations can be accessed but cannot be affected by prior
exposure – a possibility that would reduce somewhat the effective-
ness of priming. We propose that the use of a representation
(whether in production or comprehension) will affect subsequent
use of that representation; this is the logic that all accounts of
priming depend on. But this is an assumption; if it is too strong,
then priming would be somewhat less sensitive than we assume.
Such a limitation, of course, would not affect the conclusions
that we can draw from (positive) demonstrations of priming.
Of course, failure to find priming does not demonstrate that it
does not occur; a study may have been insensitive or underpow-
ered. For example, priming without lexical repetition in compre-
hension sometimes has occurred (e.g., Pickering et al. 2013;
Thothathiri & Snedeker (2008a)) and sometimes has not (e.g.,
Branigan et al. 2005; Traxler et al. 2014). Similarly, evidence for
intonational priming is limited (de Ruiter & de Ruiter), but to
demonstrate that intonational structure is represented (in
roughly the form assumed by many linguists) and that it cannot
be primed would involve extensive experimentation. It is too
early to conclude that there is a level of linguistic representation
that cannot be primed.
R5. What can acceptability judgments tell us?
Adger; Ambridge; Gaston, Huang, & Phillips [Gaston et al.];
Hall et al.; and Sprouse & Almeida contend that we unfairly
criticise a method that has been used fruitfully (and frugally) for
decades – although other commentators (e.g., González-
Márquez et al.; Lester et al.) argue that we, in fact, overempha-
size its significance. We acknowledge that acceptability judgments
have been a fertile method for generating hypotheses historically,
and we do not advocate abandoning them. Indeed, their use is
appropriate for field linguistics (Hall et al.) when identifying the
possible sentences of a language and developing representational
hypotheses (i.e., in the “context of discovery”), but even in these
situations, researchers should carry out priming experiments
when possible.
Our main concern with acceptability judgments does not lie
with their informality (Sprouse & Almeida), though we do advo-
cate avoiding informality where possible. We agree that careful
experimentation can determine which judgments can be
explained by processing limitations (e.g., Sprouse et al. 2012). Pre-
sumably, those judgments that cannot be explained by processing
limitations are the judgments that are of interest to linguists, in the
sense that they determine the set of sentences the grammar must
be able to account for (i.e., its weak generative capacity). Sprouse
and Almeida say that establishing these data is not in doubt, and
the concern is with what they call interpreting them. In other
words, they argue that determining the set of sentences generated
by the grammar is straightforward (i.e., the weak generative
capacity) and that the difficult issue is identifying the structural
representations that underlie those sentences (i.e., the strong gen-
erative capacity).
There may not be major concerns in practice about identify-
ing the set of sentences that should be generated by the linguis-
tic theory (though there remain concerns about consistency
across types of speaker and task; Da˛browska 2010; Sprouse
2009). Acceptability judgments, however, do not allow us to
determine the underlying structural representations, because
they cannot distinguish among competing analyses of the
same data. In contrast, priming allows us to distinguish among
such analyses – in Sprouse and Almeida’s terms, to interpret
the data. People may use representations that intrinsically
include lexical content, or they may not. They may use represen-
tations that include elements that are not phonologically real-
ised, or they may not. The different representations proposed
for DO sentences (e.g., a ternary-branching structure involving
no “moved” elements versus a binary-branching structure
involving “moved” elements; Pollard & Sag 1994 versus
Larson 1988) are different interpretations of the same data.
But they cannot both correspond to a speaker’s mental repre-
sentation for these sentences.
Some commentators defend constituency tests. For example,
Gaston et al. propose that the apparent contradictions that they
yield can be resolved by further enquiry. This is not correct;
their contradictions are basic and widespread. For example,
almost anything can be coordinated, so it would appear that
almost anything can be a constituent. But this claim is possible
only if we assume massively flexible constituency (Pickering &
Barry 1993; Steedman 2000) – a proposal contested by the
great majority of linguistic theories. And in practice, linguistic
theories disagree about the most fundamental points regarding
structure (not merely the structure of ellipsis or Wh-questions).
Our point is that traditional linguistic approaches assume that
strong generative capacity can be determined by combining
the sets of sentences compatible with acceptability judgments
(i.e., weak generative capacity) with constituency tests. But if
the tests are as flawed as they appear to be, this is impossible,
even if Sprouse and Almeida are correct about the consistency
of acceptability judgments.
In response to the query of Gaston et al. about the nature of
structural priming, the example of lexical priming that we use to
introduce priming as a phenomenon (sect. 1.4) involves words
that are related but not identical (i.e., associative/semantic
priming). It may be more appropriate to compare structural
priming with repetition priming of words (e.g., Scarborough
et al. 1977), which is long lasting, like structural priming
(Bock & Griffin 2000). Structural priming appears to be rela-
tively unaffected by contextual changes – for example,
between writing and speech (Cleland & Pickering 2006) – but
a more detailed exploration of such issues is necessary to fully
understanding priming itself. Understanding a method is, of
course, very important for drawing conclusions using that
method, but priming (as a cognitive phenomenon) is far better
understood than the complex combination of language process-
ing, metalinguistic reflection, and decision-making that
underlies acceptability judgments. Similarly, there is no well-
grounded theoretical motivation for constituency tests (see
sect. 1.2).
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R6. The stability of linguistic representations
Several commentators are concerned with the stability of the lin-
guistic representations that are investigated in structural priming
experiments (Cai & Liu; Francis; Günther; Hall et al.; Koot-
stra & Rossi; Martin et al.; MacDonald & Weiss; Meyer;
Ryskin & Brown-Schmidt; Ziegler et al.). Some commentators
suggest that their apparent instability and the fact that priming
itself can bring about representational changes call into question
the use of structural priming to investigate representation.
We agree that exposure to particular linguistic structures can
affect speakers’ linguistic representations, and any linguistic
theory must be able to account for such effects. In practice,
some researchers have argued that priming may offer an interven-
tion to enhance foreign-language learning (McDonough &
Mackey 2006) or recovery from aphasia (Cho-Reyes & Thompson
2012). Moreover, Ivanova et al. (2012b) found that participants
occasionally produced a DO structure with a verb such as
donate after encountering another DO sentence with donate,
even though such sentences are usually regarded as unacceptable
(Ambridge). In other words, priming can change the speaker’s
representation (at least temporarily). Other priming effects
involve repeated exposure (e.g., developing the needs + ed con-
struction; Kaschak & Glenberg 2004). Importantly, similar
effects occur in studies in which participants repeatedly make
acceptability judgments, thereby showing that such judgments
are affected also by exposure (Luka & Barsalou 2005; Snyder
2000; cf. Sprouse 2009).
So, the method of investigation (priming) sometimes changes
the phenomenon that it is investigating. But this observation is
not problematic for our proposals. Our concern is with the
nature of the representations that underlie language use at any
given time, and such representations need not be static. Priming
allows us to take a snapshot of linguistic representations. More-
over, we can track how those representations change across
time and what causes them to change (e.g., Cai & Liu; Kootstra
& Rossi; Rowland & Monaghan). For example, structural
priming supports a developmental trajectory during L2 learning
from item-specific representations in less proficient L2 speakers
to abstract representations in more proficient L2 speakers (Berno-
let et al. 2013). Other studies have shown how children’s syntactic
representations at different ages do or do not differ from those of
adults in specific ways – for example, with respect to their inde-
pendence from lexical or semantic content (Messenger et al.
(2012b)). Of course, we do not claim that they are the same in
all respects (Rowland & Monaghan).
R7. Priming, individuals, and groups
Priming experiments are typically conducted over fairly large
groups of participants, and some commentators (Hall et al.;
MacDonald & Weiss) therefore assume that anything priming
tells us must be at the group level – that is, holding over
groups of participants with the same linguistic representations
as each other. We do not make this assumption. Researchers typ-
ically assume a common core of structural representations: that
people who speak a particular language have similar linguistic
representations. Of course, the acceptability judgment method
also tends to make this assumption. But speakers of a language
may have some different representations. Again, structural
priming allows us to investigate variations across individual
speakers (idiolectal variations) or populations (e.g., L1 versus
L2 speakers of a language).
As with any other languages, priming should be used to under-
stand the representation of sign languages (Hall et al.), and Hall
et al. (2015) paves the way for such research. L1 and L2 ASL
signers may have differences in syntactic processing, but the
priming data suggest that – as with L1 and (proficient) L2 speakers
of spoken languages (Schoonbaert et al. 2007) – the syntactic
representations they use during processing may have the same
(relevant) characteristics. In these studies, syntactic priming
does not tell us how these representations were constructed
during processing, their interfaces with other representations,
how those representations are instantiated in the brain, or how
they developed (although see Slevc & Ivanova for relevant
discussion).
Contrary toMacDonald &Weiss’s contention, it is possible to
study priming in individual participants. Such studies might
require extensive data from an individual, just as in any single-
case study. Moreover, if a structure can be represented variably
within an individual, we can use priming to determine which rep-
resentation is used more often (Günther).
Finally, Francis’s observation that structural representations
are not necessarily diachronically stable highlights how priming
can address diachronic changes in structural representation (Pick-
ering & Garrod 2017). Her example shows how priming could dis-
tinguish between competing theoretical proposals that
acceptability judgments have not been able to discriminate, in
the same way as priming has been used to examine historically
motivated accounts of lexical representation (Marslen-Wilson
et al. 1994). In principle, corpus-based studies of structural
priming (Gries 2005; Szmrecsanyi 2006) also could be used to
track diachronic changes in structural representations.
R8. Structural priming and language processing (in
monologue and dialogue)
A number of commentators discuss what priming may or may not
tell us about language processing. Our focus in this paper is strictly
on representation, so we consider processing only to the extent
that it is informative about representation (thus, we do not
address questions such as the timecourse of priming [Martin
et al.], or how priming may change people’s parsing preferences
[Ryskin & Brown-Schmidt]).
For example, Slevc & Ivanova point out that priming can
reflect not only people’s final parses, but also their intermediate
parses (e.g., Van Gompel et al. 2006). Therefore, we need to be
careful about whether any priming effect depends on a temporary
but abandoned representation rather than on the final representa-
tion. Investigations of abandoned analyses are, of course, also
informative about the process of language comprehension
(which analyses people consider, whether they hold on to aban-
doned analyses, and so on). Such issues, however, are not directly
relevant to linguistic representation.
Slevc & Ivanova also discuss how priming might interact with
other aspects of cognition, such as depth of processing and
working memory resources (see also Hartsuiker & Bernolet;
Martin et al.). These issues may be important to an understand-
ing of processing – for example, with respect to the relationship
between individual differences in priming and other aspects of
cognition. Differences in method (and associated processing
demands) also can affect priming magnitudes (e.g., Mahowald
et al. 2016b; Ziegler et al.), so care must be taken when compar-
ing studies. But if such factors are controlled within an experi-
ment, they do not undermine the informativeness of priming
for understanding linguistic representation, as Slevc & Ivanova
acknowledge.
We agree with Kootstra & Rossi that naturalistic studies of
priming are beneficial, but for current purposes (i.e., linguistic
representation), it does not matter whether any effects occur
under laboratory conditions or not. We are fascinated by the
priming of code-switching, but this programme of research is rel-
evant primarily to processing (i.e., language selection) – assuming,
of course that the code-switcher selects between two independent
representations of different languages. In sum, priming is versa-
tile, and its implications go well beyond linguistic representation
(see Pickering & Ferreira 2008).
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MacDonald & Weiss argue that priming may reflect a general
(nonlinguistic) tendency to repeat prior actions, as demonstrated
by parallel priming effects in motor actions and syntax (Allen
et al. 2010) and between domains such as music and language
(van der Cavey & Hartsuiker 2016) (see also Kempson & Gre-
goromichelaki). But if priming occurs between language and
non-language, it does not prevent researchers using priming to
discriminate linguistic theories; it is just that some representations
are shared with other domains. To take a more formal example,
Steedman (2002) presented an account of action based on princi-
ples (functional composition and type raising) that are used also in
Combinatorial Categorial Grammar (Steedman 2000). Extending
these principles to action in general does not invalidate his
account of linguistic representation; it just means that the same
principles are used in quite different domains.
R9. Alternative approaches to linguistic
representation
Alongside structural priming, some commentators suggest further
methods for studying linguistic representation. Ziegler et al.
argue that priming is not special. If any method appears to
relate to linguistic representation (e.g., multivoxel pattern analysis
relating to thematic roles), then they assume that it can be used to
constrain linguistic theory. This is reasonable in principle but, in
practice, is likely to always face the problem that any effect
could be due to the “parsing procedure P.” For example, it
might appear that the N400 in Event-related Potential (ERP)
research could be diagnostic of semantic anomaly and, hence,
semantic representation, whereas the P600 could be diagnostic
of syntactic anomaly and, hence, syntactic representation.
Whether an anomalous utterance in an ERP experiment pro-
duced a N400 or a P600 would then be informative about linguis-
tic representation (e.g., Osterhout & Mobley 1995 on anaphora).
It turned out, however, that some semantically anomalous utter-
ances produced a P600 (e.g., Kim & Osterhout 2005). This
finding means that these ERP components are not directly infor-
mative about linguistic representation. Rather than focus on one
method, researchers might be able to combine findings from
diverse methods and draw general conclusions about linguistic
representation. But there is little sign of this happening, presum-
ably because theoretical linguistics would ascribe any such find-
ings to “P.” Priming does not face this concern, in part because
there is no need for an indirect intervening theory, but also
because it has an established methodology that is largely consis-
tently applied across studies (a property that it shares with accept-
ability judgments, of course).
We agree with Rowland &Monaghan that multiple methods,
including corpus research and novel word studies, are desirable in
developmental research. Such methods, however, have important
limitations for studying representation. It is unclear whether novel
word studies, for example, are informative about underlying rep-
resentations or about processing. We cannot tell whether child-
ren’s reluctance to produce DO structures with novel verbs that
they have previously encountered in PO structures is because
they do not have an abstract (generalized) DO representation,
or because they find it difficult to produce unusual word orders.
In contrast, priming between DO sentences involving different
verbs supports an abstract DO representation underlying these
sentences (Rowland et al. 2012). As we note in R6, priming
studies can address how representations change (e.g., whether a
structure is lexically specific at time 1 but not at time 2).
With respect to nonexperimental methods, Gonzalez-
Marquez et al., Lester et al., and Rowland & Monaghan
emphasize the potential offered by corpus and distributional anal-
yses for both developmental and adult research (see also Rees &
Bott). These approaches offer valuable data about weak genera-
tive capacity and factors that may influence structural choices in
language use (e.g., Bresnan et al. 2007) (see also sect. R10).
Recent advances in statistical analysis help researchers to
exclude confounding variables. However, straightforward distri-
butional analyses are less informative than the substantial
corpus-based evidence of structural priming (see Gries & Kootstra
2017) – an approach that also may address some of the concerns
about statistical power highlighted in R2. Moreover, experimental
and corpus-based evidence for priming complement each other.
(Note that Kempson & Gregoromichelaki and De Ruiter &
De Ruiter query whether syntactic priming occurs in conversa-
tion on the basis of the negative results of Healey et al. [2014]).
But their conclusions contrast with many other demonstrations
of priming in conversation (e.g., Gries 2005; Gries 2011; Myslín
& Levy 2016; Reitter & Moore 2014; Szmrecsanyi 2006).
Hagoort, Martin et al., and Ziegler et al. propose that neu-
roimaging techniques can address many representational ques-
tions. As Hagoort notes, fMRI adaptation (based on variations
in the BOLD response dependent on previous experience) is a
form of priming and supports the segregation of semantic, syntac-
tic, and lexical processing in ways that are shared across compre-
hension and production (Menenti et al. 2011; Segaert et al. 2012).
But neuroimaging research not based on priming has so far been
less informative about representation.
Cai & Liu suggest that, although priming offers deeper insights
than intuition-based data into the microscopic aspect of linguistic
representation, it is less well suited to evaluating the macroscopic
characteristics of language systems and, specifically, the intercon-
nectivity of elements at each level. Complex network approaches
may offer an interesting way to study system-level representa-
tional similarities (e.g., between native and non-native speakers)
and changes in these systems (e.g., during L2 learning), in a way
that can complement the insights from structural priming into
the development of linguistic representations in particular popu-
lations (such as L2 learners), or in principle in individual speakers.
R10. Details of our theory
Our linguistic account assumes an architecture that distinguishes
distinct semantic, syntactic and phonological representations.
We agree with Hagoort that it is largely compatible with the
Memory Unification and Control model (Hagoort 2014;
Hagoort & Indefrey 2014), a neurobiological model of language
based on data from imaging studies that identifies discrete neuro-
nal network contributions for unifying semantic, syntactic, and
phonological information. However, various commentators
dispute specific aspects of our account.
Ziegler et al. are right that there is less structural priming evi-
dence relating to semantic structure than to syntactic structure.
This fact reflects the greater interest historically in the latter
than the former (e.g., Bock 1986). But it is not contentious that
structural priming of semantic structure occurs and that it is infor-
mative for theories of semantic representation (Maldonado
et al.; see also Bunger, Papafragou, and Trueswell 2013, for
priming of event structure, and Rees & Bott for extension to
pragmatic representation). Furthermore, studies converge in sup-
porting a lexically independent level of semantic representation
that includes quantificational information. We anticipate that
the growing interest in the use of structural priming to investigate
semantic representation will give rise to more detailed theoretical
proposals based on converging evidence from multiple studies, as
has occurred for syntactic representation.
Ambridge, González-Márquez et al., Günther, Lester
et al., and Ziegler et al. express some scepticism about a level
of syntactic representation that is independent of semantic and
lexical information. The finding that priming of syntactic structure
is not enhanced when thematic mappings or semantic features are
repeated (Bock & Loebell 1990; Huang et al. 2016; Messenger et
al. (2012b)) suggests that semantic information is not incorporated
into syntactic structure. It specifically fits badly with the construc-
tion-based approach advocated by Günther, who suggests that
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priming effects might hold between entire constructions (which
could be related but of different types), or just their syntactic
(i.e., form) or their semantic (i.e., meaning) components. The
straightforward interpretation of a construction grammar is that
it involves form-meaning pairings and that these pairings can be
primed. This is compatible with integrated syntax and semantics.
Günther suggests that priming can occur between the form or
the meaning side of a form-meaning pairing. But if so, this
means there is autonomy of syntax. Such autonomy can explain
priming between sentences with the same syntax but very different
meanings (e.g., from locatives to passives; Bock & Loebell 1990).
In our account, thematic relations and other semantic informa-
tion are represented separately from syntactic structure and are
mapped to syntactic representations (e.g., Chang et al. 2003;
Köhne et al. 2014; Cai et al. 2012). Not surprisingly, some map-
pings are preferred over others (e.g., Bresnan et al. 2007; Ferreira
1994; Kempen & Harbusch 2004). Such preferences, however, do
not imply that semantic (or indeed, lexical) content is part of the
syntactic representation. Moreover, acceptability judgments for
sentences reflect their likelihood of occurrence (Bresnan 2007),
so it is unsurprising that sentences involving preferred mappings
are rated as more acceptable than sentences involving less pre-
ferred mappings (Ambridge). In fact, Ambridge’s results suggest
that acceptability judgments are affected by semantic factors, a
point that reinforces our conclusion that acceptability judgments
do not straightforwardly reflect syntactic representation.
With respect to the relationship between lexical content and
syntactic structure, Ziegler et al. argue that function words can
be a locus of priming, based on Ferreira’s (2003) study. In fact,
Ferreira argued for an autonomous, lexically independent syntac-
tic component, consistent with our account: Participants did not
produce structures that included complementizer that following
primes that included complementizer that unless the primes
also involved the same syntactic structure. In other words, repeti-
tion of the function word alone did not determine choice of struc-
ture (see also Bock 1989).
Similarly, our claim that syntactic representations are indepen-
dent of closed class features is not undermined by Feldman &
Milin’s finding of differences in priming of single word production
(measured by response latencies) depending on themodality of the
prime (drawing vs. word), and differences in the specific verb form
that was produced. Any such effects do not appear to relate to
structural priming (as far as is known; Pickering & Branigan 1998).
Regarding open-class lexical content, priming evidence pro-
vides no support for redundant representations in which the
same utterance (or part of an utterance) is represented both as
a single lexicalized chunk and as the integration of several more
schematic constructions (Günther). If this were the case, we
might expect stronger priming from frequently encountered
phrases (which should be more likely to be redundantly repre-
sented), as there would be two potential sources of priming
(Rowland et al. 2012). Konopka and Bock (2009), however,
found that idiomatic expressions and nonidiomatic expressions
yielded equivalent priming.
Hartsuiker & Bernolet suggest that the lexical boost to
priming (which appears to be short lived) need not reflect a link
between syntactic representations and the lexicon but may
instead arise from an explicit memory of the prime that rapidly
decays, with the verb acting as a retrieval cue. Malhotra et al.
(2008) demonstrated (using a dynamical systems model) that
our assumption of a link between syntactic representations and
the lexicon is compatible with a short-lived lexical boost. The lon-
gevity of the lexical boost, therefore, does not discriminate
between our account and alternative accounts. Furthermore, it
does not matter whether explicit memory processes are involved
in priming: Any such memories must still make reference to
abstract structure (e.g., that the verb give appeared with an NP
and an NP) to be able to explain priming between nonidentical
sentences (Branigan & McLean 2016). Note also that these mem-
ories cannot be based on specific wordforms (because the lexical
boost is unaffected by repetition of specific features such as
tense, aspect and number; Pickering & Branigan 1998).
Other commentators discuss alternative ways of conceptualiz-
ing an abstract level of syntactic representation.Hudson supports
our overall approach but suggests that priming evidence suggests
that we should abandon the standard assumption that constituent-
structure is basic, and with dependencies (e.g., subject-verb
agreement) being defined with respect to constituent-structure.
Instead, he treats dependency as basic and constituency as deriv-
ative at best. It seems most straightforward to us to define priming
(e.g., of Prepositional Object vs. Double Object) in constituent-
structure terms (e.g., priming VP → V NP PP rather than V →
V NP NP), but it presumably would be possible to define it also
in terms of dependencies, for instance from V to N (i.e., the
head noun of the NP) and V to P (i.e., the head preposition of
the PP) rather than dependencies from V to N and V to N. Of
course, priming of subject-verb agreement itself (Haskell et al.
2010) fits particularly well with a dependency-based analysis. An
analysis of priming in terms of a dependency-based grammar
such as Word Grammar (Hudson 2010) would be very interesting.
Kempson & Gregoromichelaki propose that our data do not
need to be interpreted in terms of hierarchical representations
such as those derived from context-free constraints (or similar),
and interpret it in terms of sequential patterns of processing
actions (see also O’Grady). If those patterns discriminate
between linguistic structures that prime differently (e.g., the
sequential pattern for POs differs from the pattern for DOs),
then their approach may be able to capture priming data, and
an analysis in terms of dynamic syntax also would be very interest-
ing (Cann et al. 2005).
Adger and Koring & Reuland (see also Gaston et al.) chal-
lenge our use of priming between unergatives and unaccusatives
to propose that they have similar syntactic representations. In con-
trast, their favored accounts assume that unaccusatives have a very
different structure from unergatives – a difference that would
almost certainly preclude priming, given the sensitivity of
priming to comparable syntactic differences (e.g., priming does
not occur between constructions with different numbers of argu-
ments). Koring & Reuland simply assume an analysis involving
NP-movement, but we query the assumptions that underlie anal-
yses such as theirs. We do not dispute syntactic distinctions
between types of subjects (though at least some relevant distinc-
tions between unergatives versus unaccusatives may be semantic
rather than syntactic; e.g., Zaenen 1988), but argue that these dis-
tinctions do not require different constituent-structure represen-
tations. Similarly, Adger assumes that a distinction between Lily
froze solid and ∗Lily danced tired means that Lily froze and Lily
danced must have different constituent structures. Instead, it
shows that danced and froze have syntactic properties that allow
them both to combine with just a subject but which have different
effects on combination with a subject and another constituent. We
cannot conclude that Lily froze and Lily danced have different
constituent structures. Approaches such as those of Koring &
Reuland and Adger would lead to extremely complex constituent
structures and are challenged by theories assuming flat structures
(e.g., Culicover & Jackendoff 2005; Pollard & Sag 1994).
Our concern with many other experimental methods is that
their results can be due to processing (i.e., processing theory
“P” in Chomsky 1981). Therefore, we did not review all results
(indeed, we did not have the space to do so). As an example,
Bever and Sanz’s (1997) finding of faster responses to a probe
word associated with a subject noun that preceded an unaccusa-
tive compared to an unergative verb could be due to semantic dif-
ferences between unaccusatives and unergatives (rather than
reactivating an antecedent at an NP-trace) (see also Agnew
et al. 2014). Both Koring & Reuland and Adger point to
many experimental studies that contrast unaccusative and unerga-
tive sentences, but none of them demonstrate that the distinctions
are due to constituent structure differences. Many experimental
methods such as studies using reactivation or visual world
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paradigms provide results relating to interpretation; there may be
an underlying syntactic cause of the effects or there may not, but
we typically cannot tell. In contrast, priming is informative about
syntactic representation.
We also note that our description of “mainstream generative
grammar” (Koring & Reuland) is our best attempt to capture
the key issues of a family of views and to ignore factional distinc-
tions. It is not helpful to argue that we are using concepts that are
obsolete within the authors’ favored branch of linguistic theory.
We are simply trying to describe a complex state of affairs and
identify the core issues that we wish to dispute.
Kwon & Lee argue that priming evidence provides only limited
benefit compared with acceptability judgments. But criticising a
new method on the grounds that it has not discovered as much as
an old method would simply lead to stagnation. Their specific
point about distinguishing linear and hierarchical relations is more
insightful. We believe that priming data support a single level of
structure that is specified for linear and hierarchical relations
together, rather than one in which hierarchical structure is indepen-
dently represented. For example, Bernolet et al. (2007) found
priming between German and Dutch noun phrases that both
have adjective-verb order (the X that red is) but not between
English and Dutch, presumably because English has verb-adjective
order. In other words, the priming is not localized at an unordered
hierarchical level (relative clause, unspecified for order) and, there-
fore, we propose that such an unordered level does not exist. In
response to Hartsuiker & Bernolet, the absence of priming for
PO structures following shifted PO prime sentences is compatible
with an account in which there is no priming of independent hier-
archical relations, and thematic-function and thematic-order
priming effects counteract each other (Cai et al. 2012).
Of course, we do not assume that syntax can be reduced to simple
sequential structure (see alsoGaston et al.). Otherwise, we would
not assume constituent-structure representations such as those in
Figure 1. Priming also cannot be reduced to linear order. For
example, it occurs when the internal structure of prime and
target constituents are different (e.g., complex vs. simple noun
phrases in dative priming; see Fox Tree & Meijer 1999; Pickering
&Branigan 1998), or when the critical alternation occurs at a differ-
ent location in the prime and target – for example, datives in main
versus subordinate clauses (Branigan et al. 2006) or noun phrases
sentence-initially versus -finally (Melinger & Cleland 2011).
Hartsuiker & Bernolet and Francis question how we inter-
pret the representation of coerced sentences. Hartsuiker & Berno-
let argue that the control (event) sentences could be given a
coerced reading (i.e., both sentences could have a missing predi-
cate represented). But the picture presented with the prime sen-
tence forced it to have an event reading. Additionally, although
coerced and control sentences did not differentially prime the pro-
duction of full VP targets (relative to VP-primes such as began
drinking the champagne), they did differentially prime the produc-
tion of coerced targets, with coerced primes inducing more
coerced targets than control primes. This finding further suggests
that participants did not postulate a predicate for control primes.
Francis proposes that the data of Raffray et al. (2014) might be
due entirely to syntactic priming and so might indicate that the
three sentence types (began the speech, began the champagne,
began drinking the champagne) all have different syntactic struc-
tures. The problem with this explanation is that a purely syntactic
account might argue that began the champagne had a covert V
(corresponding to drinking) but began the speech could not have
a covert V – and if this is the case, began the champagne should
behave more similarly than began the speech to began drinking
the champagne, contrary to the findings of Raffray et al..
R11. Further directions
We argue in the target article that structural priming can be used
to address outstanding linguistic controversies, and highlight some
specific examples (sect. 3.1). Commentators identify interesting
further cases that exemplify the potential of this method.
Francis discusses how priming might be used to clarify the syn-
tactic representation of quantificational NPs and specifically
whether they have the same representation as collective NPs.
Assuming that an appropriate experiment can be designed (e.g.,
an alternative form for a lot of papers), then any finding that A
bundle of sticks primes A lot of papers would suggest that quanti-
ficational NPs and collective NPs involve the same syntactic rep-
resentation, in which the first noun acts as the head. We suspect
that such priming would occur, because priming appears to be
sensitive to categorical distinctions rather than featural distinc-
tions (e.g., tense or number; Pickering & Branigan 1998).
O’Grady highlights how priming could be used to test specific
representational questions across typologically diverse languages.
As we note in section 3.2, such studies can address fundamental
questions about the diversity of linguistic representations and
potential language universals. With respect to subject-verb
sequences, it may well be possible to prime neither is versus are
(for example) and demonstrate that such priming constitutes
priming of subject-verb agreement, rather than simply priming
of the verb form (see Haskell et al. 2010). Any such priming
could be due to semantic rather than syntactic relations, as both
types of dependency affect choice of verb form (cf. Bock et al.
1999). And even if the effects are syntactic, they could relate to
a unit consisting of the whole sentence rather than one consisting
of the subject and verb. For example, the locus of priming for
neither are satisfactory could be NP+ pl V + pl AP rather than
NP+ pl V + pl. We also suggest that priming different interpreta-
tions of Everyone didn’t finish the project takes place at the
semantic rather than syntactic level.
Rees & Bott point to Bott and Chemla’s (2016) finding that
scalar implicatures can be primed (see also Maldonado et al.).
We see this as a fascinating example of how priming can be
extended to further linguistic domains, specifically diverse
aspects of structure relating to interpretation. Priming of prag-
matic representations is, of course, compatible with it being sen-
sitive to all levels of linguistic representation.
Cai & Liu and Kootstra & Rossi suggest ways in which struc-
tural priming can be used to investigate bilingual representation.
In particular, Kootstra & Rossi note that priming can be used to
study first language attrition. We agree: It could be used to deter-
mine whether an L1 had become completely inaccessible or not.
Of course, it would be possible for a language to be temporarily
inaccessible but to become accessible again later in life, and it
might be possible to use priming to render an inaccessible lan-
guage accessible again.
Finally, we supportHagoort’s suggestion that fMRI adaptation
offers promising directions for future research that may allow us
to identify more precisely the type of priming that occurs, as dif-
ferent linguistic representations lead to adaptation in different
brain areas. This approach may be particularly appropriate for
studying structures that do not involve alternations. It is also
likely to yield important findings about the neural basis of linguis-
tic representation. It shows one way in which our proposals about
the use of priming to understand linguistic representation may be
extended and therefore underlines their value in the development
of the cognitive sciences of language.
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